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This study explores the role of municipal governance in municipal-level 
stabilization of inner suburbs in St. Louis County, Missouri. The data, from 1970 to 2015, 
include a robust collection of official government archives collected from five 
municipalities in St. Louis County, historical documents, city-state-national statistical data, 
and related materials. Interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted and data were 
analyzed based on the community power structure framework. 
I outline five mature St. Louis inner suburbs’ evolution in municipal-level 
conditions from 1970 to 2015, and I detail the role each suburbs’ municipal governance 
played in the evolution of municipal-level conditions. I conclude, the role of municipal 
governance in municipal-level stabilization is to affect impacts of housing discrimination, 
neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress through policy, administrative action, programs, and 
practices. I find two distinct philosophies of municipal governance: open housing and 
exclusion. I conclude the role of exclusion is more significant in municipal-level decline 
than open housing is in municipal-level stabilization. 
Much of what has been written about neighborhood stabilization espouses a 
common theme of preemptive action to prevent decline. For many mature inner suburbs, 
preemption is no longer an option as decline has long been realized. I offer 
recommendations for future research and projects designed to produce economic, 
structural, and civically vibrant neighborhoods by equipping officials and community 
stakeholders with refined strategic planning tools to leverage existing resources, build 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
On August 9, 2014, the fatal police shooting of unarmed Michael Brown, Jr. 
focused the world’s attention on Ferguson, Missouri, a mature inner suburb of St. Louis. 
Scholars argue Ferguson represented a microcosm of area cities that exhibit extreme levels 
of segregation and concentrated poverty. Some attest the events of Ferguson could have 
occurred in any number of other St. Louis municipalities as they lack the capacity to 
address destabilizing activities, experience fiscal collapse, and revert to taxation by citation 
measures to remedy financial strain. 
My examination of five St. Louis inner suburbs reveals Ferguson possessed unique 
municipal governance characteristics which created an exceptionally volatile environment. 
I observed successful municipal-level stabilization through proactive planning, policy 
adoption, and consistent tools refinement in University City and Hazelwood. In Jennings, 
I found proactive action and open housing were ineffective absent adequate administrative 
management. Maplewood exhibited nonracial associated municipal-level destabilization, 
leveraged many of the same tools utilized in the north county cases, and experienced a 
renaissance.       
Municipal-level stabilization and decline denote conditions ranging from 
economically and racially stable to fiscally stressed and racially homogenous. Conditions 
are influenced by a combination of institutional, spatial, structural, and socioeconomic 
factors working in relation. Municipal-level stabilization is rooted in a city’s capacity to 
stabilize its neighborhoods. 
 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 made housing discrimination illegal, and blacks 




demographics and fiscal health in the post-fair housing 1970s to 1990s posed new questions 
and introduced new neighborhood destabilizing activities to inner suburbs. Black in-
migration, white flight, and loss of tax base were big city problems up to that point. 
University City, MO experienced these phenomena in the 1960s and had some success 
stabilizing neighborhoods by employing several antidiscrimination policies and supporting 
citizens’ efforts.  
Open housing, minimum housing codes, and residential services were pioneering 
approaches, and the municipality was lauded for adopting the tools. Other St. Louis inner 
suburbs followed suit demonstrating timely use of measures and instituting policies prior 
to any noteworthy change in neighborhoods’ racial composition. Some municipalities went 
so far as to expand and redefine their city’s objectives and philosophies, modify planning 
and zoning patterns, and form new community and human relations committees in 
anticipation of change.  
 Inner suburbs who rejected or delayed the use of neighborhood stabilization tools 
were no longer able to levy some of the more familiar neighborhood preservation methods. 
Some officials opted to expand and reinforce exclusionary policies such as zoning for 
large-lot single-family homes, and existing residents levied various deterrence methods to 
prevent the entry of blacks into certain areas of the community. As deterrence measures 
gave way to supply and demand, blockbusting, and racial steering, the influx of blacks into 
these areas soon rivaled and in some suburbs exceeded numbers in open housing 
municipalities.  
A notable influx of blacks, whether in an open housing or exclusion suburb, resulted 




HUD foreclosures, vacant homes and lots, low-cost rentals, and subsidized housing. Some 
municipalities were able to combat these trends and stabilize. Others resegregated, 
experienced severe fiscal stress, and struggled to provide basic city services to residents. 
Whether through an array of evolutions, varying levels of professionalism, or policy 
precedence, changing neighborhoods revealed municipal governments’ unique foresight, 
lack of capacity, or abundance of disdain.  
Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to illuminate contributing factors impacting municipal-
level conditions which are unique to municipal governance to better understand municipal 
governance effects on racial composition and economic conditions in mature inner suburbs. 
I plan to utilize my findings to develop and disseminate tools designed to strengthen 
neighborhood revitalization and stabilization efforts by utilizing refined strategic planning 
tools to leverage existing resources, build capacity, and pursue objectives in more effective 
and sustainable ways. 
This dissertation seeks to answer a central question: What is the role of municipal 
governance in stabilizing inner suburbs? To answer this question, I must answer two 
refining questions: What are the contributing factors influencing inner suburbs’ success 
and failure in achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization? And what factors 
outside of municipal governance authority impact municipal-level stabilization? These 
questions are answered through a qualitative examination of policy decisions, 






Significance of the Study 
By 1970, fair housing laws prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental, and 
financing of housing based on race. Laws invalidated explicit discrimination, but less overt 
discriminatory practices like racial residential steering, redline mortgage lending, and 
blockbusting persisted. Policy changes were followed by racial integration in some inner 
suburbs. While some municipalities boasted notable levels of black-white populations, 
others transitioned to nearly all black. There is robust literature detailing black 
suburbanization, housing, economics, and the racial implications associated with the era.1 
During the black suburbanization period, many inner suburbs’ government faced 
similar challenges that had plagued central cities for decades. Neighboring suburbs and 
more secluded exurban locales poached residents and commercial businesses. Housing 
crises and declining revenues increased costs for delivering services to citizens. Schools 
resegregated and began to struggle. As poverty and isolation increased, so did crime. 
Federal programs funded large initiatives, cities adopted creative taxing and financing 
methods to fund developments, and municipalities revised policies and zoning ordinances 
in attempts to remain competitive. 
As blacks resettled, residential patterns exhibited in big cities emerged in inner 
suburbs. Blacks were steered to the least desirable neighborhoods regardless of economic 
means. This led to residential resegregation. Government action reinforced private 
discrimination as subsidized housing and mortgage loan programs targeted these 
neighborhoods. The disproportionate placement of the poor and discriminatory mortgage 
lending, many ending in foreclosures, concentrated poverty in these neighborhoods. 
 
1 See, Leven et al. 1976; Downs 1981; Galster 1990; 1991; Schneider and Phelan 1993; Sugrue 1996; Massey 




Neighborhoods began to experience significant decline as they were isolated from 
economic opportunities and challenges compounded over time.2 
Some municipalities experienced success in dealing with these issues while others 
did not. Characteristics of successful stabilization efforts include proactive policy action, 
community involvement, high level of membership and participation, progressive and 
inclusive beliefs and attitudes, and financial support. Factors that played a significant role 
in failed efforts include lack of capacity, delayed initiatives as demonstrated by slow 
response to rapid racial changes, and advanced level of municipal decline exhibited in 
deteriorated buildings. By the time attempts to stabilize were made, efforts were rendered 
useless as the damage of housing discrimination, public housing concentration, and school 
segregation had already occurred. 
Political, institutional, and organizational structures were important contributing 
factors to determining municipal governments’ timing, type, and level of action and 
involvement. These structures, working in relation with size, resource richness, and fiscal 
policies, guided decision making along well-defined philosophical views. These elements 
determined policy patterns, administrative prowess, and financial management practices. 
Consequentially, stabilization and decline were largely dependent upon these interrelated 
dynamics as they determined suburbs’ capacity and willingness to respond to threats and 
opportunities.  
Adoption of open housing policies and supportive measures did not necessarily 
result in effective stabilization. Fiscal incapacity could render an otherwise effective 
municipal-level stabilization agenda ineffective. According to scholar Rebecca Hendrick 
 




(2011), fiscal capacity, both internal and external, is one of the most important factors 
affecting municipal governance. Internal fiscal capacity consists of fiscal structure, prior 
policy decisions, revenues, revenue wealth (level of revenue a government can generate), 
and spending needs and obligations.3    
External fiscal capacity includes state-level institutional rules that limit or enhance 
access to different revenue sources, and the level of financial aid received from state 
government. While Hendrick’s 2011 study focused on Chicago municipalities, the 
researcher stresses the importance of examining cities’ municipal governments and the 
state in which cities are located. Hendrick goes on to layout a model for measuring a city’s 
fiscal capacity as conditions resulting from the governing body’s financial decision-making 
patterns. As such, fiscal capacity is viewed as problem solving in the context of strategic 
management.4  
Fiscal capacity impacts municipalities’ professional standards, policies, practices, 
and their ability to manage fiscal stress. Officials’ and administrators’ professionalism and 
specializations are primary factors affecting how cities solve financial problems, avert risk, 
and approach entrepreneurialism. It is important to understand that good fiscal capacity 
(defined generally as high revenue wealth and low spending needs) does not always protect 
local governments from crisis and poor financial conditions. Conversely, low fiscal 
capacity does not necessarily result from a crisis.5   
 
3 See Hendrick 2011. Note: I apply Hendrick’s theory that financial conditions are a culmination of financial 
policies and practices. The researcher outlines specific areas in which to develop measurements for 
establishing fiscal strength of municipalities which helps to explain municipal officials’ response to events. 
Since level of professionalism affects these elements, I examine not only the financial decisions of municipal 
governance in the context of institutional structure and socioeconomic philosophy, but I take care to 






The effects of capacity, governance, and other micro level factors on municipal 
financial decisions are determined by how governments with different features respond to 
threats and opportunities, especially ones with financial impact. Consider St. Louis 
County’s decisions in shaping patterns of residential land use. Zoning authority rested in 
the hands of individual municipal governments and the county. With no mechanism in 
place to incentivize local officials to consider regional economic development and 
infrastructure needs, land use decisions focused on maximizing local tax revenues. As a 
result, large-lot single-family enclaves formed.6 
Eventually, the lack of attention to larger metropolitan-level deficiencies garnered 
increased stress for local governments. Municipalities were forced to compete for new 
developments. Aggressive tactics were employed to attract new commercial developments 
and increase economic activity. This often resulted in one suburb luring a business away 
from a neighboring suburb. Similar processes occurred when suburbs developed further 
west. These fresher, more exclusively zoned exurbs began poaching residents and 
resources from the older municipalities. Eventually, the conditions that made local 
revenues so scarce and local services so expensive in the metro city spilled over into the 
suburbs.7 
Specific reasons for past crises vary tremendously, but there was one obvious 
similarity. Most mature inner suburbs struggled with economic deficits which made it 
difficult to cover spending demands. Their local economies did not provide sufficient 
wealth for them to draw enough revenues to maintain high-level quality services to citizens 
 
6 For an exhaustive examination of how governments brought on their own problems through exclusionary 






and property owners. Inner suburbs’ situations became progressively worse as 
economically stable taxpayers continued exiting, residents were becoming increasingly 
poorer, and destabilizing neighborhoods required even more city spending and resources 
to service. 
Conditions increased the tax burden on remaining taxpayers to fund basic city 
services. Well-run, professionally staffed municipal governments were not immune to 
these phenomena. Fiscal stress also severely compromised their ability to provide quality 
services. Some governments were not fiscally sustainable in the long run, while others had 
significant challenges managing their short-term financial situation. Cash shortages, which 
were less likely to be publicized, contributed to numerous inner suburbs’ descent into 
financial crisis.8 
While this is a familiar story, often referred to as neighborhood decline in older 
central cities and suburban decline in older inner-ring suburbs, municipal-level 
stabilization has not been fully explored. Suburban decline theory posits the patterns of 
racial resegregation, isolation, and inequities observed in inner suburbs are a reproduction 
of those previously observed in metrocentric cities. Scholars point out metro centers 
usually possess enough assets to fend off threats of municipal-level destabilization and 
decline, while smaller, less asset rich inner suburbs are more vulnerable to decline as a 
result of destabilizing activities.9  
 
8 For good insight into fiscal stress causing decisions and impacts of fiscal stress on municipal governances’ 
ability to deliver services see, Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck 2000; Delisle 2010; and Hendrick 2011. 
9 Resegregation in neighborhoods traditionally attributed to “tipping.” For more about tipping models, see 
Schelling 1969; 1971; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; 2008. See also, Orfield and Luce 2013. See Lake 





As more is learned about suburban decline, however, important discoveries emerge 
which challenge the notion that suburban decline was an inevitable phenomenon for ill-
prepared, ill-equipped, fiscally strapped inner suburbs experiencing significant black in-
migration. I agree with the position that policy and program defenses against housing 
discrimination, neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress improved suburbs’ stabilization 
forces. However, stabilization depended a great deal on factors outside of local 
governments’ authority. 
Municipal governance which asserts concerted efforts to avoid, deter, and isolate 
are much more effective at destabilizing neighborhoods independent of support. 
Resegregation in and of itself does not cause suburban decline. There are middle-class 
black suburbs with median family incomes greater than the national average. Furthermore, 
areas of concentrated poor people are not inevitably doomed to resegregate, descend into 
crime and mayhem, or require aggressive policing to manage.10 
There are scores of poorer areas that are integrated, racially stable places that have 
managed to remain stable for significant periods of time. Although policing tends to be 
heavier handed in these areas when compared to whiter, higher-income areas, police-
community relations are usually better, and tensions are not as high as observed in 
Ferguson. It follows that racial tipping, concentrated areas of poor people, and fiscal stress 
fail to sufficiently account for suburban decline. My examination exposes this critical 
shortcoming by demonstrating, principally, that just as municipal-level stabilization takes 
work to achieve, sometimes decline does as well.11 
 
10 For more about the varying income levels seen in municipalities with high numbers of black residents, 
see Johnson 2002; and Logan 2014.   





The community power structure framework serves as the research paradigm for this 
dissertation. Power is simply the capacity to bring about change, and a study of the role of 
municipal governance requires an understanding that policy decisions and subsequent 
outcomes do not necessarily have a causal relationship. There are multiple factors at play 
when considering municipal conditions and the role municipal governance occupies in 
prevention, management, and exacerbation of conditions. Nevertheless, research has 
demonstrated that policy decisions impact communities in various ways. Community 
power structure provides a framework in which to analyze key policy choices, identify who 
influenced and made those choices, and what those choices mean for the community.12 
Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation consists of eight chapters. You have reached the end of chapter 
one where I provide an overview of the research and outline my rationale for conducting 
this study. Chapter two is background of the literature on neighborhood stabilization, racial 
integration maintenance, and suburban decline. Chapter three is the methods and data used 
in the research. Chapter four begins the findings sections of the dissertation with municipal 
governance in St. Louis County. Chapters five, six, and seven present findings in housing 
policy, land use policy, and fiscal policy, respectively. Chapter 8 is conclusions where I 




12 My examination and analysis leverage critiques of political power, community power structures, and 
spatial inequalities. See Neumann 1950; Hunter 1969; Kraus 2000; Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001; 




Chapter 2. Background 
This chapter is a summation of literature and principal theories regarding 
neighborhood stabilization, racial integration maintenance, and suburban decline in mature 
inner suburbs. Through this literature review, I layout contextual information relevant to 
my examination of inner suburbs’ municipal governance to better understand what is 
known, what gaps exist, identify why it is important to address these gaps, develop my 
research questions, and construct a plan for answering my research questions. 
Contextual Factors 
According to the literature, there are mature inner-ring suburbs that achieved 
stabilization and remain stable. Multiple studies have identified the contributing factors to 
achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization. Research points to various 
strategies including early implementation of antidiscrimination housing policies, racial 
integration maintenance programs, civilian boards, and police-community relations 
programs as effective stabilization tools. Reports detail efforts of inner-ring suburbs that 
defy odds by demonstrating racial balance, mixed housing stock, and diverse commercial 
businesses and industry.13 
Scholars highlight a specific set of factors that need to be present for stabilization 
to be sustained over a significant period of time: 1. Human capital (talented, inclusive, 
committed); 2. Preemptive action (efforts begin prior to tipping occurring); 3. 
Environmental capital (mixed housing stock, institutional involvement, regional efforts); 
4. Political support and influence; and 5. Adequate funding. As much as these elements 
 
13 Saltman 1990; Kirwin 1999; and Pitkin 2001 presents a helpful synthesis of neighborhood change theories 
which outlines the three major schools of theoretical understandings of neighborhood change– ecological, 




need to be present for successful stabilization, according to the literature, there are factors 
that are outside of the authority of municipal governance that are just as important to 
stabilization.14 
Of the factors impacting stabilization, over which municipal governance enjoys no 
authority, the most notable are: 1. Sprawl and regional development, 2. Architectural and 
locational features, and 3. Residential choice. Findings also suggest various factors 
determining inner suburbs’ preexisting conditions such as jurisdictional boundaries, 
political polarization, and school district battles play a significant role in municipal-level 
stabilization. These factors present challenges for municipal governance as they can have 
significant impact on conditions, yet local governance often has little say in the matter.15 
Suburban Sprawl and Neighborhood Designs 
In weakening housing demand through inflated housing production, sprawl and 
poor community design receive blame from some scholars for the decline of older inner-
ring suburban municipalities. Researchers use examples of failed expansions into 
undeveloped terrains to demonstrate their points. Anti-sprawl proponents contend that 
newly developed exurbs attract middle-class residents away from the inner and middle 
rings leaving poorer suburban residents behind. They contend, developing outlying areas 
are usually unjustified as population stagnation does not call for additional housing, and 
developments are usually for whites attempting to locate further away from communities 
in transition.16 
 
14 Ahlbrandt & Cunningham 1978; Orfield 1981; Lee 1985; Keating, Pammer and Smith 1988; Saltman 1990; 
Nyden, Maly and Lukehart 1997; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Kirwin 1999; and Cashin 2004. 
15 Berkovec et al. 1996; Gordon 2008; Rothstein 2014; Bruegmann 2005. 




Some researchers focus on periods of housing shortage crises that spur policy 
decisions which result in adverse outcomes; actions which result in relocating poor blacks 
from concentrated poverty in central cities to inner-ring poverty concentrations. Since 
some zoning patterns in inner suburbs resembled metro city zoning which contained more 
mixed use, more multifamily districts, and smaller single-family lot sizes, this process 
repeated itself time and time again in some areas. Therefore, the patterns of residential 
segregation and economic decline could not be attributed entirely to sprawl.17 
Architectural and Locational 
Architectural and locational features can make a home or neighborhood obsolete. 
Age of a neighborhood’s housing stock and the neighborhood’s location in relation to the 
metrocentric city’s commercial corridor may threaten the viability of any neighborhood 
because it affects decisions to invest in property as well as decisions to move. Studies have 
demonstrated that a neighborhood’s proximity to other neighborhoods also matter.18 
Municipal decisions can influence the architectural identity of a neighborhood. 
However, a municipality’s location cannot be changed. While it is true that some 
neighborhoods, as they age and face competition from outlying areas do seem to sink in 
socioeconomic status, this is by no means inevitable. As Bruegmann (2005) points out, 
even a cursory glance at the location of many of the most affluent suburbs will confirm that 
many of these communities today are the same ones that held this distinction in the 1920s 
or even the 1880s.19 
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When comparing the differences in municipalities’ success in stabilizing their 
respective communities, scholars often point to the differences in their housing stocks. 
Housing in some areas include many row homes, and the density of populations are 
considerably greater than in areas’ zoned for large lot housing. Housing stock proves to be 
a significant impactor of a community’s ability to stabilize. However, this does not 
necessarily determine the success or failure of efforts. Many factors contribute to 
conditions, and one must be wary of focusing inordinately on just one.20 
Residential Choice 
Some studies have attributed residential choice to influencing municipal-level 
conditions and point to limitations of municipal governance’s control in such cases. 
According to Keating and Smith (1996), residential choice is most influenced by 
socioeconomic factors such as race, ethnicity, income, and age. As new inhabitants enter 
the city seeking employment, the inner zone pushes into the next outer ring. This process 
is referred to as invasion. Invasion continues until, eventually, the new inhabitants take 
over the physical space of that zone. It is at this point that succession is achieved. This 
process is presumed to be ongoing as long as migration and economic growth continue and 
areas for different income groups are designated.21 
In compliment to the income argument, status seeking based on socioeconomic 
hierarchies has also been put forward. This theory suggests that people atop the income 
and social order elect to reside in areas comprised of people with similar status. In other 
words, high-income families prefer to live among other high-income families. Some 
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scholars challenge these findings, arguing socioeconomic differences account for only a 
small percentage of black-white segregation.22  
Tests show income, occupation, or education level as weak predictors of racial 
segregation. Some analysts argue that racial residential segregation is most attributable to 
white families preferring to reside in neighborhoods where the presence of black residents 
is low. From an institutional standpoint, residential choice theory presents additional 
challenges for municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization efforts and must be 
considered when strategic planning.23 
Institutional Factors 
Some stable areas were challenged by declining surrounding areas, and the 
outmigration of middle-class blacks to the suburbs had negative effects on the economic 
conditions of the inner-city poor left behind. Regardless of the neighborhood capital and 
integration groups’ efforts, as the literature indicates, these areas may be in serious trouble. 
Conditions in an area are affected by municipal governance activities such as zoning, code 
enforcement, rent control, property assessment, lending practices, policing, and school 
partnership strategies which shape housing-market operation and can precipitate negative 
as well as positive neighborhood change. It is important to remember that these institutional 
factors, like the factors outside the authority of municipal governance, are neither natural 
nor inevitable.24 
 
22 Grodzins 1957; Farley et al. 1978; Goering 1978; Lake 1981; Schuman et al. 1997; Cutler, Glaeser and 
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Thus, there are decisions and non-decisions creating institutional elements that 
influence municipal-level conditions. Identifying and examining how municipal 
governance interacts with and influences socioeconomic and physical conditions in a 
municipality is crucial to better understanding the role municipal governance plays in 
stabilization and decline and what associated factors precipitate success and failure in 
stabilizing municipalities.25   
Constraints 
Economic, political, and legal constraints limit what decision-makers may do in 
efforts to achieve success. Examinations of urban politics conclude that because of the 
many constraints on municipal governments, political influence on policies is minimal. 
Despite influencing elements that are outside of municipal authority and constraints that 
may hinder efforts, literature asserts that municipal governance can affect municipal-level 
stability. While the federal and state policies and the timing of integration maintenance 
efforts attribute to local success and failure in stabilizing a municipality, other internal and 
environmental attributes may be more important determinants.26 
Research has illuminated key factors for integration maintenance initiatives to be 
effective and uncovers serious threats to prospects. Considering that two of the most 
successful examples in the literature are government supported initiatives, budget cuts 
threaten similar efforts in the future. Literature highlights that most successful and 
sustaining stabilization efforts result from the interventionist approach. The interventionist 
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view suggests that to achieve true racial integration, which means mixed and stable, 
proactive coalition building, mobilization, and adequate resource dedication is required.27 
Voter Preferences 
Municipal-level data of citizens’ policy preferences are scarce. Consequently, it is 
difficult for researchers to study how responsive municipal lawmakers are to constituents’ 
desires. Some researchers have overcome this problem. Utilizing advanced techniques of 
measurement, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) determine mean policy conservatism in 
cities with 20,000 or more residents by leveraging opinion estimation. Findings contradict 
the theory that posits institutional change is required to improve municipal governance’s 
responsiveness to citizens. They found that on a wide range of policy issues, local 
policymakers enact laws that are consistent with the national policy preferences of their 
voters.28 
Further, the study shows that local government’s response to voter preferences are 
minimally impacted by differences in institutional structures and episodic phenomena. 
These findings serve as helpful insight in examining different municipal governments with 
varying governmental structures. In demonstrating there is local official reverence for 
voters’ policy demands, such studies provide additional context for examining the effects 
of outside forces influencing decision making in municipal governance. They also 
highlight the importance of considering resident interaction and response to the interaction 
in determining municipal governance success and failure.29 
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Many blacks looking to trade in deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods for 
suburban oases found that what they gained was access primarily to suburbs adjacent to 
central cities. In this process, whites fled the older deteriorating inner-ring and were 
replaced by black inhabitants. Referencing this phenomenon, Galster (1991) argues:  
"The average black household, though now residing farther from the central city 
than before, remains as close to it as ever relative to the average white household.” 
 
And "Suburban residence per se is not equivalent to desegregation or relief from 
the burdens of ghetto residence."30 
 
This observation is confirmed by studies that link the racial distribution of suburban 
blacks to the characteristics of the suburbs where they reside. Black suburban residents are 
typically segregated from their white counterparts in suburbs located just outside the edge 
of the metro city. These inner suburbs lack economic viability, are poorly managed and 
serviced by local government, and levy exorbitant taxes. The ecologist approach observes 
this process of whites being likely to relocate to outer-ring and exurban areas as being 
consistent with the "invasion-succession" theory.31 
However, by applying the political economy framework it becomes apparent that 
other forces such as discrimination in the housing market are involved in the process. 
Studies have shown continued violations of Fair Housing laws and lack of enforcement. 
Designing policies and programs that better empower, strengthen, and support suburban 
municipalities and their citizens is extremely important work and requires valid research 
 
30 Galster 1991; Schneider and Logan 1982; Bobo 2001; Orfield and Lee 2007; Wilson 2012; Orfield and Luce 
2013.  
31 See Keating and Smith 1996. Also, scholars track the process of black populations following whites to the 
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goals. Despite significant policy advancements, the damaging impact of segregation 
remains.32  
De jure Segregation 
As Rothstein (2014) asserts, “We must not allow our distain for de facto segregation 
to blind us into ignoring that it does not account for the segregation we currently observe.” 
Rothstein highlights the importance of not making this mistake as it prevents us from 
recognizing windows of opportunities that lead, not just to more integrated communities, 
but to more stably integrated ones. We must seek newer, more innovative methods, begin 
to think more regionally, and expand revitalization efforts beyond just the metrocentric city 
as this model allows continued neglect of inner suburbs.33 
Through landmark Supreme Court decisions from Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 to 
Missouri v. Jenkins in 1995, the federal government of the United States sanctioned racial 
segregation. Promulgating doctrine such as “separate but equal” and “local control,” the 
Court has repeatedly issued rulings that serve to reinforce segregation, undermine 
desegregation efforts, and dismantle or weaken earlier desegregation rulings. Despite 
Supreme Court decisions that serve to make racial integration less of a federal priority and 
local governments’ minimal support of integration efforts, integration does occur.34 
It is important to understand racial integration policies as they relate to effects and 
efforts at the local level. While federal-level decisions have significant implications 
associated with the racial spatial dynamics of the country, literature asserts that racial 
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integration maintenance efforts at the municipal level have demonstrated success. This 
serves to better inform the examination of the role of municipal governance in municipal-
level stabilization.35 
Approaches to Stabilization      
As black entry into traditionally white municipalities increased, communities 
adopted integration maintenance plans. Integration programs seek to limit or channel black 
entry while stemming the tide of white flight. Racial integration maintenance posits that 
proactive antidiscrimination action, mitigation of black overrepresentation in residency, 
and white flight prevention methods must be employed to prevent racial tipping, housing 
stock deterioration, and economic decline in white neighborhoods experiencing in-
migration of black families.36 
Scholars have found that there are many neighborhoods that have stabilized and 
have not tipped to all-black where intervention of institutional networks and resources are 
present. Based on Lee’s (1985) findings, racially mixed areas in the largest U.S. cities are 
not inevitably doomed to experience the irreversible process of resegregation like social 
scientists have traditionally thought.  We need to better identify and understand what policy 
decisions and non-decisions are most influential in impacting positive and negative 
municipal-level change.37 
Some scholars argue that the variety of forms that integration maintenance policies 
can take complicates the evaluation of their legality. They point to the allowance of 
 
35 Saltman 1990; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Perkiss 2014. For examples, see West Mount Airy 
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communities to develop plans with varying levels of exclusion, racial preferences, and 
government involvement.  These opponents of integration maintenance, often law scholars, 
question the constitutionality of such policies because the social, political, economic, and 
legal judgments can be unique to each community. They argue that because integration 
maintenance treats prospective entrants in a community differently based on race it is 
essentially violating the constitutional rights that protect prospective entrants from similar 
actions that brought about disparities to begin with.38 
Some think of it as freedom of choice versus integration maintenance.  This position 
suggests that efforts to maintain integration deny freedom of choice to blacks thus 
rendering them fundamentally in conflict with fair housing laws and equal housing 
opportunity. Critics point out that blacks’ rights are violated for the sake of attempting to 
achieve neighborhood integration and prevent tipping. However, as Saltman (1990) 
highlights, the truth about integration maintenance is that it relies on affirmative marketing, 
which is a moral, effective, and essential movement strategy, consistent with fair housing 
laws.39 
Given the question raised as to the legalities of integration maintenance policies 
and practices, it is important to outline the approaches to serve as a guide to better 
understanding the political implications of the different types of municipal efforts 
undertaken. The most direct approach to integration maintenance is to limit the number of 
blacks entering one neighborhood by restrictive selling and renting practices. This 
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approach, when considered at face value, resembles the discriminatory housing practices 
employed both by the private and public sectors during the era.40 
Limiting a specific demographic from accessing housing based solely on race is an 
egregious violation of civil rights and provides opponents to integration maintenance 
strong support for their constitutionality argument. The literature explicitly refers to racial 
residential integration maintenance when describing efforts that sought to address the 
resegregation process that takes place because of black in-migration to a municipality and 
white flight from that municipality by curbing white flight. A review of municipal and 
historical archives uncovers examples of this type of integration maintenance practice. The 
literature examines several attempts to enact such a practice by ordinance in Oak Park, 
Illinois and an incentive of service in Shaker Heights, Ohio.41 
Instead of deterring black entry, a less rigorous approach to integration maintenance 
is to encourage entry into designated areas and promote to whites the benefits of remaining. 
This approach can vary in rigidity and racial emphasis. A community can choose to 
establish definitive targets for racial composition, such as a 30 % black population limit. 
Real estate agents would be required to encourage white entry whenever the black 
population exceeded 30 % and to encourage black entry whenever the black population fell 
below that level.42 
A community can choose a more fluid and less racially explicit alternative, such as 
requiring encouragement of the entry of underrepresented racial groups in a community in 
relation to the entire metropolitan community, the state, or the nation. The encouraged 
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racial group will vary according to the racial demographics of the community and the 
shifting of larger geographic population units. This practice, referred to as the mirror 
approach, is the most frequently observed approach utilized in integration maintenance 
efforts.43 
However, it is important to point out that while implicit in the literature is the aim 
to “preserve” a certain racial balance; only a small number of references of specific racial 
composition targets were made by interventionists. A third form of integration maintenance 
is the race-conscious dispersal of entrants throughout a community. This type of plan 
encourages whites to move into areas that already contain some blacks and encourages 
blacks to move into areas that are predominantly white. This form of integration 
maintenance can be viewed as addressing the issue of racial residential segregation within 
an area that may be inaccurately considered integrated when analyzing census tract data.44 
Segregated Integration   
Often communities are labeled “integrated” when they have racial compositions 
comparable to that of the greater metropolitan area. However, upon closer examination 
researchers discover that many of these communities are segregated with whites 
concentrated in one specific area of the community and blacks concentrated in another. 
Literature outlines in-depth examinations of examples of this form of racial residential 
integration maintenance condition exposing a high-level frequency of this occurrence.45 
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There remain gaps in the literature regarding the role municipal governance plays 
in influencing municipal-level stabilization and decline. In developing a suburban 
typology, researchers must be careful not to commit the ecological fallacy of assuming that 
suburban populations are automatically middle-class. Conversely, black suburbanites do 
not always reside in poor, ghettoized suburbs. Research points to many examples to 
strengthen this argument.46 
For instance, a third of Washington, DC’s suburbs are categorized as black middle-
class areas. Some of these suburbs are home to large populations. As such, the percentages 
of middle-class black residents are not inflated by statistical anomalies from smaller 
population sizes. Another assumption researchers should be careful not to make is that 
suburbs are inherently better off than their central city. Some suburbs are comprised mainly 
of blue-collar workers with modest incomes.47 
These communities often do not have the resources and infrastructure to effectively 
combat economic decline and other threats. Central cities are usually better equipped with 
a tax base, business community, law enforcement, and social service providers needed to 
navigate various pressures cities face. Without certain critical financial, institutional, and 
social tools, inner suburbs are more vulnerable than major cities to succumbing to 
challenges.48 
It is important to note that suburban poverty differs from the urban poverty 
traditionally associated with central cities. Further, not all suburbs with increasing poverty 
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experience the trend the same. Some individuals experiencing poverty reside in middle-
class suburbs while others live in areas where poverty is prevalent throughout the 
neighborhood and municipality. Identifying the presence and the effects of poverty in the 
suburbs is complicated by these variations in conditions. For policy to be impactful it must 
incorporate diverse solutions for addressing poverty at the specific levels in which it 
exists.49 
Furthering these distinctions, researchers must consider that there are big suburbs 
neighboring small suburbs; there are boroughs and hamlets; and there are suburbs that rest 
in the hills while some others are flat suburbs located in low-lying valleys. A suburb’s 
geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has important implications 
as well.  Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or the outer-ring 
often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic, racial, and 
environmental determinants.50 
Schools   
One of the first places to show signs of economic decline is the local schools, both 
public and charter. Anti-segregation policies and enforcements such as public-school 
desegregation have waned since the declines in segregation during the civil rights era of 
1960 to 1990. Multiple studies have found that racial isolation of contemporary black 
students is nearly as extreme as it was for black students during the civil rights era. In fact, 
 
49 In fact, Hanlon, Vicino and Short (2006) found that the poorest suburban place has a lower median family 
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since the signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not much has changed in terms of black-
white school segregation rates.51 
Research demonstrates underperforming outcomes for black children experiencing 
racial isolation. They score less on tests, have higher high school dropout rates, have lower 
wage-paying jobs, and are more likely to have interaction with the criminal justice system 
than black children living in more integrated areas. As with housing segregation, school 
segregation can serve as a precursor to economic decline in the area.52 
In his Twin Cities study, Orfield (1997) found that by 1994, more than 20 % of 
students received free or reduced lunch in nine of 11 inner suburbs’ school districts. 
According to the findings, growth of low-income students outpaced Minneapolis schools 
and eight of the schools were experiencing higher rates of minority enrollment. Orfield 
uncovered that over the course of 10 years, 18 out of 29 mature inner suburbs experienced 
significant white flight of preschool children. In inner-ring suburban Minneapolis, high 
school non-graduation rates closely resemble the percentage of poor children in the central 
cities. These schools typically become “school-to-prison pipelines” as the likelihood of 
children being incarcerated often outweigh odds children will attend college.53 
 Municipal efforts in local schools are prevalent throughout the literature. For 
example, a study of Milwaukee demonstrates how instrumental municipal governance can 
be in local school stabilization efforts. Of 44 schools constructed between 1950 and 1965, 
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only two were in areas where black enrollment was over 50 %. When white schools became 
overcrowded or were closed down for remodeling, the school system for many years had 
bused white children to receiving schools which absorbed them routinely. This practice 
was known later as intact busing.54 
Like housing segregation, school segregation is most pronounced in the Northeast 
and Midwest. Municipalities that focus efforts in local schools demonstrate higher success 
rates in stabilization efforts as conditions in local schools are improved. The purpose of the 
school efforts is to promote quality integrated education, to inform the community of 
educational programs in area schools, to support those programs, and to develop 
supplementary educational activities for neighborhood children.55 
Racial inequities span a broad range of economic strata. For example, a majority of 
Ferguson residents are black. Although sections of the municipality have less poverty than 
comparable neighborhoods, the city exhibits distinctly different characteristics than its 
white neighbors. Elementary schools in the Ferguson-Florissant School District are among 
the lowest performing schools in the state. Classified in the bottom 10 % to 15 %, Ferguson 
schools only slightly outperform the typical central city school in the metro area.56 
An effective municipal school strategy will exert a significant influence on school 
board policies. By working with the school board, municipal government affects major 
changes in local schools. In addition, it can be instrumental in reducing racial tensions 
 
54 Feit and Bonds 2014. See also, Judd 1997; and Nelsen 2015. 
55 See Orfield 1981; and Orfield and Luce 2013. 




when schools are desegregated and support people from the community who run for the 
school board.57 
This dissertation utilizes principles associated with local school stabilization efforts 
in studying municipal governance success and failure. Several municipalities have fairly 
contiguous school district boundaries. Others share school district boundaries with other 
municipalities. Due to varying school district structures among the study cases, analyses 
are performed in a way that considers these differences. 
Regional Fragmentation 
It is clear that many factors impact municipal government decision making. Some 
scholars point to regional fragmentation as an influential factor. Inner suburbs’ physical 
and fiscal health are connected with those of neighboring inner suburbs. Regional 
fragmentation dissuades collaborative stabilization efforts in which cities throughout the 
region leverage resources in a collective manner to address deficits. Thus, it is not 
uncommon for governments in fragmented regions to be entrenched in fiscal deficits and 
to exacerbate their problems with budgeting and financial practices that ignore the 
economic deficits.58   
In the absence of a solidified regional response to inner-ring suburban decline, some 
municipalities have managed to avoid decline while others have declined dramatically.  
Considering various municipal choices such as open housing policy, land planning and 
growth management, property tax-base sharing, and investments in transportation systems, 
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this study will identify municipal characteristics that may serve as predictors of municipal 
success at stabilizing in a highly fragmented region. Of particular interest to this study is 
the fact that some municipalities have stabilized in this fragmented environment.59 
Summary  
One of the largest social and racial transitions in the nation occurred in inner 
suburbs of cities during the 1970s to 1990s. As scores of middle-class residents moved out 
of inner-ring suburbs, low-income families were replacing them. While this transition 
along with some physical decline may explain some of the racial tipping and economic 
decline in mature inner suburbs, change in financial status of residents fails to sufficiently 
account for the totality of the phenomena. 
Examining the interrelated dynamics of municipalities’ institutional and fiscal 
capacity will serve as a critical component to this study. As purported in the literature, 
some municipalities that have suffered decline may have talented leadership capable of 
governing effectively. However, financial troubles due to low revenue or external factors, 
such as a national and local economic downturn can bring on severe fiscal stress for a 
municipality despite municipal efforts. This point raises the importance of considering a 
municipality’s size, resources, and policy tools available when examining its influence on 
stabilization and decline.60 
This study considers the impact of sprawl, architecture, location, and residential 
choice factors. Of great importance, however, is the understanding that sprawl and an aged 
housing stock do not necessitate decline. There is an interaction of elements, decisions, and 
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non-decisions occurring. For example, understanding that the strength of residents’ social 
networks, neighborhood sentiment, and symbolism may all play significant roles in 
municipal-level change. Identifying these interrelated dynamics better informs the study. 
This dissertation will contribute evidence to the field, providing a clearer 
understanding of municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization. In doing so, 
the examination will better explain unique municipal governance characteristics that result 
in municipal-level stabilization, economic growth, and increased diversity. I look forward 



















Chapter 3. Methods and Data 
In this chapter, I discuss the methods employed and data used in the study. I used 
quantitative data to select the five case studies. I collected archives spanning from 1970 to 
2015. I interviewed 25 community stakeholders, and I used the community structure 
framework as the method of analysis to better understand the role of municipal-level 
governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs. 
By performing a data analysis on multiple quantitative data of municipal conditions 
from 1970 to 2015, I identify five St. Louis municipalities that meet several varying criteria 
ranging from economically and racially stable to economically declined and racially tipped. 
Comparative exercises are executed generating histograms, scatter plots, and charts of key 
measurements. Results of the exercises are analyzed for key trends and conditions that 
exhibit stable levels of racial composition and economic conditions as well as distinct 
upward or downward trajectories in municipal-level conditions.   
The quantitative data consists of Census data including the American Community 
Survey (ACS), the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS), county 
and city-level data, and state auditor data from 1970 to 2015 of the following 21 data points: 
1. Municipality; 2. Population; 3. Percent white not Hispanic; 4. Percent black; 5. Percent 
single parent headed household; 6. Poverty rate; 7. Percent residents under age 18; 8. Per 
capita income; 9. Median household income; 10. Percent bachelor’s degree or higher; 11. 
Median home value; 12. Percent pre-WWII housing; 13. Residential tax rate; 14. 
Residential tax assessed; 15. Percent owner occupied; 16. Percent renter occupied; 17. 
Percent vacant housing units; 18. Point of sale, pooled, or both; 19. Sales tax rate; 20. 




To illuminate factors unique to specific elements of municipal governance that 
affect economic health and racial composition, qualitative case studies are conducted on 
the five municipalities. I examine municipal government decisions, administrative actions, 
professional capacity, size, fiscal strength, location, interaction with residents, and factors 
outside of municipal governance control. 
Selecting the Cases   
In some studies, researchers follow the standard used by the U.S. Census Bureau 
which defines suburbs as municipalities located in metropolitan statistical areas, have 
populations greater than 2,500, and are not central cities. In other cases, available data and 
research questions determine the definition of the term suburb. The Census Bureau’s 
definition does not delineate inner suburb, middle suburb, and exurb. The researcher must 
make these distinctions to demonstrate that suburbs’ characteristics vary and these 
variations impact conditions as well as municipal governance decisions.61 
To circumvent this challenge, this study will use more finely grained place-level 
data to categorize suburbs into inner, middle, and exurban and identify and examine mature 
inner suburban areas of St. Louis County. This study asserts that the Census category 
“Places” is the best available category for identifying suburbs and sets specific parameters 
for identifying cases and for determining how to measure and analyze them. 
Minimum thresholds are set to study like cases. First, only municipalities 
maintaining at least a population of 10,000 residents throughout the study period 1970-
2015 were considered. Fourteen municipalities met the population minimum over the 
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period (See Figure 1., p.317). Additionally, municipalities demonstrating at least 30 % 
black residency at some point during the study period 1970-12015 were considered. Six 
municipalities met the racial minimum: 1. Bellefontaine Neighbors, 2. Ferguson, 3. 
Florissant, 4. Hazelwood, 5. Jennings, and 6. University City (See Figure 2, p.318). 
Based on trajectories of racial composition and economic conditions over the study 
period, municipalities were partitioned into three categories: 1. Stable, 2. Declined, and 3. 
Transitioning. Two municipalities were selected that exhibited stabilization. At least one 
of the municipalities demonstrated stable racial and economic conditions for at least 20 
years. The other exhibited stable racial and economic conditions at some point during the 
study period but exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable stabilization after exhibiting 
signs of acute transition which threatened stability. 
Two municipalities were selected that had declined or at least showed traits of 
transitioning to decline in terms of racially resegregating and exhibiting stressed economic 
indicators. One municipality had experienced decline for a minimum period of 20 years 
exhibiting racial resegregation and economic decline during the study period. One 
exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable destabilization showing signs of transitioning 
into declined status. 
For racial composition, selected cases considered to be stabilized demonstrated 
characteristics such as black population at least 30 % of the total population in the 
municipality for a time period of at least 20 years between years 1970 and 2015. Through 
plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 as well as 
five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in racial change and stabilization were 




including increase in black residents to at least 30 % and remained at least 30 % without 
exceeding 70 % were considered stabilized or transitioning depending on the circumstances 
and were eligible cases for the study. 
Selected cases considered to be declined in terms of resegregating demonstrated 
characteristics such as black population at 71 % or more for at least 20 years. Cases 
considered to exhibit signs of decline demonstrated significant increases (at least 30 
percent in a ten-year period) in black population and contained a minimum of 60 % black 
residents at any point during the study time period. Identification of these cases was also 
performed by plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 
as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015. 
Before an effective examination of municipal governance’s effects on stabilization 
could be performed, a clear understanding of how the conditions in suburbs were changing 
and why these changes were unique to suburbs needed to be reached. In addition to 
considering racial shifts, this study operationalized the concepts of suburban poverty by 
defining it and distinguishing it from other forms of economic conditions and poverty 
observed in cities. 
Poverty is generally accepted to mean a lack of resources to sufficiently provide for 
one’s needs. Official measurements tabulate income and size of household to determine 
poverty status. For this study, county-wide averages were used in measuring the prevalence 
of poverty in a municipality and in determining overall economic conditions in the 
municipality. For economic conditions, selected cases considered to be stabilized 
demonstrated characteristics such as median household income at least 80 % of the 




average, and poverty rate less than 200 % of the county’s average for a period of at least 
20 years between years 1970 and 2015.62 
Through plotting municipalities’ economic conditions at decennial points 1970 to 
2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in economic conditions 
were observed. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in 
addition to meeting the racial composition threshold were considered stabilized and were 
eligible cases for the study. Selected cases considered to be in decline in terms of economic 
condition demonstrated characteristics such as median household income of 70 % or less 
of the county’s median household income average, per capita income of 50 % or less of 
the county’s average, and poverty rate of 200 % or more of the county’s average for at 
least10 years. 
Identification of these cases was also performed by plotting municipalities’ 
economic conditions at decennial points from 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates 
from 2010-2015. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in 
addition to meeting the racial composition threshold for municipalities in decline were 
considered to be declined or transitioning depending on the circumstances and were 
eligible cases for the study. 
Proximity to Metro City  
Stabilized, declined, and transitioning cases exhibited similar attributes related to 
population size, capacity, and municipal structure. Therefore, geographical proximity to 
the central city was also considered in the selection process. However, given the 
impossibility of selecting a group of municipalities that fit perfectly into these categories, 
 
62 For more about considering differences in suburban poverty, see Murphy 2010; 2016; Kneebone 2014; 




variations in these factors were considered in the examination and played a significant role 
in the final interpretation of results. Further, additional indicators such as housing stock, 
education levels of residents, and number of single parent headed households were 
considered during the selection process as well as throughout the study. 
A suburb’s geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has 
important implications. Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or 
the outer-ring often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic, 
racial, and environmental determinants. This study considered implications associated with 
the location of municipalities and how these conditions may have affected municipal 
governance. Proximity to the central city, which in this case is St. Louis, MO, correlates 
with black population shifts. Municipalities to the northwest of St. Louis demonstrated a 
significantly higher increase in black population during the study period than 
municipalities located in other areas of the region. For instance, of the six municipalities 
that have experienced at least 30 % black population at some point during the study period, 
only one municipality (University City) is not located in an area northwest of St. Louis 
City (See Figure 3, p.319). 
While University City’s proximity to the central city differs from the other cases, it 
was not eliminated from consideration as this study seeks to better explain the influences 
geographical proximity may have on municipal governance. University City offered an 
opportunity to study a mature inner-ring suburb’s municipal governance effects on racial 
and economic conditions in the context of enjoying proximity to the central city. Other 





As for the remaining five municipalities, a closer examination of their racial and 
economic conditions over the study period was warranted to delineate them and identify 
best cases for the study. There were several sets within the group with very similar 
proximities to the central city (e.g. Bellefontaine Neighbors / Jennings, and Florissant / 
Hazelwood). While Ferguson lies northwest of St. Louis City, as do the others, it is located 
between the two aforementioned sets of municipalities. 
Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings are located on the northwest border of the 
city while Florissant and Hazelwood are located in the northwest corner of St. Louis 
County.  It was determined that Ferguson’s proximity to the city was unique from the other 
sets of municipalities. This factor was considered a point of interest during the analysis of 
racial and economic conditions. 
Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings were considered first. Given their 
similarities in location (northwest border of St. Louis City) and their populations as of 2015 
(10,815 and 14,755), these cases were analyzed closer for dissimilarities that may make 
one a more relevant case for study than the other. If no striking differences were identified 
between the two, one would be selected based on traits important to the study such as 
commonalities and differences in racial, economic, and other demographic indicators 
related to the other selected cases. 
Racial Composition  
Like the other municipalities under consideration, with the exception of University 
City whose black population was 20 % in 1970, both Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings 
contained small black populations in 1970 (1.2 % and .5 %). Notably, Jennings’ black 




the same period, Bellefontaine experienced a relatively small increase of 1.6 % in black 
population which represented 2.8 % of total population in 1980. 
The modest black population increase would continue for Bellefontaine Neighbors 
over the next decade while Jennings experienced another significant increase in black 
population over the same period. By 1990, Jennings was well on its way to racially tipping 
with black residents representing nearly half (48 %) of its population−a nearly 47 % 
increase in only two decades. While Bellefontaine Neighbors experienced a higher rate of 
black population increase than in the previous decade, the municipality was yet to show 
signs of tipping as black population was still fewer than 10 % (eight percent). 
During the 10 years from 1990 to 2000, Bellefontaine would experience a 
significant increase in black population reaching 44.4 % in black residents (an increase of 
36.4 %). This was notable and worth investigating to better understand what policies, 
actions, and phenomena occurred to bring about such a drastic increase in such a short 
period. However, Jennings offered valuable insight into explaining what was happening 
not only in Jennings but in the neighboring municipality. During the same period, Jennings’ 
black population increase by 30.6 %.  Since Jennings’ racial shift began two decades earlier 
and continued throughout the study period eventually topping 91.70 % black residents by 
2015, Jennings represents a fully tipped municipality. 
While Bellefontaine Neighbors tipped racially, according to this study’s metric, it 
failed to meet the 20-year minimum threshold for declined. The municipality did not reach 
the tipping threshold until 2010 (See Figure 4, p.320). Jennings met the 20-year minimum 
threshold having tipped by 1995 (See Figure 5, p.320). Considering the geographical and 




earlier and more dramatically.  Additionally, the similarities decreased the need to examine 
both municipalities. Jennings remained in consideration for the study as a declined case by 
meeting the racial resegregation requirements. Bellefontaine Neighbors was excluded. 
Florissant and Hazelwood were considered next. At initial glance, a glaring 
difference in these two municipalities was apparent. Their population sizes were quite 
different. As of 2015, Florissant had 52,356 residents while Hazelwood had just under half 
of that with 25,686 residents (See Figure 1, p.317). While this raised the issue of whether 
these were comparable cases, another notable statistic was also considered. These 
municipalities experienced opposite overall population shifts during the study period. 
From 1970 to 2015, Florissant experienced an over 20 % decrease (from 65,908 to 
52,356) in overall population while Hazelwood enjoyed a 45 % increase (from 14,082 to 
25,686) in overall population (See Figure 1, p.317). During the same period, both 
municipalities experienced a gradual increase in black population (approximately seven 
percent per decade) with the highest uptick coming during 2000 to 2010 (approximately 
14 % for Hazelwood and 19 % for Florissant). Hazelwood reached the 30 % black 
population threshold in 2010, while Florissant did not experience a 30 % black population 
until 2015 (See Figures 6 and 7, p.321). 
Florissant’s decline in overall population and Hazelwood’s increase in overall 
population since 1970 were not unusual as other municipalities in St. Louis County 
demonstrated similar trends. However, of the 14 municipalities meeting the population 
eligibility for this study, only Ballwin and Hazelwood experienced population growth over 




Figure 1, p.317). Notable was the fact that Hazelwood, unlike Ballwin, experienced more 
than minimal black population increase. 
Halfway into the decade of the 2010s, Hazelwood was on pace to maintain the trend 
of modest increases in black population over 10-year spans. This was counter to trends 
exhibited by other St. Louis County municipalities that reached the 30 % black population 
mark during the study period (excluding University City and a number of small 
municipalities). 
According to this study’s metrics, the similarities in geographical proximity and 
rate of black population growth were where the commonalities ended with Florissant and 
Hazelwood. Their size difference, difference in population trajectory, and varying time in 
which they reached the 30 % black population threshold made it difficult to select one or 
the other based solely on their racial trends and was grounds to consider their economic 
conditions before making a selection or perhaps selecting both cities for the study. 
Upon initial review of Ferguson’s racial trajectory over the course of the study 
period, it was clear the municipality had experienced significant population shifts. It was 
third only to Jennings and University City in increase in black population during the period 
between 1970 and 1980 and third behind Jennings and Bellefontaine Neighbors in increase 
in black population over the entire study period from 1970-2015 (See Figures 8 and 9, 
p.322-323). 
This was very intriguing because, while Ferguson experienced one of the highest 
levels of black population increases of the municipalities in the set, it had not yet tipped 
according to this study’s metric (71 % or more). Notwithstanding, at 67.4 % black 




However, upon closer examination of Ferguson’s racial trajectory, several 
interesting attributes further distinguished Ferguson from its neighbors. Of each of the 
municipalities in the set, as well as smaller neighbors such as Berkeley and Dellwood that 
reached 30 % black population at some point in the study period (excluding University 
City), Ferguson was the only municipality that did not experience a 30 % or more increase 
in black population over any one 10-year period. 
Further, Ferguson was second only to University City in decline in black population 
since 2010 (See Figures 10 and 11, p.324). These characteristics coupled with Ferguson’s 
unique location between border municipalities like Jennings and north county 
municipalities like Florissant offer intriguing elements for case study. Based on Ferguson’s 
racial shifts and accompanying elements, it was considered for the study as a transitioning 
case. 
University City offers perhaps the most interesting case of all the municipalities in 
the set. Its unique geographical proximity to the central city was covered earlier. In addition 
to that and possibly because of that, the city experienced racial shifts unlike any other case 
in the group of eligible municipalities and otherwise. By 1970, black residents already 
comprised 20 % of University City’s population— over 13 % more than second place 
Kirkwood (See Figure 12, p.325). Consider Hazelwood was fourth in black population in 
1970, and blacks represented only 1.9 % of that city’s population. 
During the 1970 to 1980 period, University City and Jennings experienced similar 
growth in black population (See Figures 13-16, p.326-327). By 1990, the municipalities’ 
racial trajectories inersected at 48 % and 48.2 %, respectively. Over the next 25 years, 




composition (See Figure 17, p.328). It is important to note that University City’s path to 
48 % black residents by 1990 was a much shorter one than was Jennings’ given Univerity 
City began at 20 % in 1970 while Jennings had only .5 % black residents in 1970. 
The rapid racial shift in Jennings from 1970 to 1990 was indicative of the racial 
tipping that was occurring and continued until present day. Jennings was 91 % black at 
study’s end. University City, on the other hand, managed to avoid the racial tipping that 
claimed many of its smaller neighbors like Pagedale, Wellston, and Pinelawn. University 
City offered a very interesting case as it represented a long-term stable case having enjoyed 
black population above 30 % for over 35 years without ressegregating to all black. Notable, 
however, was the fact that University City lost over 10 % of its black population since its 
black population peaked at 48.2 % in 1990. 
It is possible that University City’s loss of nearly a quarter of its overall population 
since 1970 accounted for some of the black population decline (See Figures 1, p.317 and 
11, p. 324). However, closer examination of the data reveals that the largest loss of overall 
population in any one decade came during the period between 1970 and 1980. What is key 
here is that this was also the period in which University City experienced its largest gain 
in black residents (23 % increase). 
This may indicate that there was some flight of white residets during this period. 
More critical to this analysis, however, is what cirrcumstances, actions, decisions prevented 
University City from continuing on a trajectory that ultimately leads to racial 
ressegreagtion? Based on University City’s racial stabilization for over 35 years of the 





Selected cases, based on racial conditions over time, include Ferguson, Jennings, 
and University City. An examination of each of their economic conditions over the study 
period would confirm or invalidate their eligibility for the study. Additionally, Florissant 
and Hazelwood were deliniated more granularly for final selection based on their economic 
conditions over time. 
Economic Conditions 
Ferguson’s economic conditions over time presented an interesting trajectory 
which demonstrated steady increases in per capita income and median household income 
accompanied by significant increase in the municipality’s poverty rate over the same 
period. It is important to point out that though there were steady increases in the income 
strata, the levels were consistantly below county-wide averages while the poverty rate 
exceeded 200 % of the county average by 2015 (See Figures 18 and 19, p.329). 
This raised important questions regarding the income levels of Ferguson residents 
prior to the significant increase of black residents over the period from 1980 to 2010 as 
well as the income levels of black residents moving in to the area over the period. Ferguson 
appeared to get poorer as it increased in black residents. Consistent with appearing to get 
poorer, Ferguson’s single parent headed households increased most significantly during 
the period in which it experienced its highest increase in black population. This suggested 
that a dispoprtionate number of low-income families were represented in the population of 
black residents moving to the municipality. 
This served as an important indicator to analyze as it was possibly associated with 
Ferguson’s decisions related to low-income housing placement. Also notable was that 




period, the rate remained well-below the county average (See Figure 20, p.330). Changes 
in housing conditions offered further evidence of Ferguson’s economic decline being 
consistent with its growth in black population. Percent of owner occupied homes declined 
while percent of renter occupied homes increased during the period of greatest black 
population increase (See Figure 21, p.331). Even more intriguing was the trajectory of 
percent of vacant housing.  
A review of Figure 22 (p.331) demonstrates that during the period between 1980 to 
1990, a nine percent increase in vacant housing occurred despite only an 11.5 % increase 
in black population— roughly the same amount of black population increase the previous 
decade which experienced only .7 % increase in vacant housing. Yet, during the decade in 
which Ferguson experienced its highest increase in black residents (1990 to 2000) doubling 
from 25.1 % to 52.4 %, its vacant housing rate decreased by 5.3 %. This suggest that a 
clearing out and filling up process occurred. Such a phenomenon is consistent with the 
increase in low-income housing developments taking place in the county during the period. 
Ferguson presented evidence related to its economic conditions to qualify as an 
exceptional case for this study. It was categorized, for purposes of the study, as a 
transitioning municipality. While the municipality experienced 200 % of the county 
average poverty rate, this level was just recently achieved between the 2010 to 2015 time 
period and did not meet the minimum ten-year threashold for declined. Further, its median 
household income was 72 % of the county average and its per capita income met the 
minimum threashold of 50 % of the county average. Ferguson’s selection for investigation 
of its municpal governance influence on racial and economic conditions was confirmed as 




Jennings was a much clearer case than Ferguson as it related to presenting definitive 
evidence of a municipality that had declined in terms of economic conditions. The city 
ranked within each economic indicator as a declined case. Jennings’ median household 
income and per capita income were both demonstrated as being less than 50 % of the county 
average for over 10 years while its poverty rate had been at least two times the county 
average for 15 years and nearly three times the county average in the last five years of the 
study period (See Figures 23 and 24, p.332). 
A review of Jennings’ demographic shifts provided additional evidence of the 
suburb’s economic struggles. While some decreases in single parent headed households 
occurred, the rate remained nearly one in every five. In terms of residents with bachelor’s 
degree or higher, Jennings had nearly 30 % less than the county average at 11.2 % (See 
Figure 25, p.333). Jennings demonstrated similar traits as Ferguson in that it experienced 
some economic improvements over time but the key difference was Jennings’ increases 
were much more below county averages. 
Several final elements related to Jennings’ economic conditions over time were 
considered. As demonstrated in Figure 26 (p.334), Jennings’ housing condtions steadily 
declined in ownership and increased in rentership to the point that there were nearly the 
same percent of renters as homeowners (47.7 % and 52.3 %). Jennings’ vacancy rates over 
time exhibited several significant spikes in vacancies during the 1980 to 1990 period and 
again during the 2000 to 2010 period after enjoying a 10-year span of modest decrease in 
the rate. As of 2015, estimates were that nearly one in every five homes in Jennings were 




As mentioned earlier, Jennings shares a number of similarities with Ferguson and 
the two differ significantly in other areas. For instance, a review of median home values 
shows notable similarities in trends of increase and decrease in value and noteworthy 
differences in values at each decennial period (See Figures 28 and 29, p.335). These 
observations offered additional economic evidence that further strengthened the case for 
both Ferguson and Jennings to be included in the study as a transitioning and a declined 
municipality. 
University City presented an opportunity to investigate a case that demonstrated 
economic conditions over the entire study period that remained within the stable range of 
county-wide averages required for this study. Additionally, University City served as an 
excellent contrast to Jennings. While University City’s population was over two times 
larger than Jennings’ over the study period, the municipalities shared several 
commonalities worth noting. 
Both cities are positioned on the border of the central city. During the 1970 to 1980 
period, the municipalities grew in black population at roughly the same rate. As noted 
earlier, the municipalities’ percent of black residents were nearly identical in 1990. It was 
at this point when the trajectories of University City and Jennings went in entirely different 
directions. 
As observed in Figure 30 (p.336), University City experienced some interesting 
variances in economic conditions including poverty rates that appear to contradict the 
notion of municipalities becoming poorer as its black residency increases. By 1990, 
University City had experienced its largest gain in black population and peaked at 48.2 % 




county average. Further, data indicates that over the next 25 years University City would 
lose 11.3 % of its black population while experiencing a sharp increase in its poverty rate 
up to just over 100 % of the county average. 
Much of this increase could be attributed to declines in the overall economy during 
these periods. However, the phenomena of black population decrease and increase in 
poverty in the suburb raised important issues associated with University Cities’ economic 
conditions over time which were well-worth investigating. 
Despite University City’s increase in poor residents, its overall economic strata 
remained strong throughout the period. This again raised a notable element associated with 
the city’s racial shift and the impact on its economic conditions. Over the period between 
1980 to 1990, University City enjoyed its largest jump in per capita income and median 
household income. Notable was the fact that this period followed the period in which 
University City experienced its largest growth in black residents. The following decades 
saw a decrease of over 11 % in black population (See Figure 31, p.336). 
In analyzing University City’s economic conditions, it became clear that the city 
faced threats to its economic stability over the years such as acute shifts in rate of poor 
residents. However, these threats appeared to have been effectively mitigated. Perhaps this 
successful mitigation was due in part to positive trends that counter the threats. For 
instance, when University City’s single parent headed households peaked in 1980 (17.2 
%), though still below the county average, the spike was followed by a decade which saw 
a peak of 58.3 % of residents with a bachelor’s degree or more (See Figure 32, p.337). 
A 58 % increase in residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher could help 




significant economic shifts. The city enjoyed a significant proportion of residents who were 
more likely to be civically involved. However, following this surge in educated 
constituents, University City experienced a significant decline in residents with degrees 
over the next 10 years. Athough the city rebounded with modest increases over the next 15 
years, the rate has not returned to the 1990 level (See Figure 32, p.337). 
Unversity City’s residential demographics may offer an even more intriguing 
quandry than its racial-economic dichotomy. During the periods of largest per capita and 
median household income increases, University City experienced its largest declines in 
owner occupied residency rates and its highest rates of renter occupied homes (See Figure 
33, p.338). Further, during this period, the city’s median home values rose steadily (See 
Figure 34, p.339). Most notably, the biggest jump in home values occurred during the 
period of black population decline accompanied by a sharp increase in vacant housing (See 
Figure 35, p.339). 
It is possible that municipal governance had minimal impact on these trends and 
that these phenomena were mostly caused by market forces, resident choices, or a 
combination of the two. However, because University City was such a unique case among 
this set and among most mature inner suburbs, an examination of the suburb’s municipal 
government was warranted to better understand decisions and impacts of those choices on 
economic conditions over time. Therefore, University City was confirmed as a stabilized 
case for study. 
Despite significant difference in total population, Florissant and Hazelwood 
exhibited very similar traits elsewhere. Selecting the municipality that reflected attributes 




conditions over time. Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic attributes were viewed in the 
context of the size differential between the two as certain comparisons were skewed due to 
the population gap. Therefore, the analysis was not Florissant versus Hazelwood but rather 
Florissant in relation to the study and Hazelwood in relation to the study. 
A review of both municipalities’ economic trends revealed that conditions over 
time remained within stable ranges of county-wide averages. Neither city experienced any 
noteworthy spikes unique to trends exhibited at county levels. However, each city recently 
experienced notable increases in their black population and reflected noticable changes in 
median household incomes. Florissant experienced an insignificant increase in its median 
household income (See Figure 36, p.340). Hazelwood, on the other hand, experienced a 
6.3 % decrease in median household income in 2015 after its black population more than 
doubled since 2000 (See Figure 37, p.340). 
While Hazelwood’s black population grew at a slightly higher rate than 
Florissant’s, the growth may not have been significant enough to account for the drop in 
Hazelwood’s median household income. Florissant’s size and capacity could help explain 
why the suburb’s median household income remained stable during the period. This 
highlighted the possibility of size impacting municipalities’ ability to stave off economic 
threats. 
This also shed light on municipalities’ experiences related to their poverty rates 
during the period in which both cities experienced their highest black migration into the 
areas. As observed in Figures 38 and 39 (p.341), Florissant remained below the county-




Hazelwood exhibited signs of being acutely impacted economically by moderate to 
significant shifts in racial composition while Florissant appeared to experience 
insignificant changes in its economic conditions as a result of racial change in its residency. 
However,  further investigation illuminated that the phenomenon of black population 
growth influenced some demographic attributes in the municipalities in virtually identical 
ways and other demographic attributes in the inverse. 
In analyzing Florissant and Hazelwood’s rates of single parent headed households 
and percent of residents with bachelor’s degree or higher, the numbers were nearly 
indiscernible, particularly during the period of the highest increase in black residents from 
2000 to 2015 (See Figures 40 and 41, p.341-342). Despite their parallel trajectories in 
demographic shifts over the 2000-2015 period, Florissant and Hazelwood exhibited 
distinctly different residential traits. Contradictory to the results in poverty rate and income 
levels for the cities, residential figures reflect Hazelwood experiencing a lower level of 
adverse impact on its residential conditions over the period. 
Despite Florissant’s occupied homeownership figures remaining higher and its 
rentership lower than Hazelwood’s, Hazelwood’s homeownership decreased and 
rentership increased at slower rates than Florissant’s during the period (See Figures 42 and 
43, p.342-343). Further, Hazelwood’s home values (despite some decrease due to the 
housing crisis of 2008) and vacancy rate were representative of a stable municipality with 
the capacity to effectively navigate crisis and prevent decline (See Figures 44 and 45, 
p.343). 
This is not to imply that Florissant did not have the capacity to navigate crisis and 




significant threats to its stability. This concept was important for better understanding the 
varying levels of stability represented in these municipalities. Even though Florissant’s 
homeownership decreased (See Figure 42, p.342), vacancy rate increased (See Figure 46, 
p.344), and median home values decreased during the period of black population growth 
(See Figure 47, p.344), it remains stable with values in stable range of county averages.  
Additionally, one must consider how Florissant’s geographical space, number of 
buildings, and number of residents impact figures. Based on the results of the analyses of 
Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic conditions over the study period, Hazelwood was 
selected as the fourth case for study for several key reasons: 1. Hazelwood’s sharp 
population growth over the study period provided an interesting counterbalance to the other 
cases that have all declined in population over the same period. And 2. Hazelwood’s size 
presented additional bonuses for the investigation.   
Hazelwood was a municipality large enough to leverage certain resources to 
effectively address concerns of decline but was small enough to experience similar 
challenges that have proven too great for several comparably sized cities in the region. 
Hazelwood experienced positive demographic trends in response to racial and economic 
shifts thus far. However, will the suburb maintain a balanced turnover rate and remain 
stable or will a continued increase in black population and lower income residents lead to 
resegregation and economic decline? 
While this study does not seek to answer this question per se, the looming 
possibility of the newly integrated area eventually tipping provided relevant information to 
the study. I proceeded with caution and skepticism regarding Hazelwood’s status as a stable 




Selected Cases   
 Ferguson, Hazelwood, Jennings, and University City (Note: Maplewood was added 
to the study as a comparison case and was not held to the minimum thresholds). 
Data Collection 
 Data was collected through primary sources such as official government archival 
records of council, board, and committee meeting notes; legislation; ordinances; codes; 
budgets; purchase orders; legal briefs; case files; transcripts; memos; letters; historical 
documents; US Census including the American Community Survey; National Historical 
Geographic Information System; St. Louis County; Missouri State auditor; and related 
materials. Additionally, interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted.  
Secondary sources included books, prior studies, reports, electronic sources, print 
articles, and multimedia news sources. 
Recruitment 
Interviewees were identified by accessing public records such as historical data, 
occupancy permits, data bases, neighborhood associations’ membership logs, etc. Some 
participants referred candidates for interview. Candidates were contacted via letter, phone, 
and email notification requesting their participation in the study. Participants were 
provided all the required forms and information prior to interviews commencing. 
Participants  
 Individuals considered for participation in this study were limited to those who had 
experience as a resident, public official, business owner, and other relevant connection to 
the municipality being studied (e.g. employed in or by municipality, parents home located 




included at least five years’ experience in one or more of the aforementioned areas and 
must be over the age of 35 at the time of interview. 
Interviews 
 Interviews were preceded by a short conversation to confirm eligibility and level of 
knowledge about areas. This process served to better categorize the participant in terms of 
relevance to the study as well as topic of priority. Conducting this pre-interview 
conversation allowed for effective and efficient organization of submissions for easier and 
accurate identification and interpretation during the qualitative data analyses. 
 Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone, or via video chat. Interviews 
were audio taped and handwritten notes were taken as well. The method in which the 
interview was conducted depended primarily on how a participant was categorized and 
how pertinent the participant’s perspective was to the study. While the selection process 
may appear rather subjective, a clear rubric outlining various levels of priority was 
developed based on timing of policies, institutional structure, fiscal conditions, racial 
composition, and function of suburb (e.g. bedroom, commercial, etc.). This process 
produced rigorous parameters for minimizing subjectivity. 
Data Preparation 
Data were considered with other relevant elements before performing the 
examination for final interpretation. Along with integrating various quantitative data, 
qualitative characteristics collected independent of interviews were categorized and 
prioritized to be considered during the analyses phase. Certain integrated data were ranked 
to account for variances in conditions and considered in a weighted context to better glean 




outliers, unusual circumstances, one-time occurrences, and distinct municipal 
characteristics outside of municipal governance authority. 
Trustworthiness of the Research Process 
There were potential biases, errors, and other subjective possibilities that could 
skew results of the examination. The research methods accounted for these by 
acknowledging them as well as leveraging techniques throughout the study to minimize 
their effects. Scholars suggest that theory, policy, and decisions based on studies that only 
offer a snapshot in time are problematic because the full picture may not be exposed, and 
HUD determined that an area is racially impacted when more than a 10 % change in black 
population occurs in a 10-year period, or when an area becomes more than 40 % black.63 
With these principles serving as one of the guides to ensuring this study produces 
reliable findings, an examination of time series data integrating a variation of the elements 
above was performed. No one point in time was weighted more than another. To better 
understand the changes occurring in racial composition and economic conditions, 
phenomena were observed over time and contextualized with other factors before 
interpreting the changes and identifying factors which influenced those changes. 
In isolating factors which were outside the authority of municipal governance, a 
better understanding of the role municipal governance played was achieved. Once the role 
of municipal governance was identified, illuminating specificity and uniqueness within 
each municipality was possible. Identifying and examining differences in municipal policy 
and other related decisions provided information critical to an effective study of municipal 
governance success and failure in stabilization efforts. 
 




Data analysis   
Selected cases were categorized into three groups: 1. Stabilized, 2. Declined, and 
3. Transitioning. Since some suburbs had small segregated pockets of poverty, 
transitioning refers to municipalities exhibiting significant municipal-level segregation and 
poverty increases over a shorter period but have yet to meet the declined thresholds. In 
some areas, poverty remains well-concealed. Exclusive zoning and minimal pedestrian-
friendly conveniences which tend to increase resident interaction make it difficult for 
residents and visitors to observe poverty in certain areas. 
Race is more easily identifiable than economic characteristics. Participant 
submissions related to economic conditions may have been more tainted by the invisibility 
of poverty in some areas than submissions related to race. Therefore, analyses of economic 
conditions were performed utilizing more of the quantitative data and archival records than 
data collected in interviews. 
As for measuring race, the literature reveals that scholars depend a great deal on 
U.S. Census data which helps mitigate the race quandary. Still, some researchers struggle 
with what level of data to utilize due to potentially misleading findings. Researchers 
express concerns that areas, often mistaken as integrated at the tract level, are not all that 
integrated when data are examined at the block level.64 
While this study utilizes Census place data in selecting the cases, more granular 
nuances associated with the racial composition of municipalities were leveraged. These 
included specific interview questions about racial dynamics, school enrollment records, 
and racial composition in neighborhood associations. 
 




Of important interest to researchers is the transition to predominantly black 
municipalities from exclusively white ones and the transition from one race to integrated 
over time. This study, however, dealt primarily with cases in which the municipality shifted 
from all white to an integrated area and cases in which the municipality appeared to be 
tipping to all black after experiencing a period of stabilization. However, the study does 
not assume that municipalities were automatically tipping from all white to all black. A 
selected case could have included a formerly stabilized area that was experiencing 
resegregation back to all white.65 
This study developed measures and interpretations that offered more insight on 
what was truly happening as it relates to racial and economic change. For instance, 
measuring the length of time an area maintains a certain racial composition and economic 
health was a critical component to the study. The analysis challenged notions of success 
and failure and offers an expanded understanding of effectiveness and political influence 
by establishing metrics for better assessing varying degrees of integration and economic 
implications. 
Degrees of integration vary as its measures rang from slightly integrated to 
moderately and then substantially integrated. This dissertation considered integration as 
referring to the amount of black-white mix of residents in a given municipality. To measure 
this mix, numbers were assigned to each level of integration relative to the proportion of 
blacks in a municipality and how the proportion of blacks in a municipality compared to 
the proportion of blacks in the county. 
 




Economic strength was analyzed over the 45-year period by considering the 
changes in the data points relevant to economic conditions. These figures were measured 
against county-wide averages and compared within the set of selected cases in order to 
ensure that cases were appropriately categorized according to fiscal strength and analysis 
of financial decisions were performed equitably by adjusting measures to ensure relativity. 
The case studies involved a robust set of qualitative data such as interviews, 
archival records, and media stories. Interpreting the qualitative data involved integrating 
the quantitative data elements and developing context in which to explain phenomena and 
tell the story of municipal governance success and failure in stabilization. This process 
required a great deal of subjectivity. Therefore, the analyses of quantitative data in selecting 
the five cases as well as the integration of quantitative data into metrics with the qualitative 
data were extremely important in minimizing subjectivity prior to the examination. 
The examination of cases was performed with the utmost reverence to both the 
quantitative and qualitative data. While eliminating all subjectivity in the study was 
impossible, producing findings that consider only the data in measurable and replicable 
contexts was attainable. This dissertation outlined a definitive rubric by which evidence 
collected was measured and cataloged. This process assisted in strengthening the validity 









Chapter 4. Municipal Governance in St. Louis Inner Suburbs  
(Post-Fair Housing Era) 
Introduction 
By 1970, St. Louis County had become highly urbanized and was approaching a 
million in population. Approximately 75 % of county residents lived in one of 96 
incorporated areas. Of the 96 municipalities, 44 had less than 2,000 inhabitants. Efforts to 
consolidate smaller municipalities had been ongoing since the mid-1960s. Proponents of 
consolidation believed if these municipalities merged it would help solve many of the 
problems county residents were experiencing. Meanwhile, some cities sought growth 
through annexing pockets of unincorporated areas adjacent to their boundaries.66 
The City of Ferguson had recently finalized its 15th annexation since incorporating 
in 1894 and boasted a population in excess of 28,900 residents. Although University City 
had lost around 10 % of its population since 1960, the municipality was still home to 46,309 
residents. Study group cities Jennings, Hazelwood, and Maplewood recorded populations 
of 19,379, 14,082, and 12,785 citizens, respectively. While these five cities were not among 
the smaller communities under pressure to consolidate, they were experiencing pressure 
nonetheless.67 
Housing stocks, infrastructure, and service delivery systems were antiquated, and 
demographics were rapidly changing. Populations in the inner ring were now older and 
becoming increasingly poorer. Revenue sources were inadequate, inflexible, and in some 
 
66 According to US Census figures included in City of Ferguson, MO archives October 13, 1970, page 3 and 
City of Hazelwood archives Special Meeting on County Consolidation: December 20, 1976.  
67 National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). When Ferguson incorporated in 1894, the 
city had a population 1,200 residents. City of Ferguson archival document dated October 13, 1970, page 3. 
Records of annexations taken from City of Ferguson archives Regular Council Session: February 14, 1984, 




cases, obsolete. Inflation in the nation’s economy further intensified economic woes as 
expenses often outpaced revenues. Concurrently, the failure of large urban renewal projects 
in the City of St. Louis displaced many black families and in part, sparked a significant 
housing shortage in the central city. Along with recent fair housing enactments, the lack of 
available dwellings in the city resulted in more black families moving to the suburbs.68 
As blacks moved westward, a complex financial crisis not unlike the one that had 
existed in central cities for decades was emerging in the county’s older inner-ring suburbs. 
A dramatic decline in revenues threatened significant reduction in public services and 
spurred the need to continually increase taxes and commercial activity to maintain quality 
public services. This created a cyclical effect that served to compound economic struggles. 
Balancing budgets was increasingly difficult, and fiscal tools were limited. Suburban 
governments were ill-equipped to effectively manage such dynamic changes without some 
form of alteration in governance structure, financial aid, and resources from state and 
federal agencies.69 
Municipal officials scrambled to address public safety concerns, stem the tide of 
residents exiting for newer suburbs established further from the central core, and to 
maintain financial solvency. Left unaddressed, housing discrimination, mass exodus of tax 
base, and outmoded suburban idealism would result in resegregated neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty garnering nominal property tax revenues from deteriorated housing 
 
68 Claim references multiple archival mentions of the results of urban renewal in St. Louis. For example, 
Mayor Cervantes, St. Louis City sends communication regarding the housing shortage in the St. Louis 
Metropolitan area which is included in City of Ferguson archival document from August 25, 1970, page 5.   
69 Note: Larger municipalities like University City were not immune to the rapidly changing business 
markets, demographics, and public demands. The city was feeling the strain from a shrinking and poorer 
tax base. By 1970, 19 % of residents qualified for some form of public assistance or tax relief. University City 
had already reached the legal limit of taxation on real property at $1 per $100 assessed valuation and could 




stocks. Most pre-fair housing policies were no longer legal preventative options. Suburban 
cities needed to develop creative strategies, enact policies, and support grassroots efforts 
for meeting physical, fiscal, and social challenges.  
Forms of Government 
At the beginning of the study period (1970), University City and Ferguson were 
two of only fifteen Missouri municipalities operating under a home rule charter having 
adopted the provision in 1947 and 1954, respectively. Electing to govern under the council-
manager form of government, both municipalities had professionally trained and highly 
skilled city managers. They were well-versed in county, state, and federal laws and 
understood how policies at those levels impacted conditions and local governments’ tools 
for dealing with conditions. Each city had a council comprised of six councilmembers (two 
for each of the three wards) and one councilmember at-large (mayor) possessing one equal 
vote in the council.70 
Acting on recommendations from the charter review committee and with voter 
approval, University City made several revisions to its charter in the last third of the 1970s. 
Revisions included adjusting term limits from two years to four, establishing a conflict of 
interest section, and stipulating council members deal with administrative staff only via the 
city manager. In the late 1980s following a turnover of councilmembers, a rumor emerged 
that Ferguson’s council was against the city manager form of government. Officials 
vehemently denied these claims imploring citizens to allow the new council to gain 
experience. Aside from a few charter moderations and an unfounded rumor, I found 
 





nothing to suggest these cities were anything other than satisfied with the council-manager 
form of government.71 
Hazelwood and Maplewood adopted home rule charters and established the 
council-manager form of government in the 1970s. Residents voted to transform their 
governmental structure citing the need for a professionally trained manager. They believed 
it was in their respective city’s best interest to have a city manager responsible for the day-
to-day administration of city business. While the municipalities took different paths to 
enacting the council-manager form of government, both cities struggled to adjust to the 
change and experienced extreme difficulties early on.72  
In 1969, the board of trustees of the Village of Hazelwood adopted its first charter 
electing to institute the council-manager form of government. The village became a city on 
April 7, 1970, established six wards with one councilmember per ward and a councilman-
at-large (mayor), and initiated a search for a city manager. On September 15, 1970, the 
City of Hazelwood officials began governing as a council-manager city. The first decade 
was plagued with uncertainty, internal strife, and a high rate of administrative turnover. 
According to one official, “With the newness of the charter, confusion arose. The council 
was used to acting in the capacity of administrators.”73 
 
71 Ferguson officials believed the rumor began because of difficulties new councilmembers were 
experiencing adjusting to being in office. They thought residents needed to give the new council a fair 
chance to gain the experience needed to navigate public office. One councilmember stressed that he 
supported the city manager form of government and as for inexperience, “By the time any new persons 
would be elected they would be the inexperienced ones and the current members will have at least one 
year of experience on the council.” City of Ferguson, MO archival document dated January 10, 1989, page 
2. 
72 According to claims in transcript of City of Hazelwood Mo archives Regular Session: July 26, 1978, page 9 
of 13. 
73 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1-2. 
City of Hazelwood, MO Charter set forth on page 40, Section 4. "The Village Trustees shall remain in office 
until the date the charter is adopted after the election of April 7, 1970. See also: City of Hazelwood, Mo 




Maplewood began its transition, in October 1974, by first establishing the office of 
city administrator to be appointed by the mayor and approved by a majority of the city 
council. Although the position required professional training and duties resembled those of 
a city manager, the city administrator served at the pleasure of the mayor as the chief 
administrative assistant. As was the case in Bridgeton, Missouri where 17 different 
managers had served since 1968, the arrangement was not successful in Maplewood. 
Shortly after the institution of the city administrator citizens began petitioning for the city 
manager type of government. One petitioner exclaimed, “We’ll have a city manager who 
is not the council's yes man. He's not anybody's yes man.”74 
While Maplewood City Council initially rejected requests to transition, appeals 
gained steam when candidates campaigned on a platform promising the installation of a 
city manager. In 1976, the city began investigating the charter form of government and on 
April 4, 1978, voters elected to adopt a home rule charter by a narrow margin of 1,462 to 
1,325. The city selected the council-manager government, appointed its first city manager 
on May 8, 1978, and later divided the city into three wards with two legislators serving 
each ward. As in the other council-manager cities, the mayor was elected city-wide, had an 
equal vote in the council, and did not have veto power.75 
 
74 Bill No. 3867: An ordinance creating the office of city administrator. City of Maplewood, Missouri archive 
Regular Session: October 28, 1974, document 108-111. See Section 7: Duties in document 109. According 
to reference made to Bridgton, MO in City of Hazelwood archive Special Session: August 23, 1978. Excerpt 
of quote taken from transcript of public hearing in City of Maplewood, MO archives Year 1975, Document 
No. 237. 
75 City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1976 document #59, City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 
1977 document number 380 resolution number 158, 1977; City of Maplewood Missouri archives Resolution 
No. 31, 1978 declaring the results of the special municipal election voting on the proposition of the adoption 
of a home rule city charter on the 4th day of April 1978 : by Ordinance No. 3924 approved on the February 
13, 1978; City of Maplewood Missouri archives Resolution No. 40, 1978 approved May 8, 1978, Document 





Maplewood’s early experience with the council-manager government mirrored 
Hazelwood’s experience. Attempts to remove mayors for alleged violations including 
administrative interference were accompanied by suspension, resignation, and termination 
of city managers. Hazelwood had three different city managers in its first five years as a 
council-manager government and four in the first eight years. Maplewood changed city 
managers three times in its first three years as a council-manager city. Some observers 
believed the cities lost several very capable city managers during these times. Nonetheless, 
each city would eventually settle into their new structure and enjoy competent, long-
serving city managers.76 
The City of Jennings has never favored the council-manager form of government. 
Through the years, officials and residents alike have expressed their preference to have 
more elected officials rather than appointed administrators running the city. As a third class 
city, Jennings possessed the authority to establish any form of government it wished 
without voter approval. The municipality chose the mayor-council structure. The only 
notable call for a city manager in the city’s history registered amid escalating turmoil 
during the 1990s. Opponents of the idea mobilized, Jennings elected not to transition to the 
council-manager governing arrangement, and the municipality remains a mayor-council 
city to this day.77 
 
76  Allegations were that the mayor of Hazelwood violated a charter provision under Article II, Section 10 
(Prohibition of Interference). See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1. 
See also: archive dated September 15, 1971 for allegations Hazelwood mayor failed to report city mail 
received. For city manager transitions, see archives Special Session: April 15, 1971; Regular Session: 
November 5, 1975; Special Session: January 24, 1979; and Regular Session: June 6, 1979. See also, 
Resolution No. 60, 1981 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives dated April 10, 1981 approved April 28, 1981 
in Document No. 448; and 2/8/83 Document 133. 
77 For more information about preferences see City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session: 
December 28, 1992, page 3. For more information on elected offices in Jennings in the 1970s, see City of 
Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: February 8, 1971, page 5; and Jennings election results in Regular 




Governing under the mayor-council form, the mayor of Jennings was an executive 
official possessing veto power and the power to appoint boards and commissions. The 
mayor performed many of the duties executed by city managers and other administrative 
staff in council-manager cities. For example, Jennings’ mayors have been responsible for 
planning for the city, directing community development, administering Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs, liability and property insurance programs, 
and the signing of checks.78 
A 1992 University of Missouri examination concluded, “The value of functions 
performed by Jennings’ mayor far outweighs the compensation the mayor receives.” 
Although the prevailing rationale for retaining the mayor-council form in Jennings rests in 
the notion of more voter influence on administrative forces, it was clear affordability 
played a role as well. The city saved money by not paying a mayor and a city manager. Did 
this decision cost the city more long-term? Did the other municipalities better position 
themselves to deal with stabilization threats by adopting the council-manager form of 
government?79 
 
change in the form of government in Jennings. Jennings could consider the commission, city manager, or 
city administrator form or a city charter. The city could contract with the county for certain services, as well. 
For more info see: Jennings archive Regular Session 1240: February 10, 1992, page 1; and Prepared 
statement in reply to allegations, Document Aug. 10, 1992.    
78 Section 7.250 of the Missouri revised statutes 1969: Mayor to be president of council, the mayor shall be 
president of the council and shall preside over same but shall not vote except in case of a tie in said council 
when he shall cast the deciding vote but provided however that he shall have no such power to vote in 
cases when he is an interested party. He shall have the superintending control of all the officers and affairs 
of the city and shall take care that the ordinance of the city and the state laws relating to such city are 
compiled with. See: Jennings Regular Council Session: October 14, 1974, page 4 Document 2887; and 
Resolution dated December 13, 1993.    
79 Jennings record Regular Session 1240: February 10, 1992, page 1; and Document dated August 10, 1992, 
page 41. Note: In one instance, a Jennings mayor offered to pledge his personal assets to the bank to secure 




I examined the municipalities’ forms of government to determine if and how form 
of government impacted their role in stabilization. 
Impact of Forms of Government on Municipal Governance 
By the end of the study period (2015), Jennings had recently elected the first black 
mayor in the city’s history. The city was also embroiled in a lawsuit filed against the city 
by the new mayor. As the city’s contract with the St. Louis County Police Department 
neared the renewal date, officials were seeking cheaper pricing for police services. City 
lawmakers were also initiating impeachment procedures against the mayor on grounds of 
incompetence and creating a hostile work environment. There were allegations of sunshine 
law violations, misappropriation of funds, and abuse of power.80 
The state of Jennings’ municipal government in 2015 bore striking resemblances to 
the City of Maplewood in the 1970s— highly polarized and politically charged. Politicians 
doubled as administrators, the city struggled financially, and local government was largely 
ineffective and entangled in corruption allegations. In fact, one lawmaker in Maplewood 
was indicted on 18 charges in 1973. Policymaking and administering city business is 
difficult work. Trying to stabilize a municipality in this type of political environment is 
much more daunting. However, not only did I find this type of environment in each 
municipality at some point during the study period, I also observed increased 
responsiveness to voter preferences and efficiency as negative environments proliferated.81 
Campaign violations, corruption, “stealthy” backdoor dealings, and ineffective 
municipal governance were not reserved for the mayor-council form of government in the 
 
80 City of Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: June 22, 2015, page 4; Regular Session: August 24, 2015, 
page 3; Regular Session: November 23, 2015, page 2-3. 
81 While there were four lawmakers removed from office, only one was indicted on charges. See City of 




City of Jennings. Intense infighting among lawmakers, polarized politics, divisive rhetoric, 
and hardline stances were observed at one time or another in each study city during the 
study period. These activities were exacerbated by recall attempts and multiple political 
power struggles within local government. Just as Jennings had a strong mayor, each charter 
city had strong city managers who not only managed the day-to-day but also enjoyed 
immense power in the policymaking sphere.82 
Interviewee U4 recalled about one city manager, “He gradually came to feel that it 
was his city. He kind of just made decisions and the city council would rubber stamp it.” 
The goal for the new council-manager cities was to separate politics from the 
administration. However, citizens often complained their city manager behaved “like a 
dictator.” Atmospheres were especially toxic when incoming legislators, voted in as pseudo 
referendums, challenged veteran officials and established norms. Disagreements regarding 
delineation of legislative and administrative duties often resulted in what one former local 
lawmaker framed, “an inertia model for cooperation in an era of individualism.”83 
Interviewee U2 thought it pertinent to point out, “In a council-manager city, the 
council decides the budget and a professional administrator runs the city.” In doing so, 
some city managers’ decisions led to votes of no confidence for poor performance, 
disturbing results from financial audits initiated by citizen petitions, employment 
 
82 “Stealthy,” part of a larger quote referencing the speaker’s description of management style in City of 
University City, MO archive Regular Meeting: October 10, 2005, page 13. 
83 Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents. 
Also, from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official. “There was a 
council that was not, in my opinion, protecting its initiative in the policy-making of the city. We had a city 
manager at that time who, in my opinion was too active. Now with the current administration, he's trying 
to take it back to his time.” Excerpt of Quote taken from City of University City transcript of archive Council 
Retreat: October 31, 2006, page 1-4. Excerpt of quote from transcript of City of Hazelwood, Mo Public 
Hearing dated July 26, 1978, page 9 of 13. For more information regarding the changing political landscape 





discrimination lawsuits, and alleged violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Despite 
the presence of professional administrations, council-manager cities faced “potentially 
crippling financial obligations”84 
There is broad agreement among political science scholars that there are significant 
benefits to municipalities having a professional administrator. According to Interviewee 
J4: 
“Having a council-manager form of government with a professional city manager 
plugs the policymaking apparatus into a tradition of looking for best practices. You 
have a much broader sweep of alternatives that can be presented to elected officials 
for making a determination about policy.” 
 
Like pre-charter Hazelwood and Maplewood, Jennings lacked the expertise of a 
professional city manager, and by the end of the study period, Jennings had long been 
resegregated and economically stressed.85 
Considering these observations, one may deduce that cities like pre-charter 
Maplewood and Jennings struggled in large part because they were not council-manager 
municipalities, and one rebounded in large part because it became one. However, the 
 
84 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official. It is important 
to note that despite intense division and diminished federal and state supports, the council-manager cities 
sustained high service levels. See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session Public Hearing dated May 
5, 1971; September 1, 1976, page 7-8 of 11; City of University City Council meeting transcript of Regular 
Session 1408: May 5, 1986, page 1; City of University City public hearing transcript of archive Session 1915: 
March 29, 2004, page 13; City of University transcript of archive Session 1934: September 20, 2004. Excerpt 
of quote from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official. Also, a poll of 
several thousand city residents showed 55.4 % were in favor of a state audit of city finances, 17.6 % opposed 
the audit, and 27 % were undecided. Poll numbers listed in City of University City archive Regular Session: 
December 7, 2009. See also, Humphreys v. City of University City, et al. Case information outlined in City of 
University City archive Regular Council Meeting October 26, 2009, page13. For example, University City’s 
insurance deductible was as high as $150,000 as a result of so many lawsuits levied against the city. 
According to a University City official, the city was no longer in the insurance pool because “we had been 
sued so often.” Note: Deductibles for cities like University City normally range between $10,000 to $15,000.  





evidence does not support such claims. It is clear their institutional structures, operational 
mechanisms, and subsequent conditions differed from the council-manager municipalities. 
Nevertheless, I found that the forms of government did little to influence the quality 
of municipal governances’ policy decisions. In fact, I found Jennings’ policy decisions— 
particularly pre-2000s were slightly superior to Ferguson’s in terms of quality (number of 
times best practice was applied to in-common destabilizers). Best practice refers to policies 
and practices which mitigated negative effects of destabilizing activities. Examples of best 
practice include open housing/antidiscrimination policies, zoning which dispersed low 
income rentals, and establishment of a land clearance authority or housing corporation. 
Jennings’ mayor-council government did not preclude the city from proactively 
intervening, supporting grassroots stabilization efforts, and making good policy and 
administrative decisions. Equally, the presence of a city manager did not exclude Ferguson 
from failing to do so. As a former mayor of Hazelwood said: 
"No government is better than the people who run it. It makes no difference what 
the form may be so long as the administrators are honest and capable."86 
 
Faced with the Jennings/Ferguson form of government dilemma, I examine other 
distinguishing characteristics which may better account for discrepancies in quality of 
policies. I posed the question, did officials’ characteristics and the varying composition of 
individuals in municipal government determine the quality of policy decisions? I examined 
municipal officials’ characteristics and the composition of governments to better determine 








Characteristics and Composition of Municipal Governance 
Many transitions occurred in the 1970s, but few were more significant than the 
changes in characteristics and composition of municipal governments. Some cities tried to 
improve conditions by professionalizing. They were new to the council-manager form and 
struggled adjusting to the transition. Others witnessed longtime serving officials and 
established professionals cycle out. Some were replaced with individuals who upheld 
previous policies and practices. Others were replaced with reformers. Cities created new 
positions and redefined roles for existing ones. Regardless of the shifts and alterations in 
municipal governance, municipalities experienced perpetual crisis in the 1970s.87 
Policymakers and administrators diligently attempted to serve as stabilizing 
influences in their respective cities. They generally tried to engage and educate citizens and 
work with various groups for their city’s betterment. Municipal leaderships consisted of 
talented, knowledgeable decisionmakers possessing unique specializations. They held firm 
commitment to upholding the constitution as public officials, took pride in their public 
service, and believed by governing according to the letter of the law, “Every citizen was 
amply protected.”88 
 
87 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 
year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 209; and City of 
Maplewood archives September 28, 1979 Document number 273 -274. City of Ferguson, MO archive dated 
March 26, 1974 page 7. In University City, by mid-year 1975, City Manager announced on May 12, 1975 he 
accepted the city manager position in Eugene, Oregon. His departure signaled a substantial changing of the 
guard. Henry had served as city manager since 1958. City of University City archive Regular Session 1105: 
June 16, 1975, page 28; For more about resignations and decisions not to run for reelection see the 
following: City of University City archives: Session 1172: October 17th, 1977, page 2; Session 1176: 
December 12, 1977, page 15; and Session 1187: May 22, 1978, page 2.Also, see Charter revisions of 1975. 
The term councilmember replaced councilman. Councilman at-large was now referred to as mayor. For 
more on the city’s charter revisions of 1975 refer to City of University City archive Session 1120: December 
15, 1975, page 5. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 18, 1979. 





However, civility and collaboration were difficult to achieve during this period, 
especially between parties with diverging perspectives on how to approach changes in 
racial composition and economic conditions. Interviewee U5 described the environment 
this way: 
“Before, there were always people striving to get to the middle to make decisions, 
understanding that compromise was important for peace and stability. But you 
didn't see that anymore in city government.” 
  
Lines were clearly drawn. Officials stood firm on either side and did not mince words 
regarding alliances.89 
While each municipality’s municipal governance consisted of a majority of 
officials in favor of progressive racial integration policies and practices, opponents of such 
measures were present and vocal in each case. Opposing integration, albeit a view held by 
a minority of officials in the study group, was widely accepted, and in some situations 
expected. To get a better sense of the atmosphere during this period, observe the language 
used by a Ferguson lawmaker to refer to Kinloch residents and councilmates in the 
following excerpts of a 1970 public hearing transcript: 
“We have people here in the city saying that we have to play it [really] careful, it’s 
touchy. I think we should call a spade a spade, a black a black, and not be afraid to 
face up to these people and tell them we don’t want their little pickaninnies coming 
over and throwing rocks at our kids…. Call a coon a coon and nigger a nigger. If 
you are [diplomatic] about it they walk right over you.” 
 
“I sometimes get disgusted by some of the outrageous antics of the council 
majority…. In these times when it sometimes seems as though the limp wristed, 
weak wheel types are [predominant] in so many areas, it has been a pleasure for me 
 
89 Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / Resident / Ex-State Government Official. 
Interviewee says, “I would go to a meeting and I wouldn't care if it was about whether or not we should put 





to serve on the council with a real man’s man…who is not afraid to espouse the 
proper…position no matter how politically unpopular.”90 
  
Despite the fact that some fellow city officials held racist convictions, municipal 
leaders employed collegial approaches in attempts to reach consensus. They quickly 
became adept at navigating rough political, economic, and social terrains consistently 
seeking to learn new strategies and techniques. They participated in professional 
development groups and held memberships in local, state, and national consortia designed 
to help build municipal capacity for combating threats to stability. Council majorities often 
responded to issues in concert— particularly in matters related to justice. However, 
decisions did not always align with their expressed views. In these instances, minority rule 
prevailed.91 
For cities like Hazelwood, where civic engagement was relatively low, and 
Maplewood, where no threat of resegregation ever emerged, municipal leadership enjoyed 
more liberty to enact policy and practices consistent with the preferences of the council 
majority and administrative recommendations. These municipalities realized tremendous 
progress and accomplishments. Hazelwood grew from a small village occupying the 15th 
position in 1970 to registering as the fifth largest municipality in St. Louis County by 2002. 
 
90 Excerpts of quotes taking from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated June 23, 1970, page 5 and City of 
Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session: April 11, 1978, page 3. See also, Ferguson archive dated August 
25, 1970, page 5.  
91 When the Missouri Municipal League decided to endorse a Missouri, Peace Officers Association-
supported mandatory sentencing bill, University City Council unanimously opposed the league’s position. 
They sympathized with the association’s objectives but thought it inappropriate for the league to take a 
position on the matter. Officials argued the function of imposing criminal sentences should be left to the 
judiciary and not enacted into law by the Missouri General Assembly. For more information regarding the 
council’s position on the bill refer to archive Regular Session 1061: November 26, 1973, page 6-7. See also, 




As far as revitalizations are concerned, Maplewood’s renaissance serves as a model that 
cities continue attempting to replicate.92 
While increased flexibility in municipal governance does not explain their success, 
it did increase the probability of decisionmakers voting according to their preferences— 
which usually aligned with best practice. In the civically engaged cities experiencing 
change in racial composition, policymakers did not enjoy the same freedoms. Voting 
according to best practice sometimes meant going against an overwhelming majority of 
constituents. Against their better judgement lawmakers could choose to honor the requests 
of those who put them in office and preserve their seat, or they could choose to vote for 
best practice and risk losing it. 
In chapter 5, I examine policy decisions and contextualize them in their respective 
citizen environment to better understand if and how citizen environment impacted policy 
decisions, how policy decisions impacted municipal stabilization, and how this relationship 






92 Note: As late as 1980, Maplewood was still working on improving its fair housing policies. See, City of 
Maplewood, MO archives Year 1980, Document No. 346. Bill No. 4141: an ordinance authorizing and 
directing the mayor of Maplewood to enter into a contract with St. Louis County for assistance and services 
to further the policies of the fair housing code of the City of Maplewood passed unanimously; City of 
Maplewood, archives March 25, 1980, Document 350. Bill number 4141 was approved on March 25, 1980 
as Ordinance Number 4035 filed in Document No. 350. According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated 
November 4, 1970; City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 21, 1971, page 10. City of Hazelwood, Mo 
archives dated September 1, 1976; and November 20, 2002. City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 
3, 1983, Document 221; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 23,1983 Document number 224; City 
of Maplewood Missouri archives May 8, 1984, Document number 289; City of Maplewood, Missouri 




Chapter 5. Housing Policy 
Introduction 
For decades, suburban governing bodies enjoyed immunity from having to deal 
with the types of racial and spatial challenges emerging in the suburbs in the 1960s, 1970s, 
and in to the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, most were ill-equipped to effectively do so. Their 
policies were designed and enacted in the pre-fair housing era. In many suburban 
communities, archaic restrictive deed covenants were still in use and various other 
discriminatory laws still stained the pages of city code books. With the advent of fair 
housing laws, suburbs began to face threats traditionally reserved for central cities. 
With diverse housing options and a county-wide apartment boom occurring, cities 
like this study’s five municipalities could accommodate homebuyers and renters of all 
races and economic stations. This status rendered these cities vulnerable to panic selling, 
white flight, and loss of tax base. When black suburbanization began in the early 1960s, it 
was primarily working-class, middle-class, and upper middle-class individuals and 
families in search of a safe, pleasant, and affordable community in which to settle. Black 
home seekers desired good schools, pedestrian friendly public spaces, quality public 
services, and a mix of amenities. 
As black migrants from St. Louis City settled in the various municipalities, a 
disturbing trend emerged. Black families were relocating from isolated concentrations in 
the central city to rapidly transforming areas in the suburbs. They settled in resegregating 
neighborhoods comprised of primarily smaller, more affordable post-WWII homes and 
multifamily dwellings. Eventually, many of these communities mirrored the segregated 




neighborhood preferences could explain only a modest percentage of racial disparities in 
the housing market.93 
Municipalities’ housing stock and income of home seekers could not account for 
the level of resegregation occurring in these neighborhoods. Inner suburbs were 
resegregating in large part because of housing discrimination. Real estate agents would not 
show black families homes in white neighborhoods and discouraged white families from 
moving into areas where blacks were present. Regardless of economic status blacks were 
steered towards neighborhoods where blacks lived (traditionally offering low-value 
housing at inflated prices) and white families were steered away from those areas. The 
practice of racial steering was emblematic of the federal government’s real estate policies. 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also 
engaged in housing discrimination. HUD’s mortgage insurance program administered by 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) refused to insure loans for white families 
attempting to buy homes in and around black residential areas. HUD properties repossessed 
through foreclosure and tax sales were often left vacant and in need of substantial repairs. 
Some were vandalized and left in such disrepair they had to be condemned and 
demolished.94 
The real estate industry and federal housing administrators engaged in housing 
discrimination and other activities which were detrimental to communities. Their actions 
 
93 According to reviews of 1970-2010 US Census data and 1970-2015 demographical indicators from each 
study city.  
94 Example of discriminatory housing practices being employed during a time following the passage of the 
1968 Fair Housing Act. For more details about this example see: City of University archives Regular Council 
Meeting Session 1104: June 9, 1975, page 15. In one instance, a white family moved from Kansas City and 
purchased a University City business. They placed $2,500 down on a three-bedroom home in the Third Ward 
but were denied an FHA loan. The denial letter cited “instability” as the reason the agency did not approve 
the loan.  The family involved was a family of means. It was widely known that the FHA would have 




helped accelerate and intensify resegregation and neighborhood blight and made stabilizing 
these areas much harder for local governments and citizens. When HUD amended its public 
housing program, proponents pointed to the new format as an effective way to avoid the 
decline experienced during the failed public housing projects model. 
The new system involved HUD transitioning from developing and managing public 
housing to paying a share of low-income renters’ rent on the open market through Section 
8 subsidized housing. Local officials wrestled with the question of proportionality of 
Section 8 housing within their municipal borders. Most municipalities discouraged 
developments and aimed to restrict the total amount of rental property by setting maximum 
limits. However, as suburban populations aged and transitioned income levels, notable 
numbers of residents could no longer maintain their larger homes. Thus, certain areas 
allowed for higher percentages of subsidized housing. 
As black suburbanization progressed, migration became more a result of 
displacement rather than choice. North St. Louis County became inundated with low-
income black residents uprooted from failed housing projects in the central city. Some 
communities possessed the resources, capacity, preparedness, and willingness to mitigate 
negative reactions to integration thus minimizing their destabilizing effects. Although 
some others were not as resource rich or equipped to effectively combat resegregation and 
economic decline, each possessed the capability to implement policies designed to help 
stabilize their city. 
Regardless of policy starting point, each of the study’s municipal council 
demonstrated attention to detail, performed careful analysis of issues, and enlisted the 




which included significant demographic shifts, market fluctuations, and funding 
modifications. Circumstances required amending allowances for multifamily 
developments, affordable housing, and subsidies. Through various policy actions related 
to antidiscrimination, appropriations, building codes, zoning, and land reutilization local 
governments enacted ordinances based on their respective goals.95 
Policy decisions were distinguished by each respective municipality’s 
policymaking processes; level of citizen civic engagement, citizens’ preferences, and 
legislators’ responses to citizen engagement and preferences; types of policies enacted; 
timing of policy actions; and other ancillary factors such as varying instructions for how 
administrative forces were to implement and execute policies and monitor policy impacts. 
Municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization started with open housing / 
antidiscrimination, housing, and land use decisions, indecisions, and nondecisions.96 
Open Housing / Antidiscrimination 
While no singular variable exists to explain why black residents in Maplewood 
represented only .2 % of the city’s population at the start of the study period, research 
allows us to conclude racism played a part. Like 18 other counties in Missouri, blacks were 
 
95 Residents accused city servicers of treating apartment complexes as rows of single-family homes and 
allowing multiple families to occupy single-family units. Municipal governments set out to address the issue 
of overcrowding by instituting new policies and regulations which dictated who could live together in a 
single housing unit. Policies aimed to alleviate overcrowding in neighborhoods and schools ignited a fierce 
debate over the definition of family. Many residents felt defining family in occupancy policy was an 
outrageous infringement on privacy. Other opponents of the policies felt ulterior motives may be behind 
the restrictions. Detractors argued the laws were discriminatory because they targeted low-income 
families, served to only protect wealthier residents and property values, and were based on fear of opening 
the gates to poor blacks. Groups like the League of Women Voters spoke out against the policies. They along 
with others worked to increase the supply of low and moderate-income housing by getting zoning laws 
changed to allow for shared housing. Shared housing was critical as older adults and other groups living on 
limited incomes represented a significant proportion of residents.  
96 I use the term “Positive” to denote municipal influence that helped municipality stabilize. Conversely, 





not yet welcome to reside in most areas of St. Louis County in 1970. One-half of one 
percent of Jennings’ residents were black, less than one percent in Ferguson, and just under 
two percent in Hazelwood. University City’s black residents accounted for 20 % of that 
municipality’s total population. The city had experienced remarkable growth in black 
residency over a short period of time.97 
Just 10 years earlier, only 88 of University City’s 51,000 residents were black. Of 
the city’s 260 employees, only 35 were black and they held only unskilled jobs in the 
sanitation department. Much of post-1970 neighborhood change and racial integration 
literature praise University City as a pioneer of open housing in the 1960s and rightfully 
so. However, one should be careful not to romanticize the University City experience as a 
racially harmonious utopia borne of exceptionalism, altruism, and passivity. As late as 
1959, University City seemed just as unlikely to be a leader in the protection and promotion 
of blacks’ civil rights as the other municipalities in the study.98 
Racial discrimination was not only prevalent in the city, it was still officially 
sanctioned by law in many arenas. A University City ordinance adopted in 1938 requiring 
black males working as city porters and janitors to wear badges bearing their photographs 
and fingerprints was still in use. And a survey conducted by the League of Women Voters 
found that of 45 establishments serving food and drink more than half did not serve blacks. 
When black families began migrating to the area in 1962, racist fears of irresponsible 
 
97 According to US Census data; and demographical indicators taken from each city’s archives as of 2015.  
98 Population figures according to the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). Also 
referenced in Harris 1981, p.156; and Lubeck 1978, p.73 along with Missouri counties’ persistence of 




tenants, absentee landlords, declining property values, and proliferation of crime 
abounded.99 
The in-migration of black families prompted an exodus of white residents and a 
dramatic reduction in the growth of new white residents. Interviewee U5 recalls: 
“I was the second African American in the neighborhood in 1967. As time went by 
though, I started seeing other African Americans move in around me. Before long 
it was a little over 50 % African American. It stayed like that for a while, and it was 
stable.”100 
 
University City’s success in stabilizing was in large part the result of intelligent, 
proactive, and strategic action by a cooperative collection of municipal officials and citizen 
advocates. Notwithstanding, policy decisions were the critical component supporting and 
empowering the actors to effectively navigate amenable as well as adversarial 
environments. 
Throughout the 1960s, instead of denying the inevitable (a substantial increase of 
blacks residing within their municipal borders) or engaging in futile prevention attempts, 
University City lawmakers went about the work of instituting progressive policies aimed 
at preventing resegregation. They enacted fair housing ordinances, established anti-
blockbusting policies prohibiting real estate agents from steering and soliciting sales, 
banned the use of “for sale” signs, and implemented an occupancy permit system. 
University City’s municipal governance was not necessarily prepared for the situation, but 
 
99 For a more detailed history on the racial shift and the city’s response, see Harris, N. 1981. Legacy of Lions: 
A History of University City. University City, MO: The Historical Society of University City; and Lubeck, Dennis 
R. (1978). University City: A Suburban Community's Response to Civil Rights, 1959-1970. St. Louis University. 
The 1938 identification ordinance and survey information taken from Harris 1981, p.156; and Lubeck 1978, 
p.73. 




it acted swiftly. Officials maximized available policy tools, innovated, educated, and 
advocated new policy tools.101 
By 1970, University City looked strikingly different than the other four 
municipalities. It was a multi-ethnic, multi-racial city compromised of residents of various 
nationalities and religious affiliations with a wide range of educational backgrounds. As 
the community’s ethnic character broadened, it retained its upper-middle-class standing. 
Blacks moving into the municipality matched whites in education and income levels. Data 
indicates 73 % of the work force were employed in white collar jobs and 61.5 % of houses 
were owner-occupied. Perceptions of a crisis that had gripped the city several years earlier 
soon dissipated.102 
Although University City’s forward thinking put them ahead of the integration 
curve during the turbulent 1960s, the phenomenon still brought with it many social 
challenges amid growing economic strife and inter-suburban and exurban competition. 
Except for episodic examples, the study’s remaining cities were not experiencing such 
destabilizing activities. Migration of St. Louis blacks had not yet reached their municipal 
boundaries. Via direct communication, consortia updates, and other avenues, local 
government leaders in other cities remained abreast of the events happening in University 
City. They were well-aware the municipality was combating resegregation of its 
neighborhoods and was no longer an enclave of white exclusivity. 
University City’s experience granted other municipalities not only the benefit of 
additional time to prepare, but also demonstrable evidence of effects of certain policy 
 
101 See City of University City, MO Fair Housing Information at ucitymo.org/203/Fair-Housing-Information; 
Harris 1981, p.160. 




actions. Among the study group city councils, none leveraged these benefits more 
effectively than Hazelwood City Council. Additionally, no other city’s local lawmakers 
held as many meetings and reviewed the same items more repetitiously before deciding an 
action than Hazelwood’s. 
The City of Hazelwood held a minimum of four meetings per month— one each 
Wednesday and held additional meetings as needed. Councilmembers were aggressively 
involved often performing duties executed by city managers in other cities. Only months 
into operating as a charter city, Hazelwood City Council established itself as a highly 
productive, progressive policymaking body.103 
In July 1972, Hazelwood requested a copy of the City of Berkeley’s anti-
steering/anti-blockbusting ordinance to study. Despite the most recent census indicating 
the municipality was home to only 270 black people out of a total population of over 14,000 
residents, Hazelwood City Council initiated a stabilizing policy implementation program. 
On August 7, 1974, the city council unanimously passed Bill No. 1101 strengthening the 
prohibition of housing discrimination. Filed as Ordinance No. 1071-74, the legislation 
outlawed the practices of steering and solicitation. Less than a year later, on June 18, 1975, 
the city adopted Ordinance No. 1118 -75 banning real estate signs.104 
 
103 City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated February 7, 1979. 
104 City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated July 19, 1972; Special Session dated July 13, 1972; Regular Session 
August 7, 1974: An ordinance amending the municipal code of the City of Hazelwood, Missouri, by 
amending Chapter 7, Buildings, buy the adoption of Article IV, Sections 7.13 and 7.14 relating to the 
regulations of solicitation of the sale, rental, leasing, or otherwise disposing of or moving away from such 
dwellings, and discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. To prohibit 
interference with the peace of owners and occupants of such dwellings by the use of certain tactics to 
encourage such owners or occupants to sell or move from such desires to make available to any person, 
regardless of race. For real estate ban see City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 18, 1975: Bill 
1144 was adopted as ordinance number 1118-75 by vote of 4 to 2 on June 18, 1975; and Special Session 




Hazelwood’s enactment of these legislations was in no way unprecedented. As 
referenced earlier, University City and Berkeley had similar ordinances on the books and 
larger central cities had leveraged the policy tools in various forms years earlier. 
Nevertheless, Hazelwood’s actions were noteworthy as they occurred long before any 
notable signs of resegregation or threats materialized. In fact, Hazelwood had ten fewer 
real estate listings over the year leading up to enacting the real estate sign ban than it had 
two years prior.105 
Hazelwood officials’ position on proactive antidiscrimination, blockbusting, and 
steering policies was best demonstrated in the following two statements made by two 
different councilmembers: “The appearance of two or three for sale signs in an area has a 
psychological effect and could create a problem.” And, “Since we do not have this problem 
as yet, this would help prevent its developing.” Racial integration literature lists early 
intervention as a critical requirement in stabilizing municipalities. Like University City 
before them, Hazelwood acted early.106 
By the year 2000, Hazelwood’s black population had grown to 16 % from just under 
two percent 30 years earlier. Consider also, Hazelwood’s total population nearly doubled 
during the 30-year period growing from 14,082 to 26,206. Contrast that with Ferguson 
where total population had declined 23 % but black residency went from less than one 
 
105 According to statistics referenced in City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated June 18, 1975. 
The City of St. Louis system only allowed real estate signs in residential areas if the petitioner paid a fee of 
$5. 00 and appeared before the Human Relations Commission to seek a variance to permit such a sign. The 
city did not grant many permits. Opponents of the ban including representatives of the Real Estate Board 
of Metropolitan St. Louis suggested alternatives which were in use in various locales along the east coast 
(e.g. Baltimore County). They argued they had been effective without being as restrictive as the Hazelwood 
ban. Signs may be used, but if ten voters petition to have certain signs removed, the authorities must hold 
a public hearing to decide if they should be removed. They then pass a resolution to ban signs in that area. 
This process took a minimum of 90 days. The procedure was unresponsive to immediate problems.   




percent in 1970 to accounting for over 52 % of the municipality’s population by 2000. 
Racial composition and population were not the only discernable differences between the 
two cities. Ferguson not only gained a disproportionate number of new black residents, 
they gained a disproportionate share of poor black residents.107 
Consider that by the time Ferguson instituted its landlord initiative in 2005, the 
problem the city hoped to solve already had an over 35-year head start. Of the 385 tenant 
eviction recommendations made through Ferguson’s landlord initiative between January 
2008 and June 2010, 46 % emanated from six apartment complexes on the city’s eastside. 
Nearly half of all emergency and police calls made in Ferguson in 2010 were attributed to 
these six apartment complexes and of those, more than 2/3 originated in two apartment 
complexes: Canfield (42) and Northwinds (56). Contrast this with the five calls made from 
the six-building Arbor Village Courts apartment complex on the city’s westside and an 
obvious distinction in conditions begins to emerge.108 
Erected in the late 1960s, a cluster of apartment complexes on the eastside of 
Ferguson adorned an area flanked by small homes, neighboring Jennings, and a busy 
thoroughfare. For the city of nearly 30,000 residents, 28 % renters, and 84 % post-WWII 
 
107 Note: By 1997, an average of 80 dwellings per month were transitioning occupants due to people moving 
in and out of Ferguson. Stat taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: May 27, 1997, page 
2. According to US Census data; Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information 
System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. 
108 City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Council Work Session Transcript, pages 86, 89, 91. 
Ferguson officials held a council work session to discuss the problems emanating from the city’s eastside 
apartment complexes. Officials believed the complexes were becoming a public safety issue. Despite 40 
years of citizen complaints and concerns, officials were asking “What's going on there?” And did not know 
“what else we're going to do from the council standpoint.” They were unsure if the problem was their 
concern. The mayor expressed this, “I almost feel like if that's a concern of ours, we should probably just 
go ahead and instruct our staff now to start brainstorming or coming up with a solution to bring something 
to us.” Officials identified two major conflicts: 1. Need for a better screening process of acceptable tenants. 
2. Properties’ ownership needs to provide a safe environment by enhancing their security with private 
security on location, gated communities, etc. City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Public 




dwellings, developments like the Canfield and Village apartments went largely 
unnoticed— except by area homeowners. Longstanding problems had existed in the area 
prior to the advent of the apartments.109 
With no traffic light system at the intersection of West Florissant and Canfield, no 
speed limit signs, and no speedbumps on the access road, heavy traffic and speeders made 
negotiating the area extremely dangerous for pedestrians. Insufficient city services and 
government apathy left this section of Ferguson’s Third Ward feeling ignored. The 
apartment complexes added overflowing trash dumpsters and constant drainage backups 
intensifying local frustrations. Supplicating for action from the city, one civically engaged 
citizen asked, “What can be done for the people living on Canfield?”110 
The city attributed its inaction to having no authority in these matters. West 
Florissant was a state road, apartment complexes were private properties responsible for 
providing refuse services, and MSD held authority over the sewer system. Before long 
homeowners who had resided on streets like Canfield, Glen Owen, Ellison, and Clarion for 
decades began putting their homes up for sale. When this process began, Ferguson was still 
overwhelmingly white. There were only 265 black citizens in the entire city, and the 
majority of racial hostility focused on the black municipality to the west— Kinloch.111 
 
109 Ibid 
110 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson public hearing Regular Session: February 10, 1970, page 3. 
See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 10, 1973, page 1. Citizens address council 
concerning speeding conditions existing in the area of Canfield and Village apartments. A man was killed 
while walking on the sidewalk by a speeding car. Citizens in the area remain concerned after years of 
petition the city to act. City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: June 9, 1970, page 5; April 14, 1970, 
page 1; June 9, 1970, page 1; April 27, 1971, page 1; May 11, 1971; Traffic Commission Meeting: May 12, 
1971; July 27, 1971, page 1; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session: October 14, 1975, page 2; Ferguson 
Regular Session: March 8, 1977, page 4. 
111 Note: University City took a decidedly different approach. Even though similar traffic light installations 
were needed in their city and were beyond their scope of authority, University City worked with the 
Missouri State Highway Department to get them installed. University City officials implemented 




It had only been months since the municipality removed barricades erected to 
prevent Kinloch resident’s entry into Ferguson. While the city’s racist animus focused on 
preserving and protecting the westside of Ferguson from a Kinloch invasion, demographics 
on the city’s eastside were transforming. The city’s policies, however, were not. Within a 
decade, Ferguson’s total population declined 14.4 %, black population increased to 13.6 
%, and Jennings had erected a barricade quarantining Ferguson’s eastside residents from 
its western borders. By 2010, the transformation was complete, Ferguson was 67.4 % 
black, and its eastside was home to a resegregated area comprised of multifamily 
complexes, low-cost single-family rentals, and concentrated poverty.112 
During the fall of 1996, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity 
Council (EHOC) conducted an audit of real estate firms serving Ferguson. Utilizing tests 
designed to detect disparate treatment and noncompliance with fair housing laws, the 
agency found firms treated minorities different. According to a Ferguson resolution, 
“Violators may be required to attend housing training provided by EHOC.” By the time 
the City of Ferguson contracted EHOC to investigate real estate practices, 35 years had 
 
service. With habitual flooding in the municipality, University City worked closely with MSD in efforts to 
address its challenges with the River Des Peres. 
112 According to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 
11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0. 
Ferguson officials finally sought to address the West Florissant/Canfield intersection problem by calling for 
a bond issue election for a traffic signal in 1977. See bond issue resolution and Jennings barricade issue in 
City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: March 8, 1977, page 4; Ferguson Regular Session: March 22, 
1977, pages 1 and 4. See also, Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 1, Document No. 3082: Public 
hearing to decide if a barricade should be erected on Clarion Dr. and Ellison Dr. at the boundary line 
separating the City of Jennings and the City of Ferguson. A unanimous decision that the streets could be 
blocked with no detrimental effects. Jennings argued there were adequate fire plugs and alternate 
automobile routes available to the residents of Ferguson. Ferguson citizens did not want the barricade and 
stated they believed the only reason people wanted the barricade was racial. Jennings Regular Session: 
February 28, 1977 document 3069; Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 4, Document 3087; 
Jennings council approved the barricade. See, Bill No. 1201: An ordinance authorizing the Jennings street 
department to barricade Ellison drive at the boundary line separating the City of Jennings and the City of 
Ferguson passed unanimously and approved as ordinance No. 1183. Jennings Regular Session: April 25, 




elapsed since the first black families began migrating west to settle in University City, 
black residents had represented roughly 15 % of Ferguson residents for nearly 20 years, 
and had represented a quarter of the total population for a decade.113 
For blacks moving into Ferguson during the black suburbanization period, they 
were entering a city with a decidedly different policy agenda than University City and 
Hazelwood. Consider that by 1995, Ferguson still had not accepted Oak Park, IL racial 
integration group’s offer to help initiate programs, and the city had not implemented any 
of the group’s recommendations. During a council work session, officials made their 
positions on the Oak Park matter clear through the following statements: 
“I see it as governmental steering. I don’t think that is an appropriate governmental 
activity. I have been opposed to a report listing occupancy turnover and how many 
of the different races have moved into Ferguson. There are too many other 
important things for the council to do like economics and streets.” 
 
“I’m not totally against the Oak Park programs. There are some good things behind 
it, but I don’t think most of it would work for us.” 
 
A former Ferguson councilmember attending the council work session said, 
“Ninety-nine percent of comments involved racial issues. I believe this is one more 
attempt to enforce racial integration.”114 
 
Long before the word Ferguson became synonymous with suburban transgressions, 
the seeds of the city’s principal challenge were sown. Divided policy preferences, lack of 
political will among a slim council majority, and disproportionate policy power enjoyed 
by a slim citizen majority led to a deficit in best practice policies which plagued the city 
throughout the study. For decades, community members supporting integration efforts in 
Ferguson had been overshadowed by those opposing such measures. 
 
113 Excerpt of Resolution passed and approved by the city council of the City of Ferguson, MO archive filed 
January 14, 1997. 
114 Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Council Work Session included in Regular 




Opponents felt support of racial integration maintenance programs should, “Forget 
about Oak Park.” According to one resident, “If people want to live that way, they can 
move to Oak Park.” In expressing their disapproval of policies they believed would 
transform their municipality in an “undesirable fashion,” Ferguson’s slim citizen majority 
often referred to places like Hazelwood and University City as examples.115 
Ferguson has a longstanding reputation as a city that did not desire to integrate. 
Such an assessment is demonstrably accurate. However, it is important not to rely solely 
on subsequent policy action or inaction without unpacking contextual nuances to better 
identify motivating factors behind policy action and inaction. 
When the mayor of Ferguson received a letter from the chairman of the Real Estate 
Board of Metropolitan St. Louis, in September 1970, Ferguson’s population of 28,915 
included only 265 blacks, and a Ferguson homeowner “could refuse to sell to someone 
because of race, color, or creed and he would not be in violation of city code.” The purpose 
of the letter was to inform the mayor that the board was “becoming increasingly alarmed 
at reports of block-busting.” In response to the letter, Ferguson’s mayor introduced Bill 
No. 445: an ordinance enacting Chapter 52 “Fair Housing Code.” A Ferguson official not 
aligned with the council majority’s philosophies objected. According to the lawmaker, “A 
fair housing code in this city will only bring on problems.”116 
 
115 Excerpts of quotes in transcript of City of Ferguson, MO public hearing portion of Regular Session dated 
October 10, 1995, page 1. 
116 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive of public hearing dated October 13, 1970, 
page 1. A statement made by Ferguson’s city attorney in response to a citizen’s inquiry regarding fair 
housing laws. Excerpt of quote in transcript of letter read during City of Ferguson, MO public hearing dated 
September 8, 1970, page 3. Figures according to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical 





Essentially, the bill was redundant as federal law already prohibited discrimination 
in the sale and rental of properties based on race. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s discussion on 
the matter offers an illuminating glimpse into the complexities involved in their 
policymaking process. Despite having the 4 to 3 majority required to pass the bill, 
proponents continued attempting to convince those in the minority to support the 
legislation. They pointed out that there had been no trouble with the city’s public 
accommodation bill, claimed the bill did not apply to individual property owners, and 
argued the bill could improve the city’s position in dealing with federal agencies. One 
official tried to elicit support by framing the issue as a matter of morality exclaiming, “A 
vote against this bill would be a vote in favor of discrimination.”117 
The majority’s efforts did little to sway the three opposed to the bill. Despite being 
in the minority among councilpersons, they enjoyed the support of a slim but politically 
powerful citizen majority who were very civically engaged residents. For them, claims that 
no problems were realized with the public accommodation bill and equating an opposition 
vote to discrimination were categorically false and weakened proponents’ arguments. They 
cited robust citizen disapproval of the public accommodations law and argued such laws 
“placed further limitations on the people of Ferguson to use their property.” Ferguson’s 
city council was decidedly split along two philosophical lines.118 
Each official agreed Ferguson citizens had the right to protect their property and 
families. However, one contingent believed this meant the character of the city should be 
 
117 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page 
5. 
118 For examples of citizen’s disapproval of the bill, see City of Ferguson, MO archives October 13, 1970, 
page 1. Also used here is an additional excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Ferguson, MO 




determined by the people, and they felt the mandate from the people was clear: The council 
enacts policies which preserve that character and prevent change. The other contingent 
believed it meant that, in electing them as representatives, the people had conferred 
protection responsibilities to the council, and “there are times when leadership should be 
exerted.”119 
Through these types of exchanges, I observed a critical component in Ferguson’s 
policymaking process which had significant impact on policymaking processes, shaped 
policies, and resulted in enduring and detrimental effects. Nearing the end of the 1970s, a 
decade in which Ferguson experienced exponential growth in black population (approx. 13 
%), the city was yet to enact anti-blockbusting/anti-steering legislation. Complaints of 
housing discrimination were common but went largely unaddressed.120 
It was not until homeowners began complaining of being disturbed and pressured 
by real estate firms using scare tactics and other unethical behavior in residential areas that 
the council began considering legislation. In June 1978, Ferguson’s city manager secured 
copies of University City’s ordinance to use as a template for drafting a Ferguson anti-
blockbusting bill. Local real estate industry representatives opposed the legislation as 
unnecessary citing the existence of federal law as sufficient and arguing all reputable firms 
respected the law.121 
 
119 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page 5. Also note: 
Bill No. 4450 was declared passed by a vote of 5 ayes to 2 noes and became Ordinance No. 70-119 “Fair 
Housing Code” filed in the City of Ferguson, MO Ordinance Book No. 4, page 3.    
120 According to US Census data; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 
Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. 
121 See City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: May 23, 1978, page 4; and City of Ferguson, MO 




Ferguson officials responded to the real estate industry’s objection by suggesting 
they send the council a copy of a bill “with any deletions and rewording [they] felt would 
be more acceptable to the real estate people.” Ferguson had not reached the end of the 
decade without such legislation because of a lack of local efforts. Concerned citizens and 
civic groups had been lobbying for similar measures since before black residency eclipse 
one percent of the total population.122 
As early as 1975, initial signs of resegregation were beginning to show. There 
were already pockets of concentrated low-income black residents and a proliferation of 
for sale signs throughout residential areas of Ferguson— especially in the central city 
area. Citizens that had been petitioning the council to take actions such as removing and 
banning real estate signs from Ferguson were initially met with fierce opposition. Scores 
of homeowners complained an ordinance prohibiting real estate signs would be too 
restrictive as it would greatly limit their ability to sell their homes.123 
Officials told those in favor of a ban they could contact real estate companies and 
request the excess signs be removed. By mid-1975, however, the inevitable was finally 
beginning to be realized and panic was widespread. Officials were “surprised at the number 
of real estate signs that [were] up in neighborhoods and how very few [were] Ferguson 
 
122 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: June 13, 1978, page 3. See 
also, Regular Session: March 28, 1978, page 1. Some Ferguson citizens had been expressing specific 
opposition to things like the misuse of for sale signs on properties and felt the practice should be eliminated 
through city ordinance. See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 10, 1973, page 1. 
123 Citizens were present in the council chambers requesting the council place the matter on the floor for 
future advisement. They presented a petition to remove all real estate signs in Ferguson. The petition 
contained approximately 160 signatures. A citizen claimed to have contacted a Dellwood real estate 
company said the agency said they would not take their signs down. Citizens were working diligently to get 
legislation to ban real estate signs. See, City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: June 10, 1975, page 
1; and Regular Session: June 24, 1975. Citizens presented another petition bearing 90 additional signatures. 
See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 1. Some citizens felt that after 
a real estate sign ban is established it caused more panic selling. They suggested integrating a neighborhood 




firms.” Support for the real estate sign ban had grown substantially and the city’s planning 
commission recommended enacting the measure. On August 26, 1975, Bill No. 4828 was 
declared passed and became Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 prohibition of real estate 
signs.124 
A decade later, Ferguson remained philosophically split. One contingent was still 
accusing the other of “attempting to control who moves into the city… [introducing bills 
designed] to keep minority groups out of the city.” Members of the majority lauded, “The 
council is proud of the diversity of races, home sizes, residents in this community, and feel 
that it is an asset to the city to have this diversity.” A member in the minority responded 
by suggesting the matter be “placed on the ballot to allow the citizens of Ferguson to vote.” 
Meanwhile, the city’s black population continued to rise and did so until 2010.125 
Interviewee F2 shared some insight into the Ferguson experience with the 
following: 
“At first, I didn’t see the edges of the neighborhoods and how it would…. I hate to 
say infect, because that sounds so negative. But some of the other communities and 
neighborhoods were just bringing themselves into Ferguson. Like you had Kinloch 
who was going through its ups and downs and people were trying to find a place to 
live. You had north city St. Louis where people were getting kicked out of homes 
and they had to find a place to live. Normandy, with the school district going up 
and down. [You] had people saying I still want to live in an affordable home, but I 
want my educational system. With that influx of all these different communities 
trying to come in to one, trying to make it, I don’t think that we were ready for that 
diversity and newness.126 
 
 
124 Excerpt of quote from City of Ferguson, MO archives public hearing Regular Session: June 24, 1975; 
Planning Commission meeting July 2, 1975; Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 3; Regular Session: August 
26, 1975, page 2 and 9. Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 is permanently filed in codebook No. 8, page 107. 
125 Excerpt of larger quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session: April 17, 1984, page 
2. 




Ferguson, University City, and Hazelwood offer three examples of varying 
policymaking motivators, processes, action, inaction, and subsequent conditions. 
Notwithstanding, these factors are not necessarily linked, do not require specific 
sequencing, and tend to be nonconsequential when isolated. Only when certain other 
factors are considered in combination with these elements do these factors become 
significantly important in better understanding the many complex dynamics influencing 
the role of municipal governance. No municipality in the study group demonstrates this 
more revealingly than the City of Jennings. 
Like Ferguson, Jennings’ black population at the start of the 1970s was minuscule 
(.5 %) and increased at a very high rate in a short period of time. Just a decade later, black 
residency was 53 times higher and grew to represent 4/5 of total population by 2000. By 
period’s end, over nine out of every 10 Jennings residents were black. Jennings is a 
quintessential example of a resegregated suburban municipality, and the city exhibits many 
of the conditions scholarly literature classifies as symptoms of suburban decline. However, 
Jennings’ policy path is not emblematic of the typical tipped, fiscally stressed suburb.127 
Unlike Ferguson, Jennings entered the decade of the 1970s with several 
antidiscrimination policies already on the books, and the city continued to enact additional 
policies throughout the decade. In summer 1971, with fair housing and anti-
solicitation/anti-blockbusting ordinances in place, Jennings sought to strengthen its anti-
destabilization defenses. City lawmakers unanimously passed a minimum housing code 
initiating an occupancy permit system and banned real estate signs. The city attorney began 
 
127 According to US Census data; City of Jennings, MO archives; and Minnesota Population Center. National 





issuing legal notices in local publications advising real estate companies for rent and for 
sale signs were no longer permitted in single or multifamily dwellings in the City of 
Jennings.128 
Two weeks after notification, the city’s building commissioner embarked on a 
compliance check throughout the city, and violators were prosecuted under the city code’s 
penalty clause for noncompliance. Less than a year later, Jennings City Council passed Bill 
No. 1012 as Ordinance No. 990 which expanded the city’s prohibition of solicitation to 
include other tactics such as steering. When Jennings enacted these policies, its black 
population had not yet reached one percent of total population. More notable, Jennings’ 
City Council instituted these policies amid a citizen environment bearing striking 
resemblances to the citizen environment of Ferguson.129 
Jennings’ municipal government operated under intense scrutiny from a civically 
engaged citizenry comprised of a majority of residents who disapproved of integration or 
at least preferred not to integrate the municipality. However, Jennings’ citizens were 
engaging a council that enjoyed unanimous consensus in their definition of the role of 
municipal governance in municipal stabilization. The Jennings City Council was unified 
on issues, objectives, and strategies for achieving outcomes. This infused the council with 
 
128 Jennings considered a real estate sign ban as early as February 1970. See, City of Jennings, MO archive 
Regular Session: February 9, 1970, page 6: Bill 909. See, Regular Session: August 9, 1971, page 4. See also, 
Bill No. 976: An ordinance that provided minimum health standards for sanitation facilities in housing 
requiring adequate ventilation, light, and heating, required safe and sanitary maintenance prohibiting 
substandard conditions, and provided for occupancy permits. The ordinance set forth enforcement 
regulations, penalties, and corrective measures for the violations of its provisions. Bill was unanimously 
passed and approved as Ordinance No. 958. Fee for the occupancy permit was originally set at $15. See, 
City of Jennings Regular Session: August 24, 1971, page 4. 
129 Mayor instructs building commissioner not to confiscate real estate signs erected in violation of the city 
code. Instead, he is instructed to file property owner’s, real estate agency, or other relevant party’s name 
and information with the city for prosecution. City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: August 9, 1971, 




policymaking efficiency, empowered it to lead in matters of consequential importance, and 
essentially insulated the body from citizen backlash. 
Relishing complete collegial support of policies such as the real estate sign ban, 
Jennings’ mayor responded to citizen and real estate industry opposition by asserting, “I 
would not think of repealing the ordinance; it is a good ordinance.” As reviewed earlier, 
governing in a council structure where a separation of powers endows one member with 
veto authority and supplementary controls not possessed by the other members does not 
prevent municipal lawmakers from producing policies designed to help stabilize 
municipalities. Nevertheless, leveraging antidiscrimination policies was only a first step to 
achieving stabilization.130 
Enacting anti-discrimination laws did not eliminate discrimination and inequities 
in housing. In fact, “open housing” policies did little to combat the resegregation and 
isolation blacks experienced in these communities. For instance, some residents of 
University City’s eastern end felt “trapped in the area either because they could not afford 
better housing or because they were black.” However, some officials and residents were 
reluctant to concede that race played a role and argued that despite some challenges, the 
area remained more desirable than most areas in other municipalities.131 
In response to residents’ claims of racial bias contributing to conditions, University 
City’s mayor asserted: 
“There are many residents of the area, who like me, are not black and could afford 
to live anywhere in St. Louis County. We live in the eastern end of [U City] by 
 
130 Excerpt of quote made by the mayor of Jennings in response to requests to repeal the city’s prohibition 
of real estate signs in the city. See, Regular Session No. 791. A meeting of the City Council of Jennings, MO 
dated July 10, 1972, page 1. 
131 Excerpt of quotes taken from a St. Louis Post-Dispatch staff who wrote a series on the county apartment 
boom. In the first two articles, residents of the eastern end of University City are pictured and quoted as 




choice. No other area of St. Louis County can boast of the cultural advantages we 
have, the proximity to a major university, art museum, and zoo. No other area has 
a library that is without equal in the county. As for recreational, we do not have our 
own private club houses, but we are five minutes away from a heated indoor pool 
in the winter and a wonderful outdoor pool in the summer. Trapped? Not on your 
life.”132 
 
The mayor was expressing the sentiments shared by many University Citians like 
Interviewees U4 who, due to their pride in the city’s ethnic diversity, were quick to defend 
against accusations of racism. As they put it, “We were very progressive. Remember we 
came from Hyde Park [IL].” Interviewee U2 asserted, “I think that the people in University 
City don't care who lives in the house next door as long as they take care of the house. I 
don't care what color my neighbors are as long as they're taking care of the house. 
Municipal governance plays a role in bringing about policies, but they won’t affect that.”133 
Prevailing attitudes and integration policies did not insulate the municipality from 
transitory effects, however. Racial resegregation can sometimes occur in subtle increments 
with housing policy serving as an insidious perpetrator. In cities like University City with 
its integrated communities, mixed incomes, and amenities, this can be especially difficult 
to acknowledge and accept. According to Interviewee U3, “That was indicative of the 
challenges [U City] faced. I think one of the main problems is many people don't even 
think there are challenges.”134 
By late 1976, property values had risen in the first and second wards and many 
people could no longer afford properties in those areas. While there were some modest 
property value increases in the Third Ward, they only occurred in a small area of the ward. 
 
132 Ibid 
133 Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents; 
and Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official. 




With University City’s Third Ward being home to the majority of the city’s black 
population, once again, negative perceptions of increased crime, bad tenants, and poverty 
emerged.  
However, perceptions were often inconsistent with reality. Interviewee U3 said, “I 
had people who had lived here for 15 or 17 years and had never been north of Olive and 
were surprised at what a nice neighborhood it was.” Some areas of University City’s Third 
Ward did exhibit destabilizing symptoms— particularly those areas closest to struggling 
neighboring municipalities like Pagedale and Wellston. However, the Third Ward 
consisted mainly of owner-occupied homes while 85 % of University City’s Section 8 
renters resided in the Second Ward.135 
My examination revealed that adoption of open housing antidiscrimination policy 
whether early or delayed offered indications of municipal governances’ preferences and 
for some the preferences of their citizenry. Preferences impacted timing of implementation 
and degree to which local policymakers promoted and enhanced policy. Policy influenced 
subsequent policies, use of tools and allocation patterns, and affected demographic, 
housing, and fiscal conditions. Affordable housing policy decisions demonstrate this best. 
Affordable Housing 
St. Louis County’s suburban municipalities consist of a range of residential zoning 
standards, neighborhood designs, and housing styles. City officials established codes 
regulating building size, buffering requirements, use of greenspace, and certain aesthetic 
features. Many municipalities zoned exclusive allowing only homes built on large single-
 
135 Excerpt of quote taken from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public 
Official. Figures according to US Census data; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical 





family plats. Following WWII, there was a substantial surge in more affordable suburban 
housing. Increased affordability combined with the apartment boom of the 1960s, 70s, and 
into the 80s blended accessibility with exclusivity. Accessibility did not mean equitable 
treatment or service delivery, however. 
Exclusionary planning and disparate allocation of suburban resources predates the 
arrival of black suburbanites. Regardless of race, areas containing clusters of low-income 
nonowner inhabitants received the least consideration in decision making. A Hazelwood 
resident’s 1978 statement, “I do not feel renters should have a voice in the park issue,” 
reflects this attitude. Local governments often neglected these areas and their inhabitants, 
failed to protect them from hazards, and allowed conditions to further deteriorate while 
protecting and prioritizing the preferences of wealthier sections of the community— often 
at the expense of the entire municipality.136 
Residents and officials alike were largely opposed to new apartment developments. 
“The backbone of the community are the people who buy their homes and raise their 
families,” decried one Ferguson resident in June 1971. During a 1975 building permit 
hearing, a Ferguson councilperson stated, “I believe multifamily dwellings would be 
repulsive to the people who live in the surrounding areas.” Some opponents cited spot 
zoning or complained apartment complexes overcrowded the schools and worsened traffic 
conditions. Others questioned if adequate police protection would be provided in these 
areas.137 
 
136 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session: September 6, 1978, page 
3. 
137 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO transcript of public hearing dated June 22, 1971, page 
1; and Excerpt from quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting: February 25, 1975, 
page 4. Also see, City of Ferguson, MO archives dated March 24, 1970, page 1-2 and April 28, 1970, page 2 




While the presence of multifamily housing does not necessarily indicate a 
preponderance of low-income residents or a deteriorating housing stock, they are usually 
nonowner occupied and were perceived as likely placements for public housing. Amid a 
hostile environment, the era ushered in an immense wave of new residents and the need for 
additional housing was great. For certain areas in some municipalities, rezoning from 
single-family districts to multifamily was unavoidable. Apartment projects represented 
large investments, and officials believed certain developments would be an asset to some 
neighborhoods.  
In addition to city ordinances specifying multiple requirements such as the 
installation of new sidewalks and parking lots, new apartment developments could attract 
more young couples and professionals to the area. Scores of developers submitted requests 
for rezoning and presented detailed plans before city plan commissions. Presentations 
incorporated skillfully crafted marketing strategies emphasizing the blending of amenities, 
proximity, modernity, and practicality in designs. Cities approved plans for the erection of 
multistory apartment buildings, apartment complexes, duplexes, and townhomes.138 
 
no objections to more single-family dwellings being built. Show of hands vote called by the mayor indicated 
10 to 1 in opposition of rezoning for multifamily developments. When rezoning requests involved only 
single-family structures, residents argued they should be the owner’s right to rezone for their development. 
See, archive dated July 27, 1971, page 5. 
138 In a June 1971 report on the conditions of the Kensington Subdivision Apartments in Ferguson, MO an 
advertisement in a local newspaper is referenced in which a realtor is advertising rentals for single people. 
This is notable because the realtor originally marketed the property to the city as geared towards young 
executives and their families. Ferguson residents in the area were very upset with the new project. From 
March 24, 1970, page 1. Ferguson May 12, 1970 page 1 “Maison de Ville” Apartments; Ferguson July 27, 
1971 page 2 Florissant Valley Garden Apartments presented that the property was close to W. Florissant 
and I-270 for easy access, close to the Jr. College, and close to other services like YMCA, Churches, and 
shopping Center at W. Florissant.  132 units- 66 one bedrooms, 66 two-bedroom apartments, swimming 





By 1970, the five study cities were comprised of a mixture of districts zoned for 
small to large-lot single-family homes as well as multifamily dwellings. Variations in size 
and price provided housing for a broad range of tenant incomes. As urban renewal projects 
began winding down, federal funds to cities for redevelopment transitioned in format. 
Revenue sharing, which city officials had lobbied so diligently for, was authorized by the 
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. But these were unrestricted funds that did 
not necessarily encourage development of affordable housing.139 
The Housing and Development Act of 1974 authorized the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) process. In the CDBG program, cities applied for 
grants to be utilized in developing affordable housing, anti-poverty programs, and 
infrastructure improvements. Like central cities, inner-suburban municipalities were 
familiar with HUD initiatives as many of them received funding from the agency for parks 
and urban renewal projects. In order to qualify for CDBGs, a community had to have a 
planning consultant either on staff or under contract and have a comprehensive plan for 
community improvements. This meant some cities were not prepared.140 
As a newly formed city in August 1970, Hazelwood lacked the administrative 
prowess to qualify for HUD’s 701 grant which would pay 2/3 of the cost for preparation 
of a comprehensive plan. Contrast that with Jennings, who in 1972 entered into an urban 
planning contract with the Missouri Department of Community Affairs, St. Louis County 
Department of Planning, and East-West Gateway Coordinating Council to obtain 701 grant 
 
139 For more about the act, see General Explanation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, Public Law 
92-512. February 12, 1973. 




funds for planning assistance, preparation of a comprehensive plan, and implementation of 
administrative control measures.141 
Qualifying for a CDBG was only part of the battle, however. Many residents 
opposed receiving CDBG monies. Members of a Ferguson citizens’ group spoke out 
against accepting CDBG funds warning its council, “This is an attempt to inveigle 
Ferguson into regional government.” Officials in each of the study cities pondered the 
implications of accepting federal dollars. They wanted, and in many cases needed the 
money. However, municipal leaders did not want the federal involvement in city affairs 
that came with the funds. Grants required strict adherence to programmatic standards 
focusing on anti-poverty goals and increasing subsidized housing. Despite reservations and 
objections, however, cities applied for CDBGs.142 
Ferguson was one of the few cities to put the issue to a city-wide vote following 
citizen calls for a referendum. Ironically, in Ferguson’s general election held Tuesday April 
1, 1975, Ferguson voters approved the city’s use of CDBG funding by a vote of 2,346 to 
1,663. In defeat, opponents believed that most residents did not fully understand the 
proposition. They felt they had failed to effectively communicate the downsides of the 
city’s agreement with HUD. Along with CDBGs, the federal government instituted the 
Section 8 subsidized housing program, and the low-income housing market was born.143 
 
141 See City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: August 13, 1970; Taken from archived 
transcript of presentation by a community planner from the St. Louis County Department of Planning to the 
Jennings, MO City Council: Regular Session 796 meeting of the City Council August 14, 1972, page 1. See 
also, passing of Ordinance Number 1002 in Jennings Regular Council Session: October 9, 1972, page 4.  
142 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974, 
page 2. 
143 According to the Board of Election Commissioners of the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri abstract 
of certified votes related to the referendum proposition Ordinance No. 75-14 Housing and Community 
Development Act. By Ordinance No. 74-1449, the council of the City of Ferguson, MO authorized the mayor 
to enter into a municipal housing and community development corporation and supplemental agreements 




The vast majority of residents opposed increasing public housing and officials and 
administrators wrestled with the question of proportionality within their municipal borders. 
Nevertheless, meeting CDBG eligibility requirements meant cities committed to increasing 
federally assisted housing in their municipality. Dedicating dwellings to federal assistance, 
opponents argued, would further hamper cities’ ability to effectively ensure a high-quality 
housing stock as officials had no control over which landlords, buildings, or tenants 
received subsidies.  
There remained the issue of an aging population, however. By the 1970s, many 
suburban municipalities were comprised of significant numbers of low to moderate fixed-
income households headed by residents over the age of 65. Many of these residents could 
no longer maintain larger homes and required subsidized housing assistance. 
Consequentially, municipal officials were left with no other option but to try and balance 
the issue by allowing for a limited amount of subsidized housing. Attempting to restrict the 
increase of public housing, officials either excluded or minimized the amount of resources 
for subsidized housing in their community development plan.144 
Interviewees U4 criticized University City officials’ omission of Section 8 housing 
in its initial community development application adding, “Municipal governments can 
mandate a certain amount of public housing, affordable housing, or they can pass policies.” 
With no CDBG funds dedicated to Section 8 housing development in its original plan, 
HUD denied University City’s 1975 application. After polling other local jurisdictions who 
 
Development Act of 1974. However, when asked for a show of hands relative to the city’s participation, a 
majority of hands raised where in favor of the city signing the agreement for participation. See public 
hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974, page 3. 
144 According to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 




had submitted community development applications, city staff arrived at a three-year goal 
of 90 housing units for the Section 8 housing category. HUD approved the revised plan.145 
Some prospective residents, otherwise impressed with the city, highlighted 
University City’s HUD plan as “serious cause for concern.” Consider that municipalities 
rely on property taxes for general revenue and financing of capital improvements. People 
not only viewed subsidized housing as potentially harmful to the physical characteristics 
and desirability of an area but concluded it would also further erode the local tax base and 
interfere with local assessment and rate setting processes. A proliferation of subsidized 
housing further intensified fears of the deterioration of suburban oases. However, early 
agreements with HUD for CDBGs were fairly nonconsequential.146 
Hazelwood received an initial grant of only $34,000 and expected to receive 
between $190,000 and $210,000 over three years. Hazelwood used the funds to upgrade 
housing and make improvements in an unincorporated area adjacent to their city limits. 
Maplewood received $48,000 and was approved to spend $34,600 of the funds on 
constructing sewers under contract with the St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD). 
Jennings’ initial block grant allocation totaled $55,950 with which the suburb remodeled 
an old police station, demolished some vacant houses, and made repairs to senior citizens’ 
 
145 Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents. For more 
information regarding the city’s HUD application process see: City of University City archives Session 1102: 
June 2, 1975. 
146 Missouri municipalities lobbied for what was called a circuit breaker approach to property tax relief. This 
was a system of property tax relief for older, low-income citizens enacted by state legislatures in Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and Vermont that benefited both senior citizens and local communities. The relief was for older 
homeowners and renters through state income tax credits or cash rebates. For more see, City of Jennings, 




houses. The announcement of the fourth round of CDBG funding in 1977 signaled to cities 
that the stakes were exponentially higher.147 
The implementation of a new formula resulted in the St. Louis area gaining $20 
million in CDBG funding. Although most of the funds would go to the City of St. Louis, 
St. Louis County officials were pleased. The new formula made more revenue available 
for the entire area. For 27 St. Louis County municipalities, however, the new formula 
significantly reduced their allocation. The principal change in the formula concerned age 
of housing stock. According to the new formula, old houses were blighted and age of 
housing now accounted for 50 % of the allocation.148 
This was problematic as many of St. Louis’ oldest communities were also some of 
the wealthiest. According to the new formula, Webster Groves was the most blighted 
community in St. Louis County. However, the formula failed to assess true community 
need by employing a flawed metric which disproportionately weighted age of housing 
while disparaging growth lag and measures of poverty. Nothing illustrates this better than 
contrasting Hazelwood’s $30,200 grant with the $460,700 Webster Groves received 
following the implementation of the 1977 formula change.149 
Behind the leadership of its mayor, Hazelwood joined other area leaders and 
successfully advocated for revisions in the formula. For each of the next two years, 
Hazelwood’s allocation was $136,875 and by 1979, municipal officials considered CDBG 
 
147 According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive Council Work Session dated November 20, 1974. Note: On 
December 18, 1974, Bill No. 1121 authorizing the agreement was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1092-
4. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated January 2, 1975 for more on how the city 
spent CDBG. According to City of Maplewood, Missouri archives from year 1976 Document number 10. 
According to City of Jennings, MO transcript of the Community Development Public Hearing dated October 
24, 1977, pages 4-9. 
148 City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session: October 19, 1977. 
149 Figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session dated October 5, 1977. See 




an imperative revenue stream. At this point, Maplewood was receiving over $275,000 with 
a total balance of $335,426 under contract, and Jennings had allocated $555,750 over the 
previous three years. Despite limits on eligible uses, CDBG spending garnered contentious 
debate. This was especially true in the civically engaged cities of Ferguson and University 
City.150 
Citizens, organized groups, and associations often presented detailed plans for how 
to spend CDBG funds, and vigorously contested councils, city managers, and finance 
directors’ positions. More revenue via CDBG funding not only attracted more parties 
lobbying for a bigger portion, it also required more subsidized housing commitments. 
Subsidized housing became more intertwined with infrastructure improvements and new 
developments as cities relied more on CDBGs to fund projects. By the end of the study 
period, CDBG agreements were essentially renewed automatically every three years. 
Increased reliance on CDBG funding to help finance municipal improvements 
resulted in rapid growth in subsidized housing for some municipalities. As early as 1979, 
fearing similar fates would befall them, suburban cities like Ferguson and Maplewood were 
enacting moratoriums on all subsidized housing within their municipal borders. However, 
officials quickly realized how integral the support had become to their city’s ecosystem 
and within two years, moratoriums were removed. The tide in suburban locales had 
changed dramatically in a short period of time.151 
 
150 Figure taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session: August 2, 1978. Note: In August 1977, 
St. Louis County Department of Human Resources announced that the City of Hazelwood had been 
authorized to receive $93,850 from the Community Development Act funding for the acquisition of 
property for a city garage. I did not include in analysis of formula as it was not related. City of Hazelwood, 
MO archive dated August 17, 1977. According to figures in City of Maplewood, MO archival Documents 
numbers 262-264 dated October 9, 1979; and City of Jennings, MO transcript Community Development 
Public Hearing dated October 24, 1977, pages 4-9. 
151 See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Special Council Meeting dated March 18, 1980, page 1. Bill number 




Officials that once opposed federally funded housing were now forced to become 
advocates. A collection of 1981 Maplewood resolutions best demonstrate this point. The 
resolutions, which passed five to one, outline the municipality’s agreement with HUD to 
participate in a Section 8 demonstration project. Additionally, documents indicate officials 
directed and authorized the city attorney to obtain a restraining order stopping the St. Louis 
County Housing Authority from terminating the Section 8 subsidy for tenants of an 
apartment complex and called for an investigation into revocation of subsidies.152 
Municipal officials set out to restrict the amount of rental properties, subsidized 
units, and low-income housing in the 1970s. But by the end of the 1980s, the opposite was 
evident. A robust market consisting of rental properties, subsidies, and low-income housing 
had emerged in the suburbs. Apartment complexes and rental homes had become a part of 
most inner suburbs’ fabric. University City was home to roughly 2,800 multifamily units. 
Rental properties accounted for nearly 40 % of dwellings with a disproportionate number 
of single-family rentals located in the city’s majority black Third Ward. With a population 
density of approximately 6,000 people per square mile, ½ to 2/3 of University City 
residents resided north of Delmar.153 
 
condominium conversions and the issuance of permits until the Planning Commission and the council of 
the city of Ferguson shall have the time necessary to review and revise the existing subdivision and zoning 
regulations passed unanimously. See, City of Maplewood Missouri archives Document number 288, 
Resolution number 95, 1979. Resolution of the City of Maplewood, Missouri adopted unanimously. Note: 
As recorded in the City of Maplewood, Missouri archive 1980 Document number 343, Resolution number 
18, 1980 repealed Resolution number 95, 1979 pertaining to the moratorium on all subsidized housing in 
the City of Maplewood, MO a year later. The City of Bridgeton passed a resolution calling for the elimination 
of the Community Development Act requesting that the funds be used to reduce the individual income tax. 
See, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated March 21, 1979.  
152 See, Resolutions No. 39- 1981 in City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1981, Document No. 441; 
Resolutions numbers 69- 1981 and 70- 1981 from City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1981 Document 
No. 455. 
153 US Census data report of University City included archive Session 1667: May 20,1996, page 6. According 
to City of University City records Session 1273: April 27, 1981, page 13; and According to figures in City of 




In Hazelwood, over 40 % of the housing stock was in the form of multifamily 
housing structures. While Ferguson residents believed, “Neighboring communities [didn’t] 
have the number of renters Ferguson [had],” the city’s rate of rentals was less than 25 % 
of housing— notably lower than Hazelwood and University City’s. Interviewee F2 says, 
“Ferguson was still one of the desirable districts for homebuyers. People were more 
worried about Jennings during that time.” Rental property comprised 47 % of Jennings 
housing selection. In contrast, Ferguson seemed to be avoiding any significant proliferation 
of low-cost housing or decline in homeownership. However, housing numbers masked 
what was actually transpiring in Ferguson.154 
Inaction and delayed policies of the 1970s had rendered the city more vulnerable to 
resegregation and decline. Over the next decade, Ferguson’s acute growth in nonowner 
residency indicated noticeable differences. Its new nonowner residents tended to be poorer 
than the renters arriving in neighboring municipalities a decade earlier. This 1995 Ferguson 
resident statement was more appropriate for 1980: 
“We are concerned about subsidized housing like in Hazelwood. We need to 
prevent further subsidies in Ferguson because there are too many greedy people 
who want to rent through Section 8 to get more money and become slumlords.”155 
 
154 Figure taken from public hearing on public housing in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated July 29, 1981. 
For more about Hazelwood’s IDA activities also see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: 
July 11, 1984; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive IDA Village Square Apartments dated March 6, 1985. This 
project consisted of 47 buildings containing a total of 148 one and two-bedroom units. Note: One 
apartment building permit netted Hazelwood $22, 000 in 1984 -85. See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special 
Budget Meeting May 20, 1985. According to figures in archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session: March 
11, 1980, page 5; Excerpt of quote taken Interview F2: 07/26/2019 Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-
Public Official; and According to City of Jennings, MO Redevelopment Plan in public hearing dated January 
29, 1990, page 2. 
155 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing notes dated October 10, 1995, page 1. 
Note: A communication reporting St. Louis County will discourage the concentration of low- income housing 
projects in areas where a disproportionate amount already exists was sent to Hazelwood by the St. Louis 
County Executive. North County Inc. and the Florissant Valley Chamber of Commerce sent a memo to 
Hazelwood opposing a rental housing financing for a development of opposition to the funding of a 200-
unit proposed subsidized housing development. For more see City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated 




By this time, however, Ferguson’s housing subsides already rivaled Hazelwood’s. 
And just five short years later, Ferguson had nearly reached Hazelwood in percentage of 
renters with 33 %, while Hazelwood’s percentage of renters had declined from 1990s 36.5 
% to 2000s 35 % nonowner occupancy. Other indicators shed more light on the neighbors’ 
divergent trajectories. Per capita income in Ferguson and Hazelwood was $17,661 and 
$22,311, respectively. Of Hazelwood households, 7.5 % were headed by single parents 
while over 16 % of Ferguson households were single parent headed.156 
While these numbers only illustrate a snapshot, they lend context to a larger picture. 
Municipal-level figures serve as a glimpse into what was occurring in neighborhoods. High 
rates of renter occupancy, particularly in single-family residential areas, indicate low 
desirability. Stable neighborhoods of single-family residential dwellings would boast 
around 85 % owner occupancy. Municipal-level destabilization was well-underway in 
some municipalities as assessed value of residential property declined dramatically. 
Several key components drove the decline in property values. Typically, white 
homeowners who fled the area were now unable to sell their properties. Consequentially, 
housing stock preservation measures became inadequate as a growing number of houses 
were becoming renter occupied. Besides performing daily tasks of general upkeep and 
addressing minimum maintenance matters, renters generally lack the authority and 
finances to initiate improvements or rehabilitation that correct structural deterioration. This 
dilemma was exacerbated in inner suburbs due to age and obsolescence. 
While advanced-aged housing does not automatically suggest deterioration, 
preserving older homes required more maintenance and updates to compete with newer 
 
156 According to US Census data 2016; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 




homes offering the latest in amenities and convenience. Many residential areas in inner 
suburbs still bore obsolete spatial and structural designs which rendered them impractical 
for modern residential use. Housing demands, specifications, and expectations had 
evolved. 
Characteristics once considered essential were now deemed objectionable and 
undesirable. These elements helped create a perpetual cycle of housing stock erosion 
culminating in blight and socioeconomic liabilities for inner suburbs. The challenges of an 
aged housing stock, decline in homeownership, and neighborhood blight were especially 
prevalent in the study cities. 
Established in 1908, Maplewood was the first centrally located municipality 
outside the St. Louis city limits. Amid difficult economic times, Maplewood began to lose 
its dedicated residential core. The inner suburb of just under 13,000 had seen its share of 
ups and downs over the years. In previous decades, however, homeowners braved the 
storms which allowed for the natural transfer of homeownership. A growing number of 
them were now choosing to relocate instead. Maplewood struggled to retain longtime 
residents and preserve the quality of its historic homes and neighborhoods.157  
Degeneration of housing conditions in the north county suburbs was more rapid 
and severe than in Maplewood and occurred for different reasons. During the 1970s and 
1980s, HUD’s housing policies were in direct conflict with cities’ revitalization and 
stabilization efforts. Negatively impacting cities’ housing stock, property values, and 
overall attractiveness, HUD’s activities resulted in concentrated poverty, dilapidated 
 
157 Figure according to US Census data 2016; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical 
Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. For 




houses, and vacant lots. North St. Louis County municipalities were disproportionately 
impacted by HUD’s practices as the agency targeted these areas and concentrated its 
activities in these places. 
A 1980 North Area Community Forum report noted while representing only 18 % 
of eastern Missouri’s population (from Jefferson City east to the Mississippi River), north 
St. Louis County accounted for 73 % of FHA insured mortgages, 40 % of all FHA activity, 
and 35 % of HUD repossessions. Negative effects of this type of discriminatory targeting 
compounded as image problems arose further hampering these municipalities’ stabilization 
efforts. Property values plunged as renter occupancy, low-income housing, and Section 8 
subsidies grew.158 
A 1989 St. Louis County planning department report cited, “The high percentage 
of Section 8 housing being located in north St. Louis County is the biggest concern of 
officials in north St. Louis County municipalities.” Responding to inquiries about denied 
subsidized housing requests in 1991, Jennings’ mayor replied, “The city has too high of a 
percentage of such housing now and the maintenance record of this type of housing has 
been poor.” Often these properties became neglected rental housing. The negative loop was 
devasting for these municipalities.159 
A 1991 examination of single-family homes in Jennings found that between 1987 
and 1989, 31 % of the 75 homes surveyed experienced a decline in recorded appraisals. 
 
158 Figures taken from the North Area Community Forum report in City of Hazelwood, MO dated March 19, 
1980. The North Area Community Forum, founded in 1975, was funded through the St. Louis County 
Department of Human Resources, Office of Community Development. The organization provided a forum 
for elected officials and other representatives of North County and University of Missouri-St. Louis Public 
Policy Administration Program. 
159 Report included in City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session dated November 13, 1989 page 2; and 





Declining property values meant loss of revenue and higher taxes. This further increased 
dependency on federal aid which mandated more subsidized housing. The loss of property 
tax revenues also made it extremely difficult to maintain quality-level public services such 
as policing. Perceptions emerged that there was more crime in these areas than in other 
parts of St. Louis County. North St. Louis County suburbs were caught in a vicious cycle.160 
Although University City was not technically located in north St. Louis County, it 
lied just south of Page which served as north county’s southern border. Proximity to 
struggling north county municipalities as well as decaying areas of the City of St. Louis 
made University City a target for similar transitory activities. Furthermore, the mature 
inner suburb was only partially protected by its proactive housing policies of the 1960s. 
Participation in low-income subsidized housing funding programs did not necessarily serve 
as a registerable contributing factor to achieving stabilization.  
Instead, policies which dictated the way in which cities participated in these 
programs and whether cities leveraged these resources in combination with other resources 
and activities served to determine if participation was significant or negligible. The seeds 
of stabilization were planted with the timing and degree of open and affordable housing 
policies. However, specific types of policy designed to combat housing stock deterioration 
were required as well. As Interviewee U3 framed it, “Housing stock preservation was a 




160 St. Louis County records of City of Jennings, MO in Redevelopment Plan dated January 29, 1990, page 3-
9. 




Housing Stock Preservation   
City leaders, lawmakers, and administrators worked tirelessly throughout the 1970s 
to combat housing discrimination practices like racial steering, redlining, and blockbusting. 
Some officials enacted policies, initiated programs, and pursued legal recourse. But as 
smaller, poorer populations replaced larger more economically stable citizenries, property 
values changed dramatically. Officials had to decide rather to uphold, amend, or exchange 
prevention, preservation, and improvement policies from previous decades. 
Race predominated municipal-level decision making prior to 1970 and continued 
to influence choices in the post-civil rights era. However, socioeconomics dominated 
policy in the post-fair housing period. According to one longtime resident of University 
City’s Third Ward, “It became less about race and more about economics.” Residents of 
St. Louis’ inner suburbs identified with their town’s social character and economic class, 
and homeowners took pride in how the houses in their neighborhood differentiated them 
from neighboring municipalities.162 
In the study cities, however, shrinking tax base and social change confronted deeply 
rooted identities and neighborhood nostalgia. Meanwhile, a serious threat to 
municipalities’ stability existed in the form of a public agency. HUD’s discriminatory 
housing practices and its neglecting of homes repossessed for defaulted Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) insured mortgages presented additional challenges. 
HUD properties repossessed through foreclosure and tax sales were often left 
vandalized and condemned. Many of the properties repossessed by HUD needed 
substantial repairs or were in such disrepair they had to be demolished. This left behind 
 




scores of vacant parcels, some of which were being used as makeshift parking lots in some 
municipalities. As geography dictated, Jennings and University City were among the first 
municipalities to experience the neighborhood blighting impacts of HUD’s practices. City 
officials and administrators initially attempted to work with local HUD officials to address 
the issue of deteriorating housing. 
Municipal leaders made minimal progress through these means. City officials often 
felt the agency ignored cities’ concerns. Records indicated as early as June 1974, Jennings 
City Council instructed its city’s building commissioner to forward complaint letters and 
pictures of HUD houses to senators, congressional representatives, and the county 
supervisor. Further worsening housing conditions in 1975, HUD changed its policy for 
handling repossessed houses to include low-priced “as is” investor purchases. That same 
year, University City’s local government decided to submit a grievance directly to the 
source of the activities.163 
University City’s city manager sent a letter of complaint directly to the HUD 
secretary’s Washington, D.C. office. The correspondence included spot maps showing the 
locations of foreclosures and derelict HUD properties along with a report detailing the 
impact of “as is” housing in residential areas in the city. Nevertheless, HUD repossessions 
continued to mount, properties deteriorated, and the devastating impact on property values 
persisted. University City homes that listed for $15,000, when HUD acquired 26 buildings 
between 1972 and 1973, garnered less than $3,000 three years later.164 
 
163 See Document No. 2852 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: June 24, 1974, page 6; and Document 
No. 42 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: July 22, 1974, page 2.   
164 For more about the contents of the letter see: City of University City archives Regular Session 1101: May 
19, 1975, page 13. Letter of complaint addressed to HUD Secretary, Washington, D.C. The correspondence 
included spot maps showing locations of foreclosures and recent reports regarding derelict HUD properties. 




With collegial measures proving futile, municipal decision-makers collaborated to 
openly promote filing a lawsuit against HUD. Officials accused HUD of violating Chapter 
89 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The law authorized cities to regulate and restrict the 
use of land within their jurisdiction for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals, 
and the general welfare of the community. According to a local newspaper announcement, 
“City officials claimed to have received a greater degree of cooperation from HUD 
following the threat of a lawsuit.” Whether the news of a potential lawsuit was truly a 
catalyst to increased cooperation is unclear. What is clear, however, is that municipal 
leaders recognized that HUD’s activities threatened municipal-level stability.165 
Prior to any recorded FHA foreclosures within their borders, Hazelwood officials 
began lobbying for regulatory changes, strategically planning to combat the agency’s 
practices, and coalition building. The municipality’s leadership served as a prominent voice 
in the county’s push for more rigorous mortgage bank requirements, penalties for bad 
actors, and prospective homebuyers’ education. Working with the North County 
Community Forum, Hazelwood leveraged tracking reports to monitor FHA lending 
activity and advocated for the equitable dispersing of low to moderate-income housing 
throughout north, south, and west county.166 
 
demolition and were being offered to the city at a cost of $1 per lot. For more information regarding the 
early phase of HUD foreclosures see: City of University City archives Session 1073: May 6, 1974, page 10; 
Regular Session 1101 May 19, 1975, page 13; and Special Session 1115: October 13, 1975, page 1. 
165 Excerpt of quote referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1117; 
and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5.; Statute 
referenced in discussions regarding filing a lawsuit against HUD. See: University City, MO Regular Session 
1089 dated November 18, 1974, Page 4. 
166 For more information see City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session October 4, 1978; Hazelwood 
Regular Session August 1, 1979; Hazelwood FHA Activity Special Meeting January 23, 1980; Hazelwood 
Special Meeting June 25, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session February 27, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session 
March 19, 1980. See also, North Area Community Forum proposal under Section VIII, Support Program, 
funded out of the St. Louis County, MO Office of Community Development. There were 312 units proposed, 




Hazelwood policymakers saw what was happening in Jennings. A city of just over 
19,000 persons at the time, Jennings’ unemployment rate was above the national average. 
Residents, both existing and forthcoming, were largely working-class folks of modest 
means. Stability was already fragile. Jennings officials understood they needed to act with 
urgency. In October 1976, Jennings leveraged dollars from the Department of Commerce 
and Economic Development’s capital investment program to establish a special community 
stabilization fund.167 
Utilizing capital investment funds, Jennings started home loan and home 
improvement programs. They leveraged CDBG funds and partnered with a local bank who 
reserved $250,000 in loans for program participants to purchase homes in Jennings. On 
January 23, 1978, Bill 1250 unanimously passed as Ordinance1221 authorizing the City of 
Jennings to enter into a contract with FHA to purchase foreclosed properties. Bypassing 
the county’s HUD agreement, Jennings began working directly with HUD in the Federal 
Urban Homesteading Program. The homesteading program established grant accounts for 
cities to draw upon to address the HUD foreclosure problem.168 
Homesteading involved HUD selling foreclosed homes to cities for $1. Loan 
balance of the houses was then deducted from the account. The previous year, University 
City had taken advantage of a similar program involving vacant lots. As mentioned earlier, 
HUD foreclosures often ended up in demolition leaving behind vacant parcels. Within the 
 
Hazelwood archives Special Meeting dated January 3, 1981; Hazelwood Regular Meeting May 20, 1981; and 
Hazelwood Regular Meeting February 23, 1983. 
167 According to US Census data; Document No. 3037 archive October 25, 1976, page 4. Employment rate; 
City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session Document No. 3037 dated October 25, 1976, page 4; 
and Jennings Regular Council Session October 23, 1978, page 4. Document No. 255. See also, Jennings 
Regular Council Session dated May 10, 1976, page 4: Document 2991.  




first several years alone, HUD transferred deeds to over 50 plots to University City. 
Jennings aimed to avoid the proliferation of vacant lots by helping the homebuyer avoid 
foreclosure to begin with. In the event of foreclosure, Jennings acquired the home for resale 
through the homesteading program in the period between foreclosure and dilapidation.169 
Utilizing the services of the North Area Community Forum, who screened for 
qualified applicants, the city would then sell the property as a three-year lease-option to 
first-time homebuyers. Program participants would have one year to bring the house up to 
code. Once the city’s building department verified compliance with all health and safety 
conditions, the deed was conveyed to the new owner. According to Jennings’ mayor, 
“There will be no need for advertising because at this time we have approximately 50 
applicants in our files waiting for property to purchase.” Jennings sold 11 of the HUD 
foreclosures in the first year of the program.170 
Jennings prioritized preventing neighborhood blight by keeping the FHA homes 
occupied. However, they also recognized their efforts would be ineffective without 
physical improvements to other segments of the housing stock. They instituted a home 
improvement rebate program and earmarked funds to rebate 20 % of any improvement cost 
homeowners incurred in making improvements to their home. Jennings modeled the 
program after University City’s homeowner rehabilitation program which required 
homeowners to pay a portion of the costs of labor and materials on a sliding scale according 
to certain criteria.171 
 
169 HUD transfer of deeds referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 
1117; and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5. 
170 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated June 11, 1979, page 1. 
See also, City of Jennings Regular Council Session dated October 8, 1984, page 2. 
171 According to City of Jennings, MO transcript of the Community Development Public Hearing dated 




Partnering with a local bank, University City established a revolving loan and 
interest subsidy program for eligible homeowners as housing rehabilitation assistance. 
Initially, the city’s policy was to extend home rehabilitation loans to single-family 
residential areas only. However, to encourage rehabilitation throughout the city, officials 
leveraged CDBG dollars to initiate a two-tiered system which included two-family 
dwellings and met the objective of giving special consideration to low-income residents. 
By the end of 1976, the city had extended loans to 247 homeowners.172 
University City policymakers further improved its housing stock by authorizing the 
city to rehab homes designated for low-income seniors. Certain areas of the city were 
comprised of blocks of single story, one and two-bedroom homes with small lots grouped 
close together. The houses required modest rehabbing, were easy to maintain, and were 
taxed at a minimal rate. The city acquired groups of these homes and partnered with the 
University City School District to rehab the homes. The rehabilitated homes were either 
sold or dedicated to leasing through the Section 8 assisted housing program. 
By the end of the study period, in 2015, Hazelwood’s home improvement loan 
program was entering its 33rd year in existence. The program contained enough funds to 
provide 13 loans averaging $5,000 each to 13 low to moderate-income homeowners and 
provided grants to homeowners meeting certain income qualifications. Emerging in the 
second half of the 1970s, Hazelwood modeled its program after neighboring Bridgeton 
whereby the county and city acted as intermediaries between homeowner and contractor. 
 




Upon securing community development funds from the St. Louis County Office of 
Community Development, Hazelwood compensated the contractor for the work.173 
The county selected sections of unincorporated north county to initiate the program. 
Berkeley, Riverview, and Flordell Hills, along with the aforementioned study group cities, 
were among the north county incorporated areas receiving support from the program. 
Initially absent from the group was Ferguson. Ferguson originally resisted enacting 
homesteading and home improvement policies to protect its housing stock. In September 
1975, by a narrow margin of four to three, the city approved a ways and means committee 
recommendation to procure and renovate a foreclosed HUD home. However, the city had 
no formal plan in place for how to move forward.174 
As with antidiscrimination, Ferguson lawmakers were bitterly divided on housing 
programs. One camp’s position was predicated on the stance that, “Government should 
keep out of private enterprise and not be getting into the real estate business.” The other 
camp believed, “If the city bought the house, renovated it, and found an owner, it might be 
the start of other people fixing up their own homes.” By August 1978, with pro-housing 
program legislatures still enjoying a plus one majority, Ferguson instituted a home 
improvement assistance program.175 
Ferguson boasted 20 program participants as opposing legislatures pushed for 
addendums like requiring repayment of home improvement monies if homeowners sold 
 
173 City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated September 11, 1978; and Regular Session dated October 
11, 1978; Figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO City Manager’s Report on the Municipal Housing and 
Community Development Cooperation Agreement 2015- 2017 with St. Louis County Office of Community 
Development. 
174 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, page 3. 





their home. By June 1983, the city had issued $270,000 in home improvement assistance 
to 213 residents. The following August, Ferguson instituted a homesteading program 
purchasing two homes in the early phase of the program. Homesteading and home 
improvement programs were valuable tools to defend against housing stock deterioration, 
neighborhood blight, and destabilization. However, they required early application and 
commitment to be effective.176 
St. Louis city was already utilizing these measures, and places in Ohio 
demonstrated they could be successful. St. Louis County municipalities were not required 
to devise innovative funding mechanisms to implement these programs as federal dollars 
were made available through the county. County officials had identified north county areas 
for improvement projects, and home improvement was among the county’s program goals. 
In other words, these tools were readily accessible and proven. Nevertheless, Ferguson was 
embroiled in an ideological struggle which cost the municipality precious time and ensured 
programs would receive minimal resources and support. 
This was best exhibited in Ferguson’s response to St. Louis County housing 
turnover maps in 1983. In reviewing the data, Ferguson officials discovered areas with high 
rates of turnover, distressed rental properties, and crime. Officials responded to this 
information by electing to, “Inspect the boundaries of these areas each year.” Contrast this 
with Hazelwood’s response to being told by St. Louis County, “Because of the extremely 
low foreclosure rate, we are not encouraged to establish a homesteading program in 
 
176 According to City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Session Regular Council Session dated August 




Hazelwood.” Hazelwood instituted a policy for monitoring conditions of the properties 
despite the low number of HUD foreclosures.177 
Hazelwood recognized the trajectory of FHA’s destabilizing practices and 
responded proactively. The housing inspector monitored and recorded the conditions of 
foreclosed HUD homes by performing an exterior inspection of the properties every three 
months. Hazelwood applied this procedure for monitoring non-HUD foreclosures as well. 
Although it was difficult to obtain private foreclosure information, Hazelwood utilized 
techniques such as reviewing trash collection records to determine if homes were vacant. 
While their actions did not prevent FHA activity in the city, they were better prepared to 
mitigate damage if FHA foreclosures increased.178 
No city’s process or programs were void of deficiencies. Maplewood struggled 
writing up their programs let alone implementing them. While officials proposed focusing 
on houses in most need of improvement, fights over limited eligibility, first come first 
serve, and per-home outlays delayed the passage of the bill authorizing the city’s 
participation. Critics bashed the plan because, as one resident complained, “Two-hundred 
Seventy-five thousand dollars isn’t going to fix all the homes in Maplewood.” Of course, 
officials could not satisfy everyone, and no amount of good city leadership or policies can 
guarantee a high-quality housing stock.179 
 
177 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of St. Louis County Assisted Housing Coordinator presentation to 
the council in City of Hazelwood, MO February 27, 1980; According to City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular 
Council Session dated August 23, 1983, page 2, Ferguson made $80,000 in home improvement funds 
available for people to fix up their homes in 1983. See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council 
Session dated October 12, 1982, page 4.  
178 For more information see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated November 14, 1984. 
179 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Year 1977, Document 
No. 257.  
Bill number 3974: An ordinance accepting the provision of chapter 353 revised statutes of Missouri Urban 
Redevelopment Corporation. See also, City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Regular Session dated October 




Ultimately, municipal leaders could only assess situations, utilize available 
information, access and leveraged resources and tools, and make decisions. While HUD 
played a prevalent role in impacting residential patterns and housing conditions, municipal 
governments possessed authority to address the phenomena. Type, timing, and level of 
action impacted the degree to which HUD activity affected municipalities’ housing. 
However, it was not a singular driver of housing stock conditions. Housing codes and 
enforcement determined preexisting conditions, informed officials of trends, and guided 
policy responses. 
Code Enforcement 
Suburbs have a long history of stringent housing codes. But no suburban city 
exemplified this more than University City. The municipality was known for having some 
of the strictest codes in the region. For some residents, housing codes were a source of 
extreme frustration. Families sometimes moved from the municipality because of the high 
costs of bringing their houses up to code. Others filed complaints accusing housing 
inspectors of harassment and hurling insults. Albeit, housing inspectors are seldom popular 
in any town as they are charged with the duty of enforcing the codes. But University City 
inspectors were often loathed.180 
Reports outlined claims that inspectors would sometimes go through dresser 
drawers and open refrigerator doors as part of inspections. Following windshield surveys 
for the rehabilitation loan program, residents claimed citations were sent to people whose 
 
cooperative agreement on behalf of the city with the Maplewood Housing Authority and declaring 
ordinance to be an emergency bill passed and became ordinance number 4161. 
180 For more information about University City’s codes see City of University City, archives Regular Session 
1009: February 7, 1972, page 7. For example, of references see also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated 
May 13, 1971; Hazelwood, MO archive dated February 18, 1975; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated 




properties were among the best kept properties in the neighborhood. According to one such 
homeowner, “I received the letter out of the clear blue sky.” A 1972 Washington University 
School of Social Work survey of 41 University City homes found most interviewees 
disagreed with the city’s inspection process.181 
The survey revealed that some residents felt the housing inspections hurt their 
neighborhoods rather than help rehabilitate them. They believed the council did not want 
certain types of modest low-income housing in University City and the inspections were a 
way to minimize and eliminate them. Criticism seldom affected the decisions of University 
City officials concerning matters related to the municipality’s aesthetic qualities. 
Policymakers were not open to debate on issues that might weaken the city’s housing codes 
and enforcement. With over 17,500 dwellings in less than six square miles, the slightest 
housing deterioration could mean a dramatically different looking University City.182 
Rigorous codes and tough enforcement resulted in nearly 45,000 repairs each year 
between 1970 and 1975 alone. The city consistently sought ways to fortify and expand its 
housing codes. For University City, Building Officials Code Administrators (BOCA) 
building codes simply served as a foundation upon which to build. BOCA provided 
regulations for the design and construction of buildings and encouraged cities to adopt 
uniform building codes and enforcement measures. Adoption of BOCA codes was standard 
practice. Archives reflect each study city adopting the latest BOCA building codes 
throughout the study period.183 
 
181 Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1099: April 21, 1975, page 
18; Taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1009: February 7, 1972, page 7. 
182 Density and properties count taken from University City, MO archives Session 1145: October 25, 1976, 
page 4. 
183 According to records outlining the city’s code enforcement figures included in Session 1378: February 




In addition to following BOCA recommendations, cities used nuisance abatement 
laws to regulate conditions of properties. Nuisance abatement authorized cities to levy 
special tax bills against property owners for costs of city workers performing property 
owner responsibilities such as cutting and removing overgrown grass and weeds. Adopting 
BOCA codes and nuisance abatement policies offered municipalities some professional 
credence and regulatory authority over the structural design, maintenance, and exterior 
appearance of the housing stock. However, they were essentially guidelines in a book and 
rules governing things like landscaping. 
Without rigorous inspections and enforcement policies, BOCA and nuisance 
ordinances did little to protect the character, preserve the taxable value of land and 
buildings, or ensure stability of residential areas. Minimum housing standards provided 
cities with more powerful tools for attaining and maintaining these elements. According to 
Interviewee J3, “Minimum housing standards were the codes that had some teeth.” 
Presence or absence of minimum housing codes significantly affected housing stock 
conditions entering the 1970s.184 
As residential patterns changed and HUD activities ramped up, the degree of impact 
and municipal toolboxes varied. Although HUD had established certain standards for 
buildings constructed under its housing programs, they did little to curb deterioration. 
University City was the first city in Missouri to adopt minimum housing policies in the 
1960s. A minimum housing code instituted new standards, enforcement measures, and 
 
and the BOCA national building code 14th edition in November 1999, page 2. Bills authorizing BOCA always 
passed unanimously. 




penalties for violators, and better equipped cities to prevent and address housing stock 
deterioration.185 
By 1970, as in most other mature inner suburbs, a notable percentage of Jennings’ 
housing stock was in disrepair or exhibited some form of substandard conditions. Jennings 
began taking steps towards minimum housing policy. On August 24, 1971, Jennings 
enacted a law requiring occupancy permits. The new policy stipulated that an inspection of 
property be performed and approved before transfers of ownership or occupancy could be 
completed. The new law was an effective way for Jennings to begin addressing 
deterioration by interjecting required improvements at the point where seller/lessor impetus 
and buyer/leaser interest intersect.186 
Then, in May 1973, the passage of Bill 1050 authorized Ordinance 1029 enacting 
space restrictions in Jennings. The law regulated the number of occupants allowed to live 
in a home based on specified dimensions. Finally, on June 24, 1974, Jennings’ building 
commissioner issued notice to property owners regarding the City of Jennings’ enactment 
of a minimum housing law governing every dwelling within the city limits. True minimum 
housing meant Jennings now conducted periodic inspections of every dwelling.187 
In addition to change of occupancy inspections, periodic inspections were 
performed at all properties and code violations had to be corrected within an allotted time. 
Jennings’ path to minimum housing was unique in that the process progressed rapidly after 
 
185 For information about HUD’s policies go to hud.gov, enter keywords Minimum Property Standards 
(MPS).  
186 City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated August 24, 1971, page 4: Bill No. 976, Ordinance No. 
958. 
187 See City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session dated June 24, 1974, page 7; Bill 1050 amending 




the introduction of bills. This was caused primarily by the council’s unity and insulation 
outlined earlier in the chapter. 
Other cities’ attempts to enact the policy involved entrenched battles. Opposing 
views pitted those who believed cities already had sufficient ordinances to control blight 
against those who argued existing ordinances were inadequate to deal with current trends. 
While opponents of minimum housing urged officials to do a better job enforcing existing 
ordinances, it was clear their principal fear was that the policy would create hardship. 
Consider that in the early 1970s, minimum housing laws were still regarded as a 
controversial issue. 
Rumors abounded in neighboring municipalities that, “University City’s minimum 
housing hurt older residents.” Many suburbanites viewed laws like minimum housing as 
peculiar, unwarranted, and authoritarian mandates that placed an undue burden on 
homeowners. According to one citizen, Ferguson’s 1973 minimum housing bill was, 
“Ridiculous and unnecessary and should be thrown out.” Ferguson was a prosperous 
community and to many, it appeared some officials were busy looking for ways to weaken 
the city instead of strengthening it.188 
Prevailing attitudes in Ferguson favored more traditional means such as exclusion 
as the best method of preserving community character and property values. Ironically, 
minimum codes had been criticized as methods of discrimination against the poor and 
people of color. Nevertheless, Ferguson detractors labeled minimum housing codes as 
dictatorial claiming building officials had too much power in assessing properties for 
 
188 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Bill No. 4607 in archive dated January 23, 1973, page 





nuisance or repair needs. They opposed the concept of inspections arguing that matters 
concerning conditions of properties should be handled by the buyer and seller.189 
Most notable was that Ferguson’s bill did not involve periodic inspections. 
Ferguson’s policy language stipulated inspections be performed preoccupancy or upon 
resale. The bill did not affect existing residences. Nevertheless, officials repeatedly tabled 
the bill until it died. Three years would pass before the city adopted Bill 4607 enacting a 
new housing code to become effective on March 1, 1977. However, before Ferguson’s city 
codebook could bear any resemblance to University City’s and Jennings’, a majority of 
voters needed to approve the measure in a November 2, 1976 special election. Ferguson 
voters rejected minimum housing by a vote of 6,398 in favor to 4,452 opposed.190 
Failing to garner constituent support for minimum housing standards in 1973 and 
1976, Ferguson officials set out to construct and present more palatable alternatives. Early 
polling for the exterior appearance program showed residents favored this type of policy 
three to one. In a supplemental election held November 6, 1979, voters approved the 
exterior appearance program. The 3,613 to 3,164 tallies contradicted the polling numbers, 
and the narrow margin reflected citizen division on such issues in Ferguson. 
Notwithstanding, the city instituted the program on February 6, 1980. Shortly after the 
implementation of Ferguson’s exterior appearance program, complaints of inequitable 
application and targeting began to accumulate.191 
 
189 See City of Ferguson, MO archive dated July 28, 1970, page 5; Reference to public comments in Ferguson 
archive Special Session dated February 1, 1973, page 2. 
190 Bill No. 4607 passed and became Ordinance No. 76-1578 filed in codebook No. 9, page 105. See, 
Ferguson Regular Council Meeting dated September 14, 1976, page 4: Results from special election 
Tuesday, November 2, 1976 from the St. Louis, State of Missouri Board of Election Commissioners; See City 
of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated November 13, 1973, page 4. 
191 According to the board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, state of Missouri passed 
and adopted by the council of the city of Ferguson as Ordinance No. 79-1726. See also, Ferguson archive 




Officials maintained claims of discriminatory targeting were untrue and that all 
houses and properties were being inspected. However, Ferguson archives indicate that 
officials were in fact directing inspectors to specific areas. Closer examination also reveals 
more supporting evidence of discriminatory treatment. Although the program was written 
to apply to the entire city, Ferguson only funded the program through HUD funds. 
Therefore, inspections were required to be limited to low to moderate-income areas only.192 
In 1984, Ferguson instituted a change of occupancy permit requirement and density 
regulations. Density controls were an effective housing preservation tool. The measure also 
helped alleviate overcrowding in schools. However, the tool proved to be largely 
ineffective for Ferguson as its enactment was woefully delayed and the policy lacked the 
accompanying components needed to make the policy effective. Without rigorous and 
reliable inspection and enforcement mechanisms to compliment it, occupancy restrictions 
were rendered pointless. For example, absent periodic inspections, Ferguson depended 
heavily on sources like school enrollment to help surmise occupancy levels.193 
This method was problematic as school districts were usually not contiguous with 
city boundaries. In some cases, family members and friends claimed residency for students 
that did not physically live on the premises. Interviewee U5 explained, “Many kids lived 
with grandma. It became less a nuclear family than a group of people living together out 
of necessity.” Stereotypical assumptions disallowed legitimate, founded, and equitable 
 
is permanently filed in Ferguson Codebook No. 11, page 85; Polling refers to a show of hands vote during 
public hearing. When in favor of the bill was called 17 hands were raised and approximately 6 hands were 
raised in opposition to passage of the bill. See, Ferguson Regular Council Session May 22, 1979, page 3; and 
Ferguson archive Regular Council Session dated June 12, 1979, page 1. 
192 See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: July 26, 1983, page 1-2. 




inquiries about occupant status and encouraged overaggressive, excessive, and 
disproportionate use of the law instead.194 
A 1992 referendum election repealed Ferguson’s exterior appearance program 
further weakening the city’s defenses against blight. Not only did Ferguson reject authentic 
minimum codes, it was now without one of the best tools it had at its disposal. The 
referendum was followed by a 4,773 to 2,115 defeat of a 1994 property preservation 
proposition. At this point, Ferguson’s overall housing stock was still in better shape than 
many of its neighbors. However, failure to strengthen housing codes, perform impartial 
enforcement, and dedicate more reliable resources helped lay the groundwork for problems 
to come.195 
Lacking the tools provided in true minimum housing policy, housing stock 
maintenance began to deteriorate rapidly in certain sectors of Ferguson. This was 
particularly true for areas containing clusters of apartment dwellings. As conditions 
worsened, Ferguson chose not to amend their policies. Instead, the city turned to a different 
source and style of enforcement to address problems. Ferguson relied on its police to 
monitor, control, and deter housing deterioration. However, police were trained to combat 
crime not housing code violations.196 
 
194 Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official. 
195 Consider that Ferguson considered enacting an occupancy permit as early as 1974. See Regular council 
meeting April 23, 1974, page 2. See also, Bill No. 5400, an ordinance providing for minimum living space 
regulations and requirements providing for an occupancy permit. Vote of six yes to one absent became 
Ordinance No. 84-2032 and is filed in book number 15, page 93, See, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council 
Session May 8, 1984, page 3. See also, Ferguson archive Regular Council Session dated October 8, 1992, 
page 4; and Ferguson Canvas of Election Results dated December 13, 1994: municipal general election held 
on Tuesday, November 8, 1994 in the City of Ferguson. MO. Results from the board of election 
commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, State of Missouri. 
196 See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session dated March 11, 1980, page 5; Special Council Session February 
7, 1984, page 1. Bill No. 5390 An ordinance levying special tax bills against property for costs of cutting and 
removing weeds as provided under chapter 12 health section 12.03 nuisance is defined unanimously passed 




This is not to imply that police were incapable of executing fair, effective housing 
code enforcement. In fact, it was common for cities to utilize police, fire, and other city 
departments in housing code enforcement, particularly those with stringent codes and 
thorough inspection mechanisms. However, these measures were usually temporary 
assignments to augment services in response to staff shortages. University City, for 
example, frequently utilized employees of its fire and police departments for duties such 
as code inspections. Jennings even appointed a former police officer as special building 
inspector in 1985.197 
In the case of Ferguson, however, police were not assigned to perform inspections, 
and housing codes were not what they were instructed to enforce. Ferguson failed to 
implement meaningful policy, delayed implementation of basic measures, and reverted to 
ineffective alternatives. The city relied on draconian methods to control aspects of 
community life having little to do with housing code compliance. Exponential growth in 
black residency, low-income residents, and renters introduced social dynamics that 
Ferguson was not only unwilling to embrace but were committed to isolating and restricting 
to the cities’ edges.  
For decades, housing codes and enforcement proved essential to protecting the 
integrity of a cities’ housing stock. But acute changes in resident demographics challenged 
municipal officials to consider and reconsider approaches to preserving the characteristics 
and value of homes and the implications associated with various approaches. Growth of 
rental properties complicated compliance enforcement, and it became more difficult to 
identify property owners and occupant status. Cities implemented different methods to 
 




evaluate, maintain, and improve housing conditions. Some policies like landlord 
registration were effective and well-liked, while others like family definition and policing 
created resentment and tension which intensified over time.198 
Early and true implementation of minimum housing did not eliminate problems for 
cities. Jennings and University City each implemented the tool early and completely. 
Nevertheless, each city still struggled with deterioration in neighborhoods. Areas contained 
condemn properties, vacant lots, and until cities passed ordinances requiring they be 
removed upon change in occupancy, aesthetically displeasing security bars on doors and 
windows. Housing codes and enforcement decisions, especially in the early period of 
suburban transformation, were difficult tasks requiring consideration of a complex array of 
competing and complementary factors.199 
Consider Hazelwood’s case. City officials first began exploring minimum housing 
ideas as early as May 1971, when they obtained copies of both Berkeley and University 
City’s minimum housing bills for comparison purposes. Three years later, in November 
1974, the council adopted an occupancy permit requirement. However, a decade later in 
 
198 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1980 Document 352; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 
April 24, 1990. For more information regarding the development and implementation of the city’s rental 
housing registration ordinance see: City of University City archives Special Session 1077: June 10, 1974. See 
also, Ferguson archive dated June 28, 1970, page 2; Ferguson Special Session September 19, 1989, page 2; 
Ferguson Regular Council Session January 24, 2006, page 4; Hazelwood Special Council Meeting dated April 
14, 2014. 
199 For the story on Maplewood’s minimum housing see, City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 
document 230; City of Maplewood, Missouri Archives year 1973 document 346; City of Maplewood 
Missouri archives February 20 1974 Document 429; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1974 
document 59; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1981 document number 454: Bill number 4201 was 
approved on May 26 1981 as ordinance number 4090 , In document number 461 . City of Maplewood 
Missouri archives 1981 document number 454; City of Maplewood archives April 14, 1987 document 8; Bill 
number 4436 an ordinance authorizing the city manager to enter into and execute a contract with St. Louis 
County Missouri for minimum housing inspection services approved as ordinance number 4291; For more 
about security bars see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated September 13, 1976, page 1: 
Document No. 3064; and Passage of Ordinance No. 5762 which be found in City of University City, MO 




May 1984, the city still did not have minimum housing and enforcement on the books as 
Hazelwood voters rejected the 1976 proposition.200 
Public records demonstrate low civic involvement among Hazelwood’s 
electorate— particularly relative to other study cities. Therefore, citizen preferences were 
not easily examinable. Nevertheless, in general, people want less government and the 
original occupancy permit issue ignited a firestorm. Hazelwood officials adopted the 1976 
measure without public discussion or education. Citizens petitioned for a referendum and 
voted 1,400 to 904 to repeal the law. Hazelwood officials made the mistake of 
underestimating the controversial nature of the policy, citizens’ issue attitudes, and voter 
capacity to mobilize against the law.201 
Although some cities chose not to adopt minimum housing codes and some faced 
staunch citizen opposition to tools like occupancy permits, by 1976, 30 St. Louis County 
communities had housing codes with occupancy permit provisions and suggested others 
adopt the tool. A 1976 East-West Gateway Coordinating Council survey of the 30 St. Louis 
County municipalities with housing codes and occupancy permits found that 100 % of the 
30 communities would recommend the procedure to other cities. The report further stated 
 
200 For more about the beginning of Hazelwood’s occupancy permit efforts see, City of Hazelwood, MO 
archive May 13, 1971; City of Hazelwood, MO November 6, 1974; and Hazelwood, MO archive November 
29, 1974. 
201 See, Referendum Petition regarding occupancy permits in transcript of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session 
dated December 1, 1976. See also, Hazelwood, MO February 18, 1975; City of Hazelwood, MO August 18, 
1976; City Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated February 18, 1975; and Hazelwood, MO Regular Session 
August 4, 1976; Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated August 4, 1976: Bill 1220 Housing, occupancy permit 
provisions unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1192-76. See also, archives Hazelwood, MO Special Session 




that 97 % of cities felt the occupancy permit had a positive effect in preventing or slowing 
neighborhood deterioration.202 
Of all the suburbs surveyed, the only community that did not feel as though 
requirements had slowed deterioration was Wellston. This further reinforces the point that 
stringent code enforcement measures were more effective at preventing decline than 
stabilizing or reversing the trend. The tool was largely ineffective once an area had already 
exhibited a great deal of deterioration. Thirteen years after Hazelwood officials first 
considered the tool, they were preparing to reach out to Ferguson officials to ascertain how 
Ferguson managed to recently get an occupancy permit law adopted.203 
Relative to both threat level and adoption difficulty, Hazelwood faced an uphill 
battle from the beginning. As in some neighboring suburbs, Hazelwood contained resource 
rich areas where maintenance quality was superb, and the dangers of deterioration were 
nonexistent. Expensive homes and newer developments dawned these sections of 
Hazelwood’s landscape. Conversely, a significant portion of Hazelwood still consisted of 
properties which contained old deteriorated accessory buildings formerly utilized in 
farming. 
Minimum housing ordinances required property owners bring buildings into 
compliance with new standards and for many Hazelwood residents, this was financially 
unfeasible. While most municipalities faced a similar dilemma, the dynamics of 
Hazelwood’s housing stock included an additional quandary. In addition to homeowner 
compliance, Hazelwood’s residents would be required to repair, maintain, or demolish and 
 
202 According to figure referenced in transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO August 4, 1976; According to 
results of East-West Gateway Coordinating Council survey figures in transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO 





clear structures which in most cases were no longer operational. Consider these elements 
and it becomes obvious why the issue garnered such a high level of involvement from an 
otherwise apathetic electorate.204 
Hazelwood officials recognized destabilization threats from their housing stock 
circumstance, leveraged the available tool of minimum housing codes, and authorized 
budget expenditures to cover the salary of a building inspector and enforcement services. 
However, voters rejected the tools through a successful referendum petition, and officials 
were back at square one. At this point, officials had several options: 1. They could elect to 
do nothing, 2. They could mount a minimum housing codes education campaign to try to 
gain more voter support, or 3. They could seek alternatives. 
Hazelwood officials chose to explore other available tools for combating 
deterioration. Alternatives to minimum housing codes were not as effective, as they had 
less teeth. Nevertheless, they were usually more palatable to voters, and contained some of 
the elements of minimum housing. These factors made them more adoptable and much 
more effective than doing nothing. As one Hazelwood policymaker put it, “A half a loaf, 
or third of a loaf is better than none at all.”205 
Hazelwood ordinances at the time only authorized the city to require property 
owners correct deficiencies posing a threat of physical injury to the public. Such a law was 
minimally effective at addressing the most prominent contributing factor in municipal-
level decline— structural decay. Hazelwood officials needed an additional tool and they 
 
204 Referendum petition contained 2,000 voter signatures. See City of Hazelwood, MO archive December 1, 
1976. See also, Hazelwood July 7, 1976; Hazelwood, MO September 15, 1976. 




set out to identify which tool met or exceeded both the adoptability and impact thresholds 
the council agreed upon. 
In August 1977, Hazelwood adopted an exterior maintenance code, and began 
leveraging CDBG funds and other funding to support inspection and enforcement 
activities. The exterior maintenance code served to mitigate some of the defects in the city’s 
existing code. However, it was essentially an expansion of nuisance and demolition codes 
which were already on the books. The exterior maintenance code did little to empower the 
city to address the real deficiency in the existing code. Inspection and enforcement 
mechanisms were what needed to be addressed.206 
Nuisance orders relied on reporting or inspector discovery. Also, conditions of 
many properties were beyond help and would have to be demolished anyway. An 
occupancy permit system would provide the additional mechanisms for prompting 
inspections thereby expanding enforcement opportunities and multiplying impact. 
Hazelwood’s minimum housing proponents understood this and since the 1976 repealing 
of the law, officials had remained steadfast in promoting the adoption of an occupancy 
permit requirement. 
During the preparation of Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive plan, disagreement 
emerged between two groups of councilpersons concerning reintroduction of occupancy 
permits. One lawmaker was especially adamant as she represented a ward in which the 
signs of decline were beginning to subtly show. A fellow lawmaker, also a proponent of 






to make Hazelwood a little bit better. It will be difficult, but the council has to determine 
if the advice of the professionals is in fact for the good of Hazelwood.”207 
Hazelwood officials were proposing adoption of the Ferguson version of an 
occupancy permit which provided for inspections at the time of rental or sale of property. 
This new Hazelwood proposal had less controls than the one voted out in 1976. That 
version of the ordinance instituted ongoing inspections and enforcement procedures. 
Nevertheless, some policymakers remained skeptical, citing reports that other cities such 
as Florissant had the periodic inspection version of housing code and it increased the cost 
of homes in the municipality.208 
Hazelwood’s council had been working on the new plan since July 1983, and the 
issue of whether to include an occupancy permit served as the only notable source of 
disagreement. While the council unanimously agreed stronger codes and enforcements 
were warranted, several lawmakers feared they may be once again traveling the 1976 road. 
Proponents pointed out the weakness of the existing exterior code, citing 75 percent of 
citations were for beautification rather than health and safety violations. This amounted to 
a beautification program, and beautification was not mentioned in the established code.209 
Nevertheless, several officials viewed the 1976 referendum as a clear message and 
mandate from Hazelwood voters to their elected representatives. While the new proposal 
varied from the 1976 law, it was still an occupancy permit and voters had issued a 
resounding no to occupancy permits. Although this was a different version, some officials 
lacked the will to test its palatability on voters. Further, survey data revealed that more than 
 
207 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City Hazelwood, MO archive Special Meeting dated May 23, 
1984: Comprehensive Plan discussion. 
208 Ibid 




90 percent of residents favored the exterior code and did not want an interior code. 
Ultimately, Hazelwood’s completed 1984 plan did not include the implementation of the 
occupancy permit inspection and code enforcement system.210 
Hazelwood produced a plan that included the implementation of communication 
techniques and instruments designed to stress the value of the existing exterior maintenance 
code and strengthen its effect. The program included voluntary services and free interior 
inspections. At the close of the 1980s, five years after the implementation of the 
accentuated exterior maintenance code and programs, Hazelwood officials authorized an 
assessment of its overall effectiveness on the conditions of the city’s housing stock. 
A 1989 University of Missouri-St. Louis area municipal housing codes and housing 
survey looked at the conditions of Hazelwood’s housing stock for the years 1980, 1983, 
and 1985. The report showed the housing stock deteriorating in 1980, but years 1983 and 
1985 showed Hazelwood’s housing stock to be improving. At the time of the report, 
Hazelwood officials still favored adoption of occupancy permits. They were still gauging 
voter temperature, structural atmosphere, and monitoring windows of opportunity. 
Nevertheless, as the report indicated, the 1984 enhanced exterior maintenance compromise 
garnered positive results.211 
Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive planning process resulted in several innovative 
additions to the city’s exterior maintenance code, and the city would continue seeking ways 
to improve and strengthen the measure in future decades. According to a December 2009 
issue of the Missouri Municipal Review, the City of Hazelwood Code Enforcement 
 
210 According to survey results included in archive City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated July 27, 
1983. 




Division was the first municipality in Missouri to deploy mobile wireless software to assist 
in assuring code enforcement and to improve productivity.212 
The article highlighted how the city partnered with an information technologies 
firm to develop the module which could be integrated with other computer systems and 
provided code enforcement personnel access to “real time” information. The tool allowed 
for more instantaneous creation of post-inspection citations utilizing laptop computers. The 
initiative was part of Hazelwood’s efforts to create a paperless office environment which 
was more environmentally friendly, decreased bureaucracy, and saved taxpayer money.213 
Over the course of the entire study period, Hazelwood officials attempted to 
implement minimum housing and over the entire period, they failed to do so. Hazelwood 
entered the era as a nonprofessionally operated village equipped with outmoded codes 
which were powerless to affect decaying old farm properties and structures. After 
establishing a charter form of government, city officials set out to institute more adequate 
measures for controlling the city’s structural health. Voters rejected those measures, but 
officials never lost sight of their original objectives and goals. They reassessed, adjusted 
plans, instituted alternatives, and continued to improve those tools. 
Exterior maintenance codes did not equip Hazelwood with the full mechanisms of 
minimum housing leveraged by Jennings and University City, or the inspection prompting 
device of change in possession permit requirements employed in Ferguson. Nevertheless, 
Hazelwood officials not only maximized the tools available to them, they also enriched 
them— making the tools more effective. Hazelwood offers an example of a cooperative 
 
212 See, reported in Hazelwood City News and Events recorded in archive City of Hazelwood, MO Regular 
Council Session: January 6, 2010. 





approach to policymaking. Despite enjoying council consensus related to identifying and 
prioritizing threats, needs, and options, Hazelwood policymakers exhibited an intriguing 


























Chapter 6. Land Use Policy  
Introduction 
Housing codes and enforcement were fundamental to early municipal-level 
stabilization efforts. Minimum housing policy proved effective in areas that utilized the 
complete tool in combination with other methods. Some municipalities chose to use only 
certain components of the tool while electing to levy various other prevention and 
enforcement mechanisms. Regardless of which housing preservation method officials 
employed, owner-occupied homes and property values continued to decline. While 
adjacent mature suburbs like Clayton, Ladue, and Florissant flourished, locals looked to 
municipal leaders to govern their respective towns to similar success.215 
Suburban governments needed to rethink land use policies, and options were 
limited. The unique character mentioned earlier was established before some areas were 
even incorporated. While some cities like Ferguson and Hazelwood grew geographically 
over time, annexed areas usually retained existing zone rights. Suburban boundaries and 
designs constrained officials to operate within the parameters set by location, historical 
function, and city founders.216 
Land reutilization in inner suburbs was not simply a method employed to handle 
deterioration, it was one of the most critical elements in suburban survival. Localities 
 
215 Occupancy rules served as a critical device for the city in controlling the integrity of its housing stock. 
See City of University City archives Regular Session 1614: April 18th, 1994, page 4 for more reference to the 
policy and practice. 
216 According to Hazelwood City Plan Commission minutes of June 11, 1992, Hazelwood usually adopted St. 
Louis County Zoning Code for annexed areas as recommended, “95 % of the county zoning is comparable 
to our zoning and is based on the St. Louis County Master Plan.” See also, City of Hazelwood, MO July 15, 
1992. Annexed land was required by law to retain the same zoning rights and could be diminished by 
annexation. Annexation was formally approved by the Supreme Court. Attorneys recommend cities make 
no extensive changes in zoning in developing plans. See City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session 




competed for homeowners and businesses, and competition was fierce. Location, physical 
characteristics, and function defined these areas in the past, but staying competitive often 
required redevelopment which frequently required rezoning. Lot sizes and designations 
had to be amended to accommodate demographical, environmental, market, and industry 
changes. Consider a Ferguson resident’s 1983 perspective, “We don't need to encourage 
people to move into shiny new carefree houses in St. Charles because we are being too 
picky.”217 
Through land reutilization decisions, municipal leaders chose whether to reinforce 
their identity or redefine it for the future. For example, University City boasted a reasonable 
level of commercial activity, but the lifeblood of the municipality resided in residential 
property. Unlike commercial centers and industrial suburbs who generated revenue from 
economic activity, property values were especially critical to the stability of bedroom 
communities. University City garnered revenue primarily from property taxes paid by 
homeowners and did not enjoy much space for new development which further restricted 
options and increased dependency on property taxes. 
Interviewee U1 explains, “We’re a very built out city. We have minor strips in our 
neighborhoods. We have the kind of neighborhoods with a corner grocery store or little 
pockets of commerce.” While bedroom suburbs like University City were particularly 
vulnerable to decline due to diminishing property values, other types of mature suburbs 
were also susceptible to the destabilizing activities of the era.218 
 
217 Excerpt of quote taken from archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: July 26, 1983, page 
1. For an example of buildable lot changes see, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Meeting April 
22, 1975, page 7. 





Historically, streetcar suburbs like Maplewood could better afford to keep 
homeowner property taxes low. Enjoying a retail rich commercial sector, Maplewood 
relied more on revenues generated from economic activity than property taxes. However, 
by 1970, the mature inner suburb was no longer a commercial retail hub enjoying robust 
economic activity. Fairly insulated from the destabilizing activities occurring in northern 
areas of the county, Maplewood offered a unique opportunity to enrich my examination of 
post-fair housing era decline and stabilization in mature St. Louis inner suburbs.   
Maplewood entered the post-fairing housing era reeling from a collapse in 
commercial activity and corruption in local government. Decline in commercial and retail 
businesses generated less tax revenue resulting in increasingly higher property tax rates for 
Maplewood homeowners. Poor management of city affairs and fiscal fraudulence 
exacerbated the city’s decline. Interviewee M3 recalls, “Maplewood really struggled in the 
1970s, business was hurting, bad politicians, and all.” Fiscal stress increased, city services 
suffered, and conditions deteriorated.219 
Despite not facing the negative impacts of resegregating neighborhoods, 
discriminatory housing and lending practices, and concentrated HUD activity, the city 
faced municipal-level decline, nonetheless. According to HUD’s action grant criteria, 
Maplewood’s age of housing, per capita income, and population lag met the three 
requirements needed to qualify as a distressed city. Consequentially, Maplewood’s 
revitalization activities resembled stabilization measures being enacted in HUD-focused 
 




areas. However, with no discernible black in-migration, there was no white flight. Despite 
higher taxes and declining city services, most core residents remained.220 
At the height of its commercial retail prominence, Maplewood never lost its small-
town appeal. Residents clung to that identity, and it helped the city get through the tough 
times. Suburbs’ historical identity and appeal did not always remain fixed, however. As 
technology, transportation, and tastes evolved, some suburbs took on new identities. By 
the post-fair housing period, some suburbs had transitioned from their original function 
and were a mix of their past and present selves. 
Jennings, for example, was a bedroom suburb before the arrival of two malls. The 
advent of two large retail shopping centers, one in 1955 and another in 1961, transformed 
the municipality’s function, financial fortitude, and municipal priorities. Despite remaining 
largely a bedroom suburb, by 1970, the city depended less on property taxes to fund city 
services and efforts to preserve the city’s retail activity rivaled efforts to protect property 
values. While some suburbs experienced a blending of functions, others experienced 
multiple functional transitions.221 
By the time highways emerged and automobile use skyrocketed, Ferguson had 
become a streetcar suburb. However, by 1970, the former railroad suburb attracting wealth 
and affluence had transitioned yet again. Although no longer serving as a retreat for railroad 
commuters or a streetcar shopping destination, Ferguson’s well-established business sector 
 
220 According to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Urban Development 
action grant program: action grants provide assistance to distress cities and Maplewood is a distressed city. 
See, City of Maplewood, Missouri public hearing archives dated October 20, 1978: Document 77-78.   
221 Schmerber 2011, p.228 and 235. Also see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: June 9, 1975, 
page 6: Document 2606. Jennings enter into contract with the Real Estate Development Corporation, a 
national corporation that does research and makes recommendations for HUD. The study was performed 




attracted prominent clientele. While Ferguson experienced several transitions in function, 
the mature suburb still fared well physically and financially. The origins of its founding 
solidified the suburb’s identity and factored prominently into policy decisions throughout 
the study period.222 
When Interviewee H5 moved to Hazelwood in the late 1950s, “There wasn’t much 
other than farmland and old Highway 66.” However, within the next 20 years, Hazelwood 
officials were citing “[lack of buildable land]” as their number one challenge and were 
considering adding more land, property, and residents through annexation. Issue positions 
ranged from believing the city existed at a nice community size to believing the city needed 
to grow by annexing areas. According to one Hazelwood policymaker, “This item should 
be determined by the philosophy of the city.” As such, by 1983, the city had acquired 
several large parcels of undeveloped land.223 
Suburbs varied in size, function, and identity. There was no standard bearer one 
could model one’s own suburb after. Nevertheless, feasibility studies and comprehensive 
planning processes helped cities better understand their situation, available tools, and 
implications of decisions. Philosophies impacted decisions but characteristics limited 
options. Factors for landlocked cities differed from those with unincorporated areas 
bordering their city limits. Impact of rezoning residential to commercial varied between 
 
222 For examples of early city policy at the start of the era see, City of Ferguson, MO archive May 12, 1970, 
page 1. 
223 Excerpt of quote taken from Interview H4: 07/24/2019, White / Male / 63-year Resident / Ex-Public 
Official; Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated 
August 1, 1979; Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Special Meeting dated 





cases. Despite these variations, however, city lawmakers’ decisions could render these 
unique characteristics valuable assets or costly liabilities. 
Parks 
Hazelwood assessed its conditions and produced a “very aggressive and 
challenging plan” for land reutilization. Utilizing land use maps of the city, Hazelwood 
integrated prospected annexations into existing area reutilization goals, and zoned parcels 
in accordance with well-defined objectives. While activity was robust, officials created and 
maintained an environment in which policy dictated development as opposed to the other 
way around. The city’s ambitious undertaking required creative methods of procuring 
resources and supports to implement.224 
Prior to the 1970s, the Hazelwood Parks and Recreation Commission actively 
explored various methods of land acquisition for parks. However, the Village of 
Hazelwood Board of Trustees continuously turned down their recommendations. By 1971, 
however, the city was no longer a village and Hazelwood councilpersons were in 
unanimous agreement that the city needed parks and facilities for recreation. Officials 
began affirmatively seeking to acquire land for park development by contacting 
landowners and collecting land availability and pricing information.225 
Hazelwood’s parks development began with a resident designating 13.28 acres of 
land for use as a city park on the condition the city properly insured and maintained the 
area. City officials accepted the resident’s benevolence and proceeded to add city-owned 
parks to the area as well. By leveraging various financing instruments including 50 % 
 
224 See, City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated April 27, 1971; City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular 
Session dated December 5, 1984; Hazelwood Regular Session dated December 4, 1985; Excerpt of quote 





matching grants, a million-dollar bond issue, a sales tax levy, and paying property owners 
in installments, Hazelwood transformed its landscape. And on January 5, 1974, Hazelwood 
became the first municipality to participate in the St. Louis County matching funds for 
parks acquisition program.226 
By June 1980, less than a decade after beginning its parks development efforts, the 
suburb of 14,082 residents boasted 10 parks, over 130 acres of parkland, two swimming 
pools, and bike/jogging trails. Although Hazelwood officials, administrators, and city 
personnel changed over the study period, the city’s commitment to its parks and parks 
development remained steadfast throughout. The city continued to develop parks and 
recreation amenities through land purchases, county park acquisitions, and annexations; 
and CDBGs and other public funding always included allocations designated for parks and 
public spaces.227 
By the end of the study period, Hazelwood’s parks and recreation portfolio 
consisted of 16 community parks covering 160 acres, an 18-hole disc golf course, 
bike/skate park, aquatic center, sports complex, and two recreation centers. Note, the city 
has struggled to achieve equitable accessibility for all its wards as early investments 
disproportionately dedicated facilities in certain areas. Notwithstanding, Hazelwood’s 
 
226 For more information about Hazelwood’s early park acquisitions see City of Hazelwood, MO archives 
January 5, 1974; Hazelwood archive February 5, 1975; City of Hazelwood, MO April 7, 1971; Special bond 
issue election on November 2, 1971. See also, Hazelwood archive dated September 28, 1971: Bill 889; 
Hazelwood archive August 1972; Hazelwood Bill 968 unanimously adopted as Ordinance 939 on September 
20, 1972; Hazelwood archive October 4, 1972; Hazelwood archive December 6, 1972.   
227 City of Hazelwood, Mo archives Hazelwood January 9, 1975; September 20, 1978, page 4 of 17; 
Hazelwood June 4, 1980: Resolution 8008; and Hazelwood December 17, 1980; Hazelwood January 2, 1985; 
Hazelwood October 28, 1981; Hazelwood June 1, 1983; Hazelwood December 5, 1984; Hazelwood May 7, 




parks development program demonstrates an example of suburban land transformation 
through effective goal setting, planning, and land reutilization.228 
While Hazelwood began the period with an evolution in objectives, Maplewood 
focused on improving and reinforcing established norms. One of Maplewood's best 
strengths was its walkable traffic. Maplewood historically enlisted the services of architects 
and planners who specialized in the creation of small-town and family-centric designs. 
Maplewood demonstrated continual devotion to developing and retaining its public spaces 
by allocating notable percentages of its financial resources to the category, appointing 
professional engineers, and ensuring adequate maintenance staffing.229 
Amid decline in the city’s fiscal health, governance performance, and 
administrative professionalism, improving Maplewood’s parks and recreation offerings 
became a way to curb decline and spark a renewed interest in the suburb. The city’s strong 
history of accentuating pedestrian friendly spaces established a reputation which 
transcended the difficult period and helped the city retain its attractiveness. Low intensity 
park developments provided natural habitat preservation, encouraged community 
interaction, and required modest management and maintenance. These were ideal settings 
for tree planting, concerts, and picnics. 
Maplewood’s zoning for parks policies adhered to well-defined parameters 
frequently rejecting proposals which infringed on greenspace while lauding developments 
proposing multiuse aspects. Despite the city’s desperate need to rejuvenate its retail 
economy, policymakers seldom considered rezoning areas established for public use and 
 
228 According to City of Hazelwood, MO website hazelwoodmo.org accessed on March 28, 2019. 




enjoyment. Instead, they focused on redeveloping existing infrastructure and revitalizing 
areas by incentivizing investment and supporting private efforts.230 
As an early participant in the St. Louis County Municipal Cooperation Financial 
Assistance Program for development of neighborhood parks, Maplewood began leveraging 
grants to help support its parks acquisition and development efforts in 1974. After 
establishing a parks and recreation department the following year, the mature inner suburb 
began increasing expenditures for parks and recreation. Neighborhood parks, youth 
programs, bike paths, senior citizens' programs, special events, inclusion specialists for 
individuals with disabilities, and a parks and recreation brochure followed.231 
In April 1985, the city received its first US Land and Water grant which funded 
aquatic improvements and continued to utilize various financing methods including a 2001 
$5.6 million bond issue to improve its aquatics facilities. City officials addressed decline 
through a method of land reutilization which focused on protecting and leveraging its 
existing small-town appeal. From expansion of bicycling/walking trails to the 2002 
formation of a joint parks and recreation department with neighboring Richmond Heights, 
Maplewood continued to improve and expand its parks and recreation selections over the 
remainder of the study period.232 
While Maplewood enhanced its parkland and Hazelwood transformed its landscape 
through parkland development, other study group suburbs boasted impressive parks and 
 
230 City of Maplewood, Missouri archive year 1982: Document No. 59. 
231 Resolution No. 139A in City of Maplewood, Missouri archives year 1974, Document No. 77; For 
information about Maplewood parks and recreation, see City of Maplewood, MO archive April 14, 2009. 
232 First land and water grant according to transcript of City of Maplewood, Missouri archive dated April 9, 
1985: Document No. 359. Bond issue listed in City of Maplewood, Missouri archives dated March 27 2001: 
Resolution 01-15. For Richmond Heights partnership, see City of Maplewood, MO archive dated January 1, 
2002. City of Maplewood Missouri archives dated February 22, 2000; and City of Maplewood, Missouri 




recreation offerings and consistently sought to improve them. By June 1970, Jennings’ 
parks and facilities improvement fund was nearly depleted. With a surplus in the general 
operating revenue fund, Jennings’ council increased the parks and facilities budget. At first 
glance, one may ascertain Jennings was underfunding the account and needed to increase 
the allocation just to sustain it. However, subsequent policies challenge this notion.233 
Jennings officials demonstrated a firm commitment to parks and recreation through 
its land reutilization decisions. Allocations continued to increase as the advent of CDBGs, 
capital equipment funds, and revenue sharing provided more revenue for improvements. 
Jennings designated substantial portions to financing parks, playgrounds, equipment, and 
programs. Despite narrow defeats, officials energetically lobbied citizens to support bond 
issues to finance land acquisition for the purpose of constructing a community recreation 
center and related facilities.234 
Bond issue elections were one of the few avenues where Jennings’ citizens’ 
preferences were accurately portrayed. As mentioned earlier, Jennings’ mayor and council 
enjoyed consensus and relative policy liberty. Following the failed bond issue, officials 
immediately adjusted. And by 1975, a park survey for the site of the new skating rink was 
complete. The council authorized the park committee to proceed with installation of the 
rink as well as a new bicycle path. As the building commissioner prepared a bulletin 
displaying the new bike route to be distributed throughout the city, the street commissioner 
secured bids to purchase signs to be posted along the route.235 
 
233 Figure taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: June 22, 1970, page 4. 
234 See, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated April 8, 1974, page 4: Bond Issue $2,000,000.  
235For more information about Jennings’ park and recreation investments see, City of Jennings, MO Regular 
Council Session: April 12, 1971, page 3; Jennings archive Regular Council Session dated August 26, 1974, 




By the time Hazelwood began developing its first 13 acres designated for park use, 
Ferguson residents already enjoyed over 100 acres of parkland, and city officials were busy 
acquiring more through land purchases. While Ferguson benefited from the benevolence 
of its founder and other wealthy landowners over the decades, the municipality also 
enjoyed knowledgeable, skilled professionals and resource purveyors which compounded 
benefits. With keen awareness and understanding of opportunities and available tools, 
Ferguson remained positioned to secure maximum resources and leveraged the latest 
devices when the city so desired.236 
With its resource richness and professional fortitude, Ferguson garnered the 
admiration of its neighbors who considered the city an attractive partner for projects. 
However, with its high-level of self-sufficiency and self-containment, citizens endorsed 
only the proposals with the least amount of Ferguson contribution and largest returns. 
When Berkeley’s city manager approached Ferguson with a proposal for a joint park 
development in October 1970, council majority members agreed with Ferguson’s mayor 
that, “This joint venture is a practical idea.” Nevertheless, a Ferguson Homeowners 
Association petition killed the proposal in park board committee.237 
Although a significant amount of Ferguson’s parkland originated from land 
bequeathed prior to 1970, an examination of ongoing parks and recreation policies offer 
glimpses into the city’s land use philosophy. Ferguson acquired a great deal of land through 
tax lien acquisitions, purchases, dedications, and annexations. Officials were routinely 
divided, and active citizens opposed certain uses and the use of public dollars. While 
 
236 Parkland figures taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated January 13, 1970. Hazelwood’s 13 acres 
references figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archives January 5, 1974.   
237 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing Regular Session dated October 27, 




Ferguson’s land use policies remained consistent with their philosophy, other policy 
patterns reveal striking contradictions.238 
Despite its expressed opposition to accepting and using public funds to finance 
developments, the city regularly participated in public funding programs like the US Land 
and Water Conservation Fund and St. Louis County’s matching funds for parks program. 
While opposition to these programs existed in each of the study cities, Ferguson’s 
opposition tended to be larger, more organized, and deeply visceral. Public hearing 
transcripts reveal a citizenry philosophically devoted to the principals of individualism and 
personal responsibility, but notably selective regarding the concepts of collective goods 
and communal developments.239 
Ferguson’s land use policies demonstrated minimal collective will to finance items 
such as recreation centers which are designated for community use. This ideology was 
further exhibited through rejection of environmentally friendly efforts. When a 1979 bike 
route proposal met fierce opposition, one supporter said, “Ferguson has many old-
fashioned residents who do not see the benefit in things like bike lanes and increasing bike 
usage.” By 1992, however, bike routes were more common in cities and significant 
transition in Ferguson’s citizenry had occurred.240 
Transportation improvement and bicycle education programs had become a popular 
tool for addressing automobile related problems in urban areas. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s 
 
238 See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session dated July 27, 1971. 
239 City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Meeting dated May 14, 1974, page 3; Ferguson Regular 
Council Meeting dated June 11, 1974, page 7; and Ferguson, MO Resolution to apply for US LWCF passed 
and approved by council of the City of Ferguson, MO 22nd day of January 1995. 
240 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 22, 1979, page 3; 
According to transcripts of public hearing in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: October 6, 1992, 
page 1: A proposed three-year project intended to educate people on using bicycles for transportation and 




1992 proposal died. Another proposal failed in 1998 with one Ferguson citizen exclaiming, 
“I don't know of one person who rides their bike to work.” Ironically, in September 2009, 
thirty years after the reading of its first bike path proposal, Ferguson was one of three St. 
Louis municipalities recognized by a membership-based bike/walk association for its 
participation in living well programs. Two years later, Ferguson established a bicycle 
pedestrian plan.241 
Ferguson’s journey to bike/walk paths offers one illustration of the city’s identity 
but fails to provide the nuances necessary to present a more complete and accurate 
description of that identity. As with Jennings, Ferguson’s policy patterns were misleading. 
However, in Ferguson’s case, policy aligned more with the citizen majority’s preferences 
which frequently conflicted with the council majority’s preferences. Also noteworthy was 
the imbalance of power. Although both groups held only slim majorities, the citizen 
majority wielded disproportionate policy influence over the council majority. 
Results of an August 1998 parks and recreation proposition vote help demonstrate 
this point. Proposition two proposed a sales tax and bond issue to finance a community 
center. The issue attracted much more harsh criticism, well-organized, and well-funded 
opposition than proposition support and financing. However, the issue was defeated by 
only 162 votes. Of all the study cities, Ferguson provides the most intriguing blend of polar 
opposite ideologies and identities among residents and officials. The suburb was home to 
a prominent number of, what some Ferguson residents referred to as, radical social and 
 
241 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated August 25, 1998; City 
of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated September 22, 2009; Ferguson Regular Council Session 




environmental activists. Yet these “radicals” enjoyed minimal influence in the 
policymaking sphere.242 
Ferguson’s dichotomy created a confounding environment. With a broad love of 
parks and recreation driving interests in the category, divergent beliefs, attitudes, and 
resources resulted in dramatic inequity of expression and realization of preferences. This 
chasm splintered Ferguson along an easily identifiable line with little room for 
misinterpretation. Residents were either very inclusionary or very exclusionary in their 
policy preferences. The city park board consisted of members from both sides, but the 
private parks committee enjoyed definitive consensus. 
While many were open to allowing nonresident use of parks, slightly more strongly 
opposed. This resulted in legislation allowing use by Ferguson residents only. Subsequent 
compromises included granting fee based and resident guest use to nonresidents, and defeat 
of a bill proposing the posting of signs which read, “This park and its facilities are provided 
by the City of Ferguson for your enjoyment. Leave it in the same condition as you found 
it.” Note that exclusionary preferences were not exclusively grounded in racial bigotry.243 
Perceived threats of increased crime and vagrancy and economic ideology fueled 
some citizens’ public park opposition well-before any significant number of black citizens 
began moving to the municipality. Racial transition in the suburb only served to bring 
existing phobias and philosophies more prominently to the surface. Since the early days of 
 
242 Excerpt of quote taken from Interviewee F4: 05/07/2019, Black / Male / Ex-Law Enforcement Leader; 
According to municipal general election results from the board of election commissioners of the County of 
St. Louis, State of Missouri dated August 25, 1998: Election held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998 in the City of 
Ferguson. 
242 See early park considerations in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, 
page 8; and Ferguson Regular Council Meeting dated October 11, 1977, page 5. 
243 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975. 




its founding, Ferguson has been home to taxpayers who often equate investment in items 
like public parks to inviting structural, social, and economic decline.244 
Ferguson’s parks policies evolved dramatically over the study period. The mature 
suburb demonstrated a lack of interest and will to commit adequate resources to parks and 
recreation in the first 30 years of the era. However, by the turn of the millennium, the city 
was investing substantial resources to parks and recreation and by 2003, the park fund 
totaled close to a million dollars. The city’s 2006 comprehensive parks and recreation plan 
and project produced new objectives, goals, guided decision making, and tasked the city to 
develop new park facilities, recreation programs, and services.245 
One Ferguson official explained, “It was about helping residents invest money and 
resources in the most effective manner possible and focusing on the quality of life for the 
community.” At study’s end, Ferguson parks projects had produced an impressive array of 
offerings. New park trails, multipurpose courts, playgrounds, aquatics center, family 
community center, and variety of special events and adult and youth programs now 
accentuate the city’s 10 parks. An examination of the 2000s’ expansion of communal 
amenities along with the commemorative theme park honoring Ferguson’s railroad history, 
completed in 1997, reveals a city delineated by two discernably diverging eras of land use 
for parks philosophies.246 
 
244 For an illustration of this see, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated June 13, 1995, page 4. 
245 According to figures in City of Ferguson, MO Work Session dated June 24, 2003, page 2; See, City of 
Ferguson, MO archives February 10, 1970; Regular Council Session August 25, 1981, page 2; Ferguson 
Regular Council Session dated March 23, 1982, page 4; Ferguson archive dated April 4, 2000; City of 
Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Session dated March 28, 2006, page 5; Ferguson Regular Council 
Session May 8, 2012, page 12; Ferguson Regular Council Session dated November 10, 2015, page 1. 
246 Ferguson Resolution passed and approved by the council of the city of Ferguson MO September 8, 1987; 
City of Ferguson, MO archive dated August 20, 1997; and City of Ferguson, MO public hearing transcript 
dated October 14, 2003; Ferguson Special Session June 8, 2004, page 3; Ferguson archive Regular Council 
Session May 8 2012 page 12; Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session 




Despite sharing striking similarities in historical prestige, resource richness, 
professional competence, and citizen activism, Ferguson and University City’s land use for 
parks policies demonstrate intersecting trajectories. Both cities’ were established by wealth 
and influence, benefited from visionary founders, and emerged as desirable destinations 
and places of residency all while exhibiting stark contradictions of opulence and 
concentrated deprivation. However, during transitions in the 1960s, University City 
distinguished itself, not only from Ferguson, but from most mature suburbs in the country 
by aiming to address these contradictions. 
By the start of the study period, University City’s professionalism and evolution in 
inclusionary policies had already empowered the city to secure resources most inner 
suburbs were yet to begin seeking out. In instances in which awareness of available 
resources was shared among neighboring municipalities, University City was usually better 
positioned. Officials’ and citizens’ acceptance and acknowledgment of diverse needs and 
interests expanded the city’s search and use of resources and tools and prepared and 
qualified the city to capitalize on opportunities. 
Funding programs regularly required cities possess a certain professional and fiscal 
capacity, and University City had been leveraging funding from programs like the Land 
and Water Conservation Fund since its inception in the early 1960s. This put the city in a 
favorable position to multiply impact and leverage various streams for existing projects 




operated youth recreational and enrichment which offered year-round programing were 
primarily supported by grants.247 
Much of the city’s parks and recreation development was made possible through 
grants and by 1970, University City’s commitment to land use for parks was already well-
established and influencing land use policy. Creative leveraging of federal, state, and 
county dollars empowered the city to approach land use funding project agreements already 
poised to expand beyond the original purpose of the funds. 
For instance, the city expanded its bike paths during publicly funded street 
renovations by cutting shoulder aprons creating natural bicycle lanes. University City 
enjoyed a citizen majority which supported city investment in parks development, facilities 
designated for communal use, environmentally conscious projects, and increasing 
pedestrian friendly spaces. While there remained a steady stream of opposition to public 
financing of such items, particularly during fiscally stressful periods, support remained 
notably higher than opposition.248 
After a 1972 bond issue passed 4,090 to 2,503, officials increased revenues 
dedicated to parks and recreation facilities, field night lights, and approved a park complex 
pavilion. By the time county voters approved the 1977 bond issue establishing the 
municipal park area purchases matching program, University City had already acquired 
and developed over 240 acres of parkland and by 2012, University City boasted 18 parks 
including a golf course, renovated community center, and 10 bike and walking trails. 
 
247 For more about the history of the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) go to nps.gov; According 
to references made in numerous city archives from 1970s-2000s, City of University, MO first applied for a 
LWCF grant in 1964. 
248 For more information regarding the bike route issue with the county refer to City of University City 




However, bond issues had been replaced with increasingly higher parks use, membership, 
and activities fees.249 
University City’s parks and recreation selection was second to none. However, 
since the 2000s, the city has been embroiled in a struggle for retention of the social and 
economic philosophy which earned the inner suburb the moniker, “pioneer of suburban 
racial integration policies,” in the 1960s. While the municipality offers many of the finest 
amenities like a state-of-the-art recreation facility, golfing professional and pro shop, 
museums, and a symphony, a significant proportion of residents cannot afford to enjoy 
these amenities.250 
Despite University City’s allure, the suburb has always been home to a substantial 
population of poor people who did not have the disposable income to access fee-based 
attractions. Parks, recreational facilities, services, and activities programs serve as ideal 
enrichment options for lower-income residents. However, fiscal stress caused by increased 
poverty, less property tax revenue, and nominal commercial and industry challenged 
University City to continue supporting these resources. 
Officials were effective at mitigating this dilemma by levying bond issues and other 
financing options to supplement resources. These strategies kept costs of accessing 
communal amenities low for users by dispersing expenses throughout the entire tax base. 
However, some contemporary officials do not favor this model and have lobbied with some 
success to implement policies which decrease accessibility to the city’s parks and 
 
249 According to an assessment of impacts of developments on residential property values included in 
transcripts of University City archive Regular Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 5; According to figures 
in City of University City, MO archive Session 1147: November 22, 1976, page 5, 12; and Figure taken from 
City of University City archive Regular Session 1177: December 19, 1977, page 12. 





recreational amenities for many residents. While these policies do result in less taxpayer 
spending overall, these policies could turn out to cost University City more in the end. 
Through my examination of land use for parks policy in five mature St. Louis inner 
suburbs, I observe conditions impacting philosophy which result in era-specific policy 
divergence. The impact of these philosophical evolutions on city conditions in the future 
is unknown as consequences are usually not realized and observable for some time after 
implementation of policies. 
Nevertheless, in examining policies of five cases over 45 years, exhibiting 
variations in philosophy, conditions for cases experiencing no philosophical divergence, 
cases which experienced philosophical divergence, and conditions at the point in which 
philosophy diverged, I identify planning, zoning, and redevelopment philosophy as a 
significant predictor of subsequent conditions. 
Planning, Zoning, and Redevelopment 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, status quo policymaking of the pre-fair housing era 
was no longer sustainable in mature inner suburbs. Some cities adopted more receptive 
attitudes towards changing demographics and demands. Officials authorized feasibility 
studies, planned for impending changes, and enacted relevant ordinances. Nevertheless, 
loss of tax revenue, poorer residents, and increasingly higher tax rates persisted. While 
stabilization was yet to be determined, planning and zoning policies significantly impacted 
municipalities’ vulnerabilities and defenses against decline. 
An exponential increase in land and property redevelopment accompanied the black 
suburbanization era. Municipalities needed a broader tax base, so officials launched efforts 




improperly, such undertakings may result in spot zoning further decreasing property 
values. Additionally, commercial overdevelopment could fundamentally change the 
character of a city. As one University City resident asserted, “If I wanted to live in Clayton, 
I would have moved there.”251 
Adequate rezoning, on the other hand, disperses and lessens negative impacts of 
alterations in and around single-family neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods contained 
larger pre-WWII homes built in accordance with lots zoned at a 10,000 sq. ft. minimum. 
Others consisted of smaller post-WWII homes constructed on 5,000 sq. ft. lots. Some 
neighborhoods offered a variety of homes which were architecturally designed to fit 
together. Other areas consisted of similarly designed and virtually identical homes such as 
one-story ranch style dwellings.252 
Altering heights and mass of existing structures like adding a second story to single-
family homes, building larger homes, and subdividing large lots with infill housing could 
also fundamentally change the character of a community. Cities utilized planning and 
zoning regulations to guide their decisions regarding approval and denial of redevelopment 
proposals. Zoning policies demonstrated as well as influenced cities’ preferences and 
served as a good indicator of cities’ demographic, structural, and fiscal conditions. 
Some cities planned for and adjusted to the evolving environment by rezoning to 
accommodate certain conversions, some reinforced existing zones, and some instituted 
 
251 According to an assessment of impacts of developments on residential property values included in 
transcripts of University City archive Regular Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 5; Excerpt of quote taken 
from City of University City archive Regular Session 1675: August 19, 1996, page 9. 
252 According to City of Hazelwood, MO dated July 19, 1974: Residents in an area had previously opposed 
reducing the size of the lots to permit 13 instead of the present 11. Surrounding properties were tracts of 
112 acre or larger, and these would be tracts just over 10, 000 square feet. The recommendation of the City 
Plan Commission was to approve. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated June 18, 1973: Bill 1027 




stricter compatibility zoning polices restricting even the slightest deviation from 
surrounding home sizes and styles. While a healthy mix was good for stability, diversity in 
zoning did not always mean equity in real space. Disproportionately zoning for large 
minimum lot sizes could dwarf areas allowing smaller lots. And since subdivided 
residential redevelopments were prohibited in large lot areas, space for construction of 
more affordable homes was limited.253 
By the late 1970s, building homes on large lots had become much less financially 
feasible. Costs of housing had skyrocketed, and it was no longer sound business practice. 
Although zoning regulations did not dictate the monetary value of homes to be built, 
building homes consistent with the surrounding properties meant developers needed to 
build fewer, larger, more expensive homes. However, this would have resulted in homes 
costing twice as much as homes in many of these areas were garnering at the time thus 
creating disincentive to developers to build.254 
It was often difficult for municipal officials to come to terms with the 
transformation happening. One mayor shared, “I couldn’t help but feel that [Mr. 
Developer] was trying to put as many homes on the land as [he] could.” Locals feared a 
proliferation of substandard, smaller, tract homes. While there were areas in inner suburbs 
consisting primarily of these post-WWII type homes, some stressed such structures would 
stand out dramatically in other parts of communities. Public hearing discussions in each 
 
253 See examples in Ferguson for 77 single-family lots on 20.48 acres in Ferguson Regular Council Session 
dated August 22, 2006, page 3; and Ferguson Regular Council Session dated June 26, 2007, page 5 and 13. 
Reference to home prices of the era taken from City of Hazelwood, MO March 16, 1977. 
254 According to housing price figures in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated March 16, 1977. Example: A 





study city conveyed a consensus of suburban idealism revealing distinct delineations in 
desirable and undesirable use of land and property.255 
City officials responded to community interests, market indicators, or both. 
Compromises reclassified zones as planned development districts which deemed areas 
suitable for specific variations in types of redevelopment or reuse. These mixed-use 
regulations were intended to allow more multifamily, commercial, and industrial 
development in and around neighboring areas zoned residential. Plans included goals to 
increase, preserve, and not negatively affect existing property values. Various safeguards 
were implemented to further extend stronger protections to neighboring properties. 
Traditionally, some areas received robust attention from developers while others 
garnered few inquiries and requests. Multiple factors contributed to activity levels but 
cities’ planning and zoning policies significantly impacted types and amount of 
redevelopment. Some cities’ planning and zoning policies inhibited redevelopment. Others 
dissuaded redevelopment as vague plans and goals created uncertainty and speculation. 
Events of the era forced some suburbs to revisit, revise, and clarify their planning and 
zoning philosophies, strategies, and goals while some elected to reinforce existing ones.256 
The post-fair housing era saw an explosion in private redevelopment proposals, 
city-operated beautification, revitalization, construction projects, and direct-to-city federal 
funding of renewal programs. Meeting specific demographic, spatial, structural, and 
financial criteria and possessing a completed comprehensive plan qualified cities for more 
state and federal funding which mitigated cities’ financial obligations to projects. Strategic 
 
255 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO dated February 2, 1983. 
256 Public response to the new plan and new zoning classification was minimal. For more information 
regarding the new plan refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1402: February 10, 1986, 




meetings produced plans that included designating residential areas more economically 
marketable for redevelopment, use of various financing tools, and levying eminent domain. 
Each study city aimed to decrease low-cost rentals and increase homeownership. 
However, cities employed different methods to control the impact of these low-income and 
subsidized homes and apartments on single-family neighborhoods. Some inner suburbs 
planned and zoned to isolate and restrict them to particular areas. Others prioritized 
spreading low-income and subsidized housing throughout the city to prevent them from 
concentrating in one neighborhood. Interviewee U1 says, “You don't want to concentrate 
it in one place. That becomes the ghetto and the walls go up around that. You have to 
disperse the wealth throughout the entire area.”257 
Maplewood municipal governance’s decision to reinforce its identity ultimately 
resulted in a revitalization of the suburb’s shopping district. However, it is important to 
highlight some notable elements of the process. By the time Maplewood officials amended 
objectives and plans to include parks and recreation development as a stabilizing tool in 
the mid-1970s, the city had undergone enormous transition. Faced with aged housing and 
infrastructure and insufficient revenues from retail activity, the city’s land reutilization 
activity expanded and accelerated rapidly. 
Through the city’s housing corporation, Maplewood began negotiation, purchasing, 
and condemning significant combinations of both residential and commercial properties 
and land. Maplewood’s volume of rezoning for redevelopment grew comparable to cities 
facing suburban challenges more frequently associated with the era. The suburb’s past 
 




commercial success, however, still guided policy and reaffirmed beliefs that commercial 
activity was the city’s best way to stabilize.258 
Officials looked to stimulate new private investment by leveraging grants and tax 
increases to improve the city’s garage and commercial retail parking for a shopping mall, 
medical building, and clinic. Maplewood’s land use philosophy was demonstrated through 
numerous amendments repealing residential districts and replacing them with various 
commercial designations. These policy actions vested more of the city’s financial solvency 
in the success or failure of commercial activity than in the protection or decline of property 
values.259 
While the strategy was risky, it was not surprising given the city’s demonstrable 
commitment to regaining its position as a retail hub in the area. More notable and 
surprising, however, the strategy also included rezoning large single-family districts to 
multifamily ones. Archives reflect, Maplewood officials beginning the decade of the 1970s 
unanimously approving multiple development projects consisting of large multifamily 
dwellings. One 1970 development involved six separate 24-unit buildings alone.260 
Maplewood’s physical identity transformed, and the transformation would have 
lasting implications on the city’s landscape and homeownership rate. Nearly fifty years 
later, one young Maplewood resident observed, “We’re like 65 % renters here in 
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Maplewood which is really interesting.” While this type of activity was not unique for the 
time, the volume occurring in Maplewood seemed to conflict with the city’s population 
density and plans to revitalize commercially. The contradiction did not reside in the 
removal of single-family districts but instead in the districts’ new designation to 
multifamily.261 
Upon closer examination, however, additional elements emerge which 
simultaneously crystalizes Maplewood’s strategy and coincides with the concept that 
socioeconomics replaced race as the dominant driver of suburban policymaking in the post-
fair housing period. Maplewood needed revenue and was committed to generating that 
revenue from commercial activity. Until 1991, municipalities could tax multifamily 
dwellings consisting of four or more units as commercial property. Although multifamily 
properties were not the traditional primary source of commercial tax revenue for 
Maplewood, they generated commercial tax revenue nonetheless.262 
Maplewood’s rezoning strategy did not place the municipality on the road to 
revitalization as that process would be administratively led and would not begin until the 
following decade. The strategy did, however, provide the suburb with ideal conditions for 
segregated concentrations of underserved, low-income subsidized areas. These areas 
accounted for less of the city’s population and land usage and were less problematic for 
Maplewood than its north county counterparts. Nevertheless, they presented major 
 
261 Excerpt of quote from Interview M1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 10-year Resident / Public Official. 
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challenges to revitalization efforts and warrants an asterisk when celebrating the inner 
suburb’s renaissance as an eclectic, pedestrian-inviting little town.263 
While Maplewood worked to protect its image, north county municipalities were 
being given a new one. Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the image of north county 
transformed dramatically. News coverage of north county was unfair and inequitable. 
Media portrayed problems in north county areas differently than issues happening in other 
county locations. According to one resident, “We were trying to build the image up and 
the newspapers seemed to be tearing it down.”264 
As conditions worsened, it became increasingly difficult for some north county 
suburbs to attract new private investment for development. New sidewalks, trees, public 
parking lots, or state-of-the-art libraries would not be enough to offset the negative 
perceptions emanating about north county municipalities. Consider that racist stereotypes 
about blacks motivated these negative perceptions, and north county was experiencing the 
majority of black in-migration in St. Louis County. Besides preexisting variations in city 
identity, no other discernable dissimilarities between north county and the rest of the 
county justified the evolving view of north county. 
North county areas were unjustly devalued, sectioned off, and considered to be 
racked with toxic assets. Transformations in the suburban housing market were 
multilayered and introduced variables municipalities had very little experience addressing. 
Missouri Highway and Transportation Department’s inequitable funding and resource 
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dedication for right of way improvement, maintenance, and beautification further 
demonstrated disparities. 
North county areas experienced less frequency of road repairs, resurfacing, and 
landscaping. Despite thousands of travelers entering the state from Illinois via Interstate 
270 and utilizing area highways, north county received less crew, equipment, and attention 
than other county areas, and highway quality suffered as a result. Deficiencies in county 
owned and maintained roads did not differ much from state-owned and operated ones.265 
North county municipal officials often complained the county maintained a “take 
it or leave it” attitude and used municipalities for its own ends and in some cases, “to the 
detriment of communities.” As with HUD, state and county actions served to further 
reinforce discriminatory treatment in the private sector. Records indicate that as early as 
1972, insurers were notifying residents, “We are not able to renew your homeowner’s 
insurance due to changing neighborhoods.” Such practices not only compounded problems 
for north county municipalities but increased inequities, accelerated decline, and greatly 
hindered stabilization in some areas.266 
The county recognized the motives for opposition to certain HUD practices. 
However, the county administered a large HUD program. While administrators advocated 
by educating municipalities about implications, the agency replicated HUD’s 
concentrations in north county through its own public housing program. St. Louis County 
Housing Authority purchased a disproportionate number of units in these municipalities 
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for use as public housing, removing the properties from city tax rolls (although the county 
paid fees to the cities), and contributing to the proliferation of low-income subsidized 
housing in north county.267 
During this period, there was incredible change in the housing market. In addition 
to discriminatory housing practices in both the private and public sector and steady decline 
in land and property conditions, the county lost its CDBG funding because of poor financial 
reporting. Cities without housing authorities began exploring whether to form one. 
Jennings’ leadership expressed, “The city is not interested in forming a housing authority.” 
Jennings officials believed its planning and zoning policies and code enforcement system 
would prevent further decline in conditions.268 
Jennings did not make the mistake of failing to implement best-practice property 
preservation methods or practical zoning laws. Instead, Jennings’ mistake was to depend 
too much on the tools to protect against and address decline. Officials looked to the building 
commissioner to execute objectives and reach goals without the tools necessary to do so. 
The city lacked the mechanisms for acquiring, rehabilitating, leasing or selling deteriorated 
properties. No land reutilization plan could be executed as there existed no city agency to 
execute it or sufficient revenue to finance projects managed by private firms.269 
In April 1981, Bill 1396 unanimously passed as Ordinance 1373 declaring the need 
for a housing authority to function in the City of Jennings. Nearly a decade passed before 
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the city-initiated activities resembling those performed by such an apparatus. By not 
establishing a housing corporation, Jennings officials deprived building officials effective 
tools and options from which to choose. Without these tools and options, Jennings’ 
buildings personnel ramped up code enforcement to compensate for the deficiency. Code 
enforcement became arduous, authoritarian, and unreasonable.270 
Code violations were administered for some items inherent to the original 
construction of homes, and corrective repairs were expensive. Citations contained 
threatening language like, “If repairs are not concluded in…, the city will initiate 
condemnation proceedings.” Some homeowners began to feel as though they were being 
punished for the “changing neighborhoods” issue. Others believed elements were 
conspiring to condemn properties to purchase at lower prices. By the 1990s, Jennings was 
acquiring some of these same homes, authorizing their demolition, and donating the vacant 
lots left behind.271 
Jennings officials worked diligently over the years to attract and promote private 
residential and commercial development to the area but were unsuccessful. Assessment of 
Jennings’ situation reveals several potential reasons for its lack of success in stabilizing the 
physical character of the city. As covered earlier, Jennings lacked a professional city 
manager to oversee the city’s daily administrative operations. The absence of a city 
manager in and of itself did not prevent the city from accessing the tools and resources 
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needed to design and execute an effective land reutilization plan. However, having the 
mayor serve in both the legislative and administrative leadership roles placed the city at a 
disadvantage. 
Although the city enjoyed strong and long serving mayors, competing duties 
created by the dual role disallowed fulltime administrative commitment required to address 
the elements of municipal destabilization. Consider city border problems, for example. City 
limits did not necessarily delineate neighborhood designs and uses. As reviewed earlier, 
many of these areas had not been modernized and uses were obsolete. Some 
neighborhoods’ proximity to other struggling neighborhoods such as those in north St. 
Louis city required robust time, attention and collaboration— the likes of which part-time 
city officials usually cannot devote.272 
Stabilizing these areas required vigorous land reutilization planning, an authority 
to manage projects, and administrative oversight. Without these components, Jennings 
zoning patterns lacked refined objectives resulting in commercial, industrial, and 
residential replacements that decreased the desirability of each. This placed the city in a 
perpetual cycle of land usage transition and continuous property value decline which led 
to more revenue loss making it more difficult to fund studies, finance improvement 
projects, and pay for marketing to attract investors. 
Many of the operations the city elected not to take on in the 1970s (acquisition, 
rehabilitation, lease, sale, tax abatement), the city ended up performing by the 1990s 
anyway. However, by this time, the problem had mushroomed into a much bigger set of 
challenges. Many more derelict properties and vacant lots existed and were in worse shape 
 




than in the 1970s. As areas remained unimproved, physical and fiscal conditions worsened. 
Degeneration spread to surrounding areas further accelerating the suburb’s residential and 
commercial health. Former revenue generating sources became structural, social, and 
economic liabilities. 
Confronted with such debilitating and insurmountable circumstances, municipal 
officials were left with few options. Any effort to reverse conditions required substantial 
investment of resources of which the city did not possess. Jennings turned to state 
redevelopment programs which authorized the city to offer incentives like tax abatement, 
tax increment financing (TIF), and eminent domain to attract developers. While these tools 
can be effective in certain situations, Jennings’ position made the city vulnerable to 
dependence and overuse. As one Jennings mayor frame it, “If you don't offer the abatement, 
you don't get the development.”273 
Jennings’ housing redevelopment project involved acquiring many of the apartment 
complexes in Jennings which were mostly county housing authority units. After the 
apartments were acquired, the city invited developers to rehab the properties and administer 
the management of the apartments. Once Jennings’ housing transformation was complete, 
the city was never able to recapture the homeownership and housing quality it once 
boasted. 
Home building involved mostly low-cost houses targeting low income families. 
While redevelopment projects consisted of some positive exceptions, the city’s land 
reutilization measures were largely unimpactful in improving the overall stability of the 
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municipality. This does not mean all the new homes needed to be big beautiful houses for 
the redevelopment program to be deemed a success. The true value in these inner suburbs 
rested in their mix.  
All levels of homebuyer could access suburban living. Interviewee F2 asserts:  
“When I came to Ferguson, there were houses for families who were just starting 
out and houses you couldn’t afford. You had people who worked a 9 to 5, but also 
those who were high level engineers, doctors, and lawyers. This was due to the 
diversity of homes, lots, and plots.” 
  
Given the enormity of negative attention Ferguson garnered towards the end of the study 
period, one may find it difficult to fathom that for some the suburb served as one of the 
more peaceful, eclectic, and desirable places to reside in the area.274 
Converse to Ferguson’s advantages of historical prominence, position, and 
professionalism were the disadvantages created by the city’s post-fair housing era planning 
and zoning policies. While policies saved money, processes saved time, and practices 
preserved treasures, the mature inner suburb’s contemporary policymakers would lose a 
great deal of each of these due to the inherited disadvantages. The insulation, interests 
protection, and policy control combined with the capitulation and caterings of 1970s to 
1990s administrations provided Ferguson’s slim citizen majority disproportionate 
preference power, marginalized poor people, and produced a powder keg.275 
By the 2000s, Ferguson’s lawmakers were producing policies that bore little 
resemblance to those of the previous 30 years. Over the next decade and a half, officials 
navigated a complicated policy arena in which the municipality suffered from a firmly 
embedded root problem while available tools empowered policymakers to only treat the 
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branches. Some have referred to Mike Brown’s death and the subsequent Ferguson uprising 
as a culmination of decades of discriminatory policies and practices. This description is 
largely inaccurate as it omits important contextual elements which indicate the culmination 
actually occurred much earlier making the efforts in the 2000s futile. 
As in many suburbs, Ferguson of 2010 exhibited stark inequities and other 
problems in multiple sectors. Nevertheless, the municipality had entered its second decade 
of enormous progress in addressing these issues through more inclusive planning processes 
and policies. Notable advances in proportionate representation, multivariate interests, and 
environmental awareness had resulted in some important accomplishments. Note that 
Ferguson was not only fighting an uphill battle established by its policy past, but the suburb 
also carried the north county identity.276 
A simple contrast of 1999’s Maplewood and Ferguson better illustrates Ferguson 
contemporaries’ policy starting point. Although Maplewood had more multifamily 
dwellings than Ferguson and its own eastside segregated concentration of low-income 
renters, the communities surrounding Maplewood were stable and the city’s appeal and 
image remained largely intact. Ferguson’s eastside concentration was more challenging as 
the north county image, proximity to other struggling areas, and the city’s policy approach 
for addressing issues only intensified problems. 
While Ferguson had more overall professional staff, the economic development and 
community relations departments operated under the same designation. Maplewood 
designated separate professional staff to focus on the city’s most critical area which was 
recruiting businesses. Maplewood exhausted all avenues of taxation, Ferguson voters 
 




repeatedly rejected tax increases to finance projects and services. Ferguson implemented a 
change in possession occupancy permit 14 years into the period, Maplewood’s interior 
occupancy inspections system dates back to the early period.277 
Maplewood Housing Corporation played a critical role from the outset of the city’s 
stabilization projects. Ferguson originally took the same position as Jennings and elected 
not to establish a housing authority. Nearly halfway through the study period in spring 
1988, Ferguson municipal leaders approved the formation of the Ferguson Housing 
Corporation. Despite this scorecard however, by 1994, only a minuscule percentage of 
Ferguson’s over 6,700 single-family houses exhibited deterioration and there was no 
notable vacant lot problem.278 
Towards the late 1980s, without a functioning authority to manage housing 
challenges in the municipality, Ferguson began to experience an increase in abandoned 
properties. The city’ noninterventionist policy of the post-fair housing era had allowed 
discriminatory housing activities to go unchecked. Besides modest home rehabilitation 
grants, loans, rebates, and the occasional HUD home purchase, Ferguson extended minimal 
resources or services related to equitable housing, dispersing low-income housing, or 
property ownership.279 
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Arguing market dictation of housing as best practice, Ferguson policy drafters 
expressed no interest in establishing an apparatus for obtaining, rehabbing, selling, or 
leasing properties, opting to defer these activities to private investors. This philosophy was 
problematic for the era. Given the extenuating circumstances, housing market theory was 
turned on its head. Stabilization required intervention. Housing authorities helped cities 
better account for and address the most pressing factors contributing to destabilization in 
municipalities. Ferguson’s 1988 housing corporation establishment signaled an evolution 
in philosophy, but its narrow focus and targeted benefits delivery made it clear the new 
agency was just another reinforcement arm of the suburb’s existing philosophy.280 
Ferguson officials met in 2012 to discuss the results of the West Florissant corridor 
study. Staff members, residents, and elected officials from neighboring Dellwood, Country 
Club Hills, Flordell Hills, and Jennings joined them. Ferguson’s increased need, interest, 
and willingness to collaborate had replaced the admiration, self-sufficiency, and self-
containment mentioned earlier. The strategic meeting concerned plans for redeveloping a 
four and half sq. mile stretch of West Florissant.281 
In 2010, the neighboring suburbs had begun exploring collaborative ways to 
leverage collective resources and secure grants and other financing tools to support the 
project. Officials established a steering committee made up of members from each 
community. Through public meetings, interviews, and focus groups, the committee 
solicited feedback from a wide range of interests. Plans included increasing accessibility, 
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connectivity via pedestrian friendly improvements, and making the area more suitable for 
walkers, bikers, and public transit.282 
New developments were to serve the community with an array of unique shopping, 
dining, and entertainment, provide an assortment of housing to all income levels, and create 
physical environments that support healthy and active lifestyles. Ironically, the 2012 
collective’s plans were practically identical to Ferguson’s 1970s plans for its westside 
downtown district. While it was logical for the city to dedicate resources to improving its 
downtown, the city’s history of divesting resources from the eastside corridor lends irony 
to the 2012 goals. Ferguson’s 1970s westside plan was considered innovative, holistic, and 
proactive. The suburb’s 2012 West Florissant corridor project aimed at improving 
conditions on the eastside was not much more than overdue.283 
West Florissant did not only serve as the crossroads to the City of St. Louis and 
north St. Louis County, the road served as a clear delineator guiding Ferguson’s post-fair 
housing planning and zoning policies. Over the three decades leading up to the millennium, 
policies had sectioned the eastside off from more single-family home friendly areas by 
concentrating low-cost rentals, commercial and industrial developments, and further 
reinforcing the city’s agenda to preserve its westside. 
By the 2000s, however, West Florissant was particularly important to Ferguson’s 
economy as it connected several major commercial centers. The city’s late 1980s and early 
1990s model vested a large stake of its financial health in sales tax revenue generators 
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located in an area where the city historically lacked the will to invest resources. 
Consequentially, 2000s policymakers inherited a dilemma of financial dependence on a 
corridor plagued with major barriers to thriving and would make a valiant effort to 
overcome those obstacles. The segregation, poverty, aging infrastructure, and obsolescence 
was not their doing. Nevertheless, 14 years into the new century, they would have to own 
it.284 
In 2004, governing a vastly different Ferguson than their predecessors (52 % black, 
16 % single-headed, 33 % renter, 12 % poverty, 30 % under 18, per capita income $17,600), 
officials began adopting policies establishing new neighborhood goals based on residents’ 
visions for Ferguson’s future. Officials hired a planning and development director, 
instituted a community wide network of neighborhood associations and organizations, 
helped each neighborhood design its ideal living environment, and designated target areas 
for infrastructure and pedestrian improvements.285 
The process resulted in neighborhood plans and strategies, implementation of 
improvement programs, and progress monitoring mechanisms. Officials’ expressed aim 
was to increase livability and quality of life, maintain high community standards, and 
stimulate interest and demand in Ferguson. Officials authorized the restructuring of the 
city’s community redevelopment financing model increasing the category’s prominence in 
economic development decisions and spending.286 
The new neighborhood agenda targeted low and moderate-income neighborhoods 
for improvements and enhancements. Officials authorized redesigns and installation of 
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various signs and monuments, initiated restoration projects, and implemented 
communications and PR techniques designed to repair the image, identity, and character of 
these neighborhoods. Lawmakers approved increased community-focused allocations, 
strengthen and expanded their financing toolbox to better service community 
redevelopment debt and capital improvement projects, and lobbied state officials to 
approve a special benefit districts amendment.287 
Missouri’s proposed special benefit districts amendment would empower 
municipalities to finance local improvements such as streets, off street parking facilities, 
sidewalks, parks and sewers by issuing bonds in which only benefiting property owners 
were required to repay. The tool would help ensure more equitable financing of 
neighborhood revitalization and mitigate the city’s quandary of governing a bifurcated city 
where one half was viewed as barons and the other burdens.288 
Consider by the 1990s, Ferguson’s slim citizen majority were beginning to feel the 
pinch created by their policy preferences. In refusing to accept, prepare, and adequately 
manage the inevitable, Ferguson failed to prevent their fears from materializing. In fact, 
policies of exclusion increased the likelihood of these fears materializing, intensified their 
effects on the city, and made addressing subsequent problems much more daunting 
challenges for future administrations. As the end of the 1990s drew near, new Ferguson 
homeowners’ properties were being assessed for less than they had paid for them just 
several years earlier.289 
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North county had transformed and even though Ferguson kept the suburban persona 
longer than many of its north county neighbors, cracks were clearly visible at this point. 
Older middle and upper-class residents, who the city had effectively shielded from the 
eastside degradation, had remained in their homes over the years. They were steadfastly 
loyal to Ferguson and its identity which did not coincide with general perceptions about 
north county. However, decades of policy implementations adhering to the preferences of 
a slim majority had created an environment less attractive to younger home seekers and 
had given way to new more pressing demands. 
While the homeowners’ exodus was notable during the decade, population decline 
was not as dramatic as in the early period of the era. Owning a home in Ferguson was still 
relatively more attractive compared to other municipalities in the area, and a sustained 
influx of renters kept population numbers fairly stable. However, Ferguson’s lack of 
preparedness for addressing changing socioeconomic dynamics made the city especially 
vulnerable to losing its rank as a first-class suburb. Increasing dependence on sales tax 
revenues and murmurs of a property tax increase to fill the gap of slumping receipts 
signaled to some residents, the time had come to relocate.290 
An examination of archives revealed through early-era planning and zoning 
patterns, Ferguson’s post-fair housing policymakers dealt future officials a very bad hand. 
The city’s professional prowess and capacity to leverage expertise and additional services 
of planning firms made discrepancies in focus areas more prominent as implementations 
were executed effectively and efficiently. Policies such as Bill 4746, which passed as 
 




Ordinance 74-1444 on November 12, 1974, set in motion a chain of events that would have 
far reaching and lasting implications.291 
Revisions and updating of zoning ordinances authorized developments which 
transitioned working-class single-family neighborhoods as well as multifamily units into 
commercial uses. This in and of itself was not necessarily problematic. However, new 
zones failed to fully account for diminishing effects on the stability of other nearby single-
family neighborhoods and the city’s continued unwillingness to commit adequate resources 
to this area meant economic vitality of the area would eventually be threatened. These 
choices created a volatile feedback loop.292 
Overdependency on economic generators and mushrooming threats to the bottom 
line had begun a generation before the formation of the 2012 collective. Historically, 
Ferguson used a discriminatory barometer for weighing developers’ answers to the critical 
question, “How will this proposed land use development interact with adjacent residential 
areas?” Development designs and acquisition maps from the early post-fairing housing era 
illuminate a city intent on preserving select sections of the city while sacrificing other 
sections in the name of economic development.293 
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Perhaps quality of developer pitches and the majority of professional opinions 
played more of a significant role in producing these land use patterns than my initial 
analysis attributes. I considered this possibility and examined Ferguson’s expressed 
priorities when accessing development proposals’ residential impact. I found strict 
minimum requirements for buffering, an extensive schedule for distancing, boundaries, and 
landscaping, and rigid limitations for institutional uses.294 
When comparing approval rates among similar projects in various areas, 
accounting for conflicting contributing factors, institutional proposals were deemed 
compatible with eastside residential areas disproportionately more than westside areas. 
Further, divergent views of areas’ value informed planning which extolled developer 
investments like traffic signals and new sidewalks as great improvements to some areas 
and inconsequential add-ons to others. Essentially, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era 
policymakers posed distinctly different questions for different residential areas. For the 
eastside, officials simply wanted to know, “Will the city receive a significant amount of 
income through the return of sales tax?”295 
Ferguson’s model continually exhibited instability. Nevertheless, making 
investments to implement improvements like those outlined in the 2012 collaborative plan 
did not align with 1970s to 1990s Ferguson philosophy and objectives. Ferguson’s 
contemporary policymakers worked diligently throughout the last decade and a half of the 
study period to realign land use policy to better address challenges. However, events would 
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essentially erase many of their gains, expose the city’s policy history, and provide present 
and future lawmakers even greater challenges to stabilizing the mature inner suburb.296 
The Village of Hazelwood began the study period with 36 % of its land area utilized 
by commercial and industrial businesses. Hazelwood’s transformation from 1950s 
farmland to a 1970s urbanized environment qualified the city as an ideal case study. In a 
little over a decade, the city had experienced significant transitions in landscape, 
population, function, and identity. Pre-era planning and zoning policies had carried the 
village to its 1970 transition into a city. And given Hazelwood’s 1950s landscape, I was 
surprised to discover, by 1970, “Service stations in Hazelwood had reached the saturation 
point.”297  
Hazelwood’s planning and zoning committee entered the post-fair housing era 
considering and recommending approval of a large number of proposals. This was not 
surprising as I concluded the city’s rapid growth and development in such a short period 
was most likely the result of lax proposal vetting and generous granting of requests. 
However, if the board of trustees’ meticulous reviews and exhaustive discussions regarding 
recommendations were any indication of pre-era processes, my assumption was incorrect. 
Hazelwood city officials retained this practical and methodical style of deliberation 
in planning and zoning throughout the entire study period. This does not mean every 
decision reaped only rewards. Hazelwood officials realized, early in the period, the 
dilemma their land use policy patterns were creating. While taxpayers appreciated the low 
property taxes made possible by the large volume of commercial and industrial activity in 
 
296 City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session April 14, 1987, page 2. 





the city, businesses increased demand on city services thus siphoning services away from 
residents. According to one Hazelwood lawmaker, by 1972, “Commercial development 
had created problems as well as advantages for the residents.”298 
As more revenues are needed to adequately fund city services, either property taxes 
are raised, or more commercial developments are pursued. Since increased taxes are never 
popular, the more plausible decision is to rezone areas to allow more encroachment into 
residential areas and the cycle continues— eventually harming property values. Each study 
city faced some form of this predicament at one time or another during the study period. In 
that respect, Hazelwood was not unique. However, Hazelwood’s quandary shared many 
similarities with its north county neighbor Ferguson’s plight, and I found the disparities in 
the cities’ approaches fascinating. 
Hazelwood’s 1970s comprehensive plan produced, what I found to be, standard 
land use permit requirements. Each study city’s policies stated some variation of language 
expressing prohibition of developments which “adversely affect the character of the 
neighborhood.” While Hazelwood’s policy language, extensive planning process, and 
adherence to business interests all paralleled Ferguson’s post-fair housing era 
characteristics, Hazelwood distinguished itself both through the goals it set, the effort to 
ensure equitable protections and preservations, and the subsequent land use policies that 
followed these objectives.299 
 
298 According to figures in transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Special Council Meeting May 30, 1972.  
299 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Special Comprehensive Plan Meeting 
dated November 2, 1982; See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Council Meeting dated September 9, 1970; 
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While Hazelwood’s early period planning objectives and implementations 
resembled the West Florissant corridor’s 2012 goals, this was not the most notable element 
in the city’s plan. That label belongs to the city’s expressed goal, “We want Hazelwood to 
continue to be the same type of community it has been.” Since blacks represented only four 
percent of Hazelwood residents, a scan of archival records may lead one to conclude 
Hazelwood’s goal was exclusionary in nature. However, further investigation uncovers a 
well-defined and measured vision for the future of the suburb; one that involves specific 
measures for preventing the practice of exclusion.300 
According to a Hazelwood official, “We were looking for the same balance of ages, 
multifamily and single-family residences, and owner versus rental properties to continue 
in the community.” Hazelwood identified its city’s optimal mix of residential, commercial, 
and industry. This metric would guide planning and zoning policy for the next 33 years. 
This did not mean the municipality would remain the same size, and it did not. 
Notwithstanding, as the city grew in population, businesses, and land through annexation, 
the optimal metric remained the principal influencer of land use policy.301 
Utilizing demographic charts, street system diagrams, and land use maps, 
Hazelwood officials land use planning employed effective techniques for integrating and 
anticipating economic and residential needs while accounting for real time transitory 
factors as neighboring municipalities experienced significant change. Hazelwood’s 
proximity to the interstate, highways, major thoroughfares, and corridors played a 
prominent role in the city’s planning as it served as both an advantage and a disadvantage 







Leveraging and remaining dedicated to the optimal metric allowed officials to 
establish long-term zoning plans which increased certainty and market confidence and 
simplified otherwise complex harmonizing of residential and commercial redevelopment. 
As Hazelwood enjoyed major projects and significant business and population growth, 
officials continued to identify tools that further empowered the city to thrive and preserve 
its balance. 
By the 1980s, Hazelwood’s city plan commission recommendations were aligning 
more with city council approval rates. Although minimum lot size remained the same at 
10,000 sq. ft., amendments were instituted which allowed for new construction to have 
more variation from surrounding properties. A 122-acre redevelopment project including 
various designs and sizes of homes built on a wider range of lot sizes followed.302 
This was not an indication of Hazelwood compromising its position regarding the 
optimal metric. Officials understood the fluidity of consequential variables. It was more 
helpful to prepare than deny the evolution happening around them. Subsequent approvals 
of previously denied rezoning requests were commonplace in each of the study cities. 
However, most were the result of minor technical matters that petitioners needed to correct 
and resubmit. Approval of resubmitted proposals which clearly conflicted with zoning laws 
in place during the time of the original submission indicated either a change in conditions, 
philosophy, objectives, or all of these. 
By 1982, residents of the northwest quadrant of Hazelwood looked a lot like their 
1960s’ counterparts— large families and many children under five years of age. In other 
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Hazelwood quadrants, residents tended to be older— over the age of 65. For Hazelwood 
officials, these factors denoted possible impact of the previous decade’s policies and were 
important to consider in the new comprehensive planning process. Hazelwood’s strategic 
plans consistently produced specific objectives, tools required, and implications.303 
Hazelwood officials formed an industrial development authority (IDA) and bonded 
several apartment projects previously denied by the county’s IDA. Hazelwood’s leadership 
promoted the decision as an important and useful tool for development and continued 
growth and prosperity of the city’s economic welfare. Nevertheless, officials recognized 
the bonds were designed to be used for expansion of industrial resources which could 
provide additional jobs in the area. Further, using IDA bonds for housing projects meant 
more low-income housing. To qualify for the bonding, developers were required to set 
aside 20 % of the housing units for low-income families.304 
Jobs are critical to a community’s economy. Therefore, city-initiated apartment 
complexes requiring designated low-income housing minimums may appear to be a 
problematic use of the IDA tool— particularly for a north county suburb during the 1980s. 
However, an examination of special planning sessions revealed the projects were consistent 
with Hazelwood’s strategy. There was indication of transitioning demographics, fiscal 
characteristics, and demands. Officials planned, secured the necessary tools, and executed 
plans according to the metric.305 
 
303 See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Comprehensive Plan Meeting dated November 2, 1982. For more 
about Hazelwood’s IDA activities also see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: July 11, 
1984; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive IDA Village Square Apartments dated March 6, 1985. This project 
consisted of 47 buildings containing a total of 148 one and two-bedroom units. Note: One apartment 
building permit netted Hazelwood $22, 000 in 1984 -85. See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Budget Meeting 
May 20, 1985. 
304 Figure taken from public hearing on public housing in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated July 29, 1981. 
305 For examples of the city’s effort to address the north county image see, City of Hazelwood, MO Special 




Consider that despite transitions, Hazelwood still enjoyed a stable per capita 
income, an optimal ratio of businesses to residences, and low property tax rates. At this 
point, neither population growth nor land expansion was a major goal for the city. Officials 
prioritized balancing sufficient adherence to high quality living spaces and protecting 
residents’ property with ensuring the business community viewed local government as a 
cooperative force supporting economic growth and sustainability. 
Community enrichment like parks, recreation facilities, and pedestrian-friendly 
amenities remained just as important to city officials as infrastructure improvements that 
ensured adequate traffic flow and access to businesses. Hazelwood’s policymakers 
authorized extensive studies and performed in-depth reviews of rezoning requests, 
consistently applying qualifying criteria equitably and reserving original objectives for 
protection of adjoining properties. 
Officials applied a principled approach in considering projects and programs 
varying in type, size, and other distinctions across a broad range of descriptors. Whether 
proposals requested developments in single-family residential areas, commercial or 
industry centers, near multifamily complexes housing low-income tenants or high cost 
condominiums occupied by the financially stable, specifications were clearly outlined in 
the zoning codes and officials were unwavering in trusting those codes to adequately assess 
compatibility.306 
One could argue that Hazelwood was better able to maintain balance because the 
city did not face the acute changes like the ones occurring in suburbs with closer proximity 
to St. Louis city. While this argument may hold true, it does not diminish the quality of 
 
306 City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated December 4, 1985; City of Hazelwood, MO Regular 




Hazelwood’s policymaking process, policies, and impact on stabilization. In fact, the 
argument serves to support the notion that Hazelwood applied the highest principals in 
policymaking and produced quality policies as a result. Hazelwood’s planning and zoning 
patterns were proactive as officials monitored not only internal transitions but problems 
emerging in neighboring locales. 
While Hazelwood did not face the acute transition experienced by other study cities 
earlier in the period, Hazelwood officials proactively instituted ordinances designed to 
combat destabilizing effects of that level of transition. It is impossible to know for sure if 
and how much these policies impacted the degree of transition in the city. What is 
discernable, however, is the city’s high level of preparedness for addressing challenges as 
transition threats rose in the following decades. 
As late as April 1981, advisers were still dissuading Hazelwood officials from 
establishing a housing authority. Several years earlier, without one registered HUD 
foreclosure in the municipality, Hazelwood enlisted the expertise of a local forum to 
monitor HUD activity in the city. Despite the absence of foreclosures, officials authorized 
an allocation of CDBG dollars to help fund the group and lobbied neighboring 
municipalities to utilize the services and contribute to funding the group’s operation. When 
the first FHA foreclosure was discovered in Hazelwood in May 1981, officials immediately 
initiated proceedings to obtain, rehab, and resale the property.307 
With Hazelwood’s city manager concurring with the opinion that Hazelwood’s 
current housing situation did not warrant the establishment of a housing authority, 
lawmakers decided not to institute the apparatus. However, officials did not intend on 
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letting their guard down. Officials authorized extensions of monitoring services and 
instituted a system for ascertaining advanced HUD foreclosures notifications. When 
forecasts predicted transitions challenging the metric, Hazelwood executed land growth 
through annexation to increase areas for future development.308 
Topically, Hazelwood’s land growth demonstrated attempts to expand its 
commercial and industrial pursuits. However, an examination of Hazelwood’s processes 
illuminated more context which warrants more admirable attribution to the city’s strategies. 
Consider, no policy can ensure complete achievement of goals and no policy is immune 
from potential unintended consequences. Forces and factors working outside of municipal 
governance’s sphere of influence can have significant impact on policy goals. Hazelwood 
officials understood this reality and approached policymaking accordingly. 
One example of Hazelwood’s approach includes the 1977 property reassessment 
battle in St. Louis County. A recent lawsuit had resulted in a proposed reassessment of 
property valuations. The reassessment would most likely result in St. Louis County 
residents paying notably more in taxes for similar properties than the City of St. Louis, St. 
Charles, and Jefferson Counties. Of course, this would impact Hazelwood as well. As 
expected, officials joined the complaint. However, Hazelwood diversified their strategy for 
dealing with the matter by also developing a contingency plan as reassessment could 
dramatically distort measures utilized in the metric.309 
Note, instead of attempting to expand the commercial footprint, Hazelwood’s plan 
focused on upgrading its current business recruitment and retention mechanisms. During 
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strategic planning sessions it was determined, while the city effectively secured 
information regarding what businesses were moving in and out of the city, officials had 
very little information to design measures to better understand important determinants to 
this activity. Officials constructed a system in which ongoing analyses could be performed 
utilizing specific identifiers like types, sizes, and locations of businesses and contributing 
factors for transitions.310 
The system improved Hazelwood’s business recruitment and retention efforts, 
better mitigated and predicted fiscal fluctuations, and equipped the city with more effective 
tools for anticipatory corrective measures and attracting new businesses. The process also 
helped the city improve planning and zoning policies which enhanced codes for regulating 
land use edges, abutting, and segued zoning districts. While many factors played a role in 
Hazelwood’s growth and stability, planning and zoning policies were definitely among the 
most influential.311 
Unrealized and failed urban renewal projects, growing clusters of multifamily 
complexes, and a proliferation of public housing and rental properties may not sound like 
an accurate description of University City. However, for parts of the city during the post-
fair housing era, this was an apt account. Some residents referred to certain areas as, “the 
slums.” Further expounding on the situation in University City at the time, one resident 
recalled: 
“Conditions were deplorable and overcrowded with overflowing trash dumpsters. 
In some cases, apartment residents were putting bulky items next to dumpsters 
which often stayed there for weeks. Sanitation services treated apartment 
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complexes like they were rows of single-family homes and in many cases, multiple 
families were occupying single-family houses.”312 
 
With all the proactive and innovative policies University City adopted, the city still 
faced decline in neighborhoods. Residing in University City’s popular eastern-end Loop 
district, by the start of the study period, was no longer desirable. Businesses in the area 
were struggling and the housing was aged and outmoded. Residents of the time recall the 
apartment buildings resembling old tenements. Longtime residents asserted, “When we 
came back in 1971, the Loop was not nearly as good as it is now. It had gone downhill.”313 
As explored earlier, preserving property taxes was University City’s priority as a 
bedroom suburb. Consequentially, the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment policies 
tended to focus on and favor residential interests— often at the expense of business 
development. Codes regulating land use hampered growth of established businesses and 
discouraged emergence of new businesses and relocation of businesses into the city. For 
instance, University City required that alcohol serving establishments be at least 200 feet 
in distance apart. This made it difficult for restaurants in the area to compete for customers 
while making it nearly impossible to attract new establishments.314 
 
312 Excerpt of a quote taken from City of University City archive Session 1143: September 27, 1976, page 18; 
Paraphrasing of an excerpted quote taken from archive Session 1201: October 23, 1978, page 14; Excerpt 
from quote taken from transcript of Refuse Box Counts detailed in archive Regular Session 1842: May 20, 
2002 page 6; Contract information outlined in City of University City archives Session 1915: March 29, 2004, 
page 8. See also: Session 1913: March 15, 2004, page 2. For information regarding the deterioration of the 
city’s refuse situation see City of University City archives Regular Session 1481: November 21, 1988, page 
5; Session 1483: December 12, 1988, page 2-6; and Regular Session 1314: August 23, 1982, page 11-12; 
Missouri bill referenced in City of University City archive Regular Session 1524: July 9, 1990, page 9. 
According to financial records included in archives from Regular Session: October 31, 2005; and Council 
Study Session: September 4, 2007; Refuse expenses and other figures taken from budgets submitted in 
archive Regular Session 1599: July 26, 1993, page 6. For more on challenges with refuse equipment and the 
transfer station see archives Regular Session 1583: January 11, 1993, page 7; Session 1581: November 23, 
1992, page 2; and Session 1583: January 11, 1993, page 7. 
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Members of the business community argued, “No vibrant business strip would ever 
come to pass in University City unless it amends several zoning ordinances that are too 
restrictive.” University City officials stood by the restrictive zoning, however. Lawmakers 
argued it gave the city some assurance of control and avoidance of strip-type developments. 
There were several municipalities that did not have any distance limitations, and officials 
felt those municipalities were paying a significant price as they experienced proliferations 
in alcohol serving businesses.315 
Cities like Webster Groves had a limitation of one liquor by the drink establishment 
for each 10,000 people. With a population of 30,000, Webster Groves had only three such 
establishments. Although University City officials opposed such a restrictive limitation for 
its city, it did value its existing distance requirement. Nevertheless, the city’s restrictive 
commercial zoning inhibited the ability of landowners to fill vacancies which further 
contributed to the decline of areas like the Loop. Vacancies increased, crime rates 
exploded, and citizens’ faith in their municipal leaders’ capacity to effectively manage the 
city’s affairs deteriorated.316 
Although University City’s location insulated the suburb from the negative imaging 
plaguing its north county neighbors, the city’s proximity to struggling municipalities 
increased vulnerability and accelerated decline in certain areas of the suburb. Further 
 
315 Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City Regular Council Meeting Session 960: April 27, 1970. 
See also for more details regarding the October 1967 zoning changes implemented in the 1968 
comprehensive plan see. 
316 See, City of Maplewood, Missouri archive dated March 11, 1980: Document 345, Bill 4138 an ordinance 
repealing the code pertaining to distances between establishments selling intoxicating liquor at retail by 
drink for consumption on the premises were sold was passed unanimously. University City dealt with a 
similar issue in the loop. Figures taken from working paper Williams, N. 2019. Role of Municipal Governance 




challenging University City was its minimal access to the major interstates, highways, and 
thoroughfares enjoyed by their north county counterparts. 
Despite receiving inequitable attention, north county roads and highways provided 
major arteries for transporting people and goods across the area which better supported 
commercial activity and economic growth and sustainability. Entering the start of the study 
period, University City lacked a north-south artery. As a city of over 46,000 residents, 
University City depended largely on Big Bend Road. The street spanned a short distance 
between the southern city limits and main east-west road located near the southern edge of 
town. At the time, Big Bend was narrow, aged, and worn.317 
Exacerbating matters, the county outlined several changes along the east-west road 
which included prohibiting parking in certain locations. The changes were especially 
impactful as this was the failing Loop business and residential district near the eastern edge 
of town leading into the City of St. Louis. Officials hoped to revive this area as it was 
critical to the city’s stabilization. University City officials vigorously lobbied the county to 
help with the situation. After a county-wide bond issue passed in November 1970, these 
areas began to see road improvements.318 
The suburb also benefited from a federally assisted traffic signal program resulting 
in improvements to important intersections. Two years later, the Missouri State legislature 
authorized the establishment of a county arterial road system. St. Louis County designated 
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15 University City streets, including the newly renovated north-south artery and the 
popular east-west strip, to its arterial road system. The arterial improvements were sorely 
needed but did little to address the problems with shared, private, and city-owned and 
maintained streets.319 
Battles between neighboring municipalities over shared streets were a common 
occurrence. Traffic problems and street damage were usually at the root of disagreements. 
University City shared five streets with the City of St. Louis, and tractor trailer traffic 
flowing from the city repeatedly ignored the suburb’s 11-ton maximum restriction. 
Consequentially, University City’s new street overlays were often broken up within two 
years of being laid. Several of the shared streets were residential and neighborhoods often 
controlled their own streets. However, maintaining them was very costly. 
Deterioration of the economic sector further impacted the already declining 
residential property values further exacerbating the fiscal stress University City was 
encountering. Officials began to adjust their planning and zoning policies to meet the 
challenges of the changing environment. They began by focusing on the Loop area. In 
leveraging city resources along with private interests and resources, the city developed 
partnerships to maximize their revitalization efforts. Partnering with proprietors organized 
as a business association, University City undertook various projects to upgrade the Loop 
area.320 
The city duplicated this multi-interest model to address decay and stabilize other 
areas throughout the municipality. Officials enlisted the services of various planning firms, 
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conducted studies, and established plans which instituted 211 changes to the city’s zoning 
codes, classifications, and districts. Rezoning several districts from high density residential 
to arterial business accommodated new commercial development. Most industrial uses 
were prohibited in the new plan, and various safeguards were implemented that would 
extend stronger protections to neighboring properties.321 
Developers were required to not only garner the approval of the plan commission 
and the council but also nearby property owners. The council also stressed the importance 
of giving all concerned parties an additional alternative when considering development 
requests. Areas where zoning had previously prevented the placement of businesses were 
now eligible for business development. Some stretches of road consisting of outmoded and 
deteriorated residential properties could now serve as vibrant economic corridors. 
Streets that had evolved to symbolize class and racial divides were targeted for 
reutilization. According to Interviewee U2, “There was more of a focus on making sure 
that Olive was not a racially divisive area. We recognized the importance of the Third Ward 
for all of University City.” The era marked a period in which the city began modifying 
plans for old urban renewal projects. New plans involved changing proposed uses like 
multifamily residential to uses ranging from office research and warehousing to retail.322 
Officials approved controlled mixed land use zones aimed at stimulating economic 
growth while retaining the overall residential character of the city. City officials capitalized 
on new and innovative engineering designs and mechanisms which resulted in modern 
renovations and new structures with more environmentally friendly aspects and functional 
 
321 Public response to the new plan and new zoning classification was minimal. For more information 
regarding the new plan refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1402: February 10, 1986, 
page 2; and Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 2. 




uses. Project financing techniques included leveraging private investments with public 
funds. Costs were reduced by partnering with local trade schools who provided students to 
work on development projects through hands-on training programs.323 
Redevelopment resulted in vast improvements in pedestrian areas, retail facilities, 
and office buildings. New developments proved helpful, but the stability of University City 
still depended on the health of residential areas. In an era of concentrated HUD activity, 
housing stock decay, and declining population, the city needed to address the issues of 
vacant homes and lots increasing by the day. With most of the city’s derelict properties 
consisting of non-adjoining 40-foot plots, there were few opportunities for land banking to 
better attract developers. Further, properties were usually located in neighborhoods no one 
other than nonprofits with only modest building capacity were willing to build.324 
Officials turned to the University City Land Clearance for Redevelopment 
Authority (LCRA) to lead the reutilization efforts. Established in 1961 to execute the city’s 
general neighborhood renewal plan, the LCRA helped empower the city with the capacity 
to effectively manage the complexities associated with private, city, state, and federally 
owned land usage. Although the LCRA was a separate and independent body, the city 
funded the operation, and certain LCRA actions had to be approved by the council. The 
city’s government and LCRA collaborated effectively, operated efficiently, and vested a 
great deal of trust in one another.325 
 
323 For more details regarding the October 1967 zoning changes implemented in the 1968 comprehensive 
plan see: City of University City Regular Council Meeting Session 960: April 27, 1970. 
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Officials elected to use city resources to address the problems with repossessed 
HUD properties and leveraged the LCRA to oversee the construction of projects and 
redevelopment of blighted areas. The city authorized a rehabilitation and property sales 
and leasing program and began selling buildings rather than tearing them down. However, 
there were frequently no takers on buildings because of the rehabbing costs. Conditions of 
the buildings made it difficult for prospective owners to borrow money to rehab or purchase 
properties. When borrowers were successful in securing loans, they had to pay exorbitant 
interest rates. 
Without policy change, properties could remain vacant for years. The county's 
policy involved selling properties for $100 while waiving all county taxes owed. Although 
the city was hesitant to grant tax abatement, there were several advantages in getting the 
lots into private ownership. 1. The owner would be responsible for all maintenance; 2. The 
city could bill the owner if the city performed any of these services; and 3. The property 
would be back on the tax rolls.326 
University City enacted a charter amendment, in 1978, authorizing the council to 
wave back taxes. Immediately following the enactment, the city began receiving requests 
from buyers for the vacant properties. This was tantamount to the city basically subsidizing 
the redevelopment of a notably sized segment of its housing stock. The policy turned out 
to be largely successful in some areas. Consider that prior to policy implementation, many 
buildings had stayed vacant for up to five years. After implementation, similar buildings 
averaged less than two years vacancy.327 
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Shortly thereafter, the LCRA was selling properties at their appraised value. 
University City executed a five-year plan which included a 13-acre redevelopment near the 
city limits shared with the City of St. Louis. While the original 1964 general neighborhood 
renewal plan proposed an industrial redevelopment, over a decade had passed and 
significant market, demographic, and geographical changes had occurred.328 
Current demands called for clearing of some of the land, rehabilitating other 
sections, and redeveloping the area residential. Increased business activity, LCRA 
redevelopments, and supplemental funding spurred renewed developer interest in the city. 
Corporations and individuals began buying up more property. New, more modern single-
family homes, garden homes like duplexes and townhouses of up to four-bedrooms, and 
high-rise apartment developments followed. Others rehabbed houses, developed 
multifamily complexes, and converted existing apartments into condominiums.329 
Zones controlled building heights as to provide buffers of low-rise buildings next 
to single-family homes. Designs led to an aesthetically pleasing effect of buildings 
becoming gradually taller toward the city’s main thoroughfare. Experts and publications 
lauded University City’s planning and rezoning for demonstrating ingenuity in city 
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designs. However, the municipality was known historically as a city designs innovator, and 
officials recognized that praise would not stabilize the city.330 
Housing conditions improved but fiscal stress remained. The city’s LCRA 
strategies were effective at slowing decay but did little to regain its tax base. University 
City’s dilemma centered on how much economic development was necessary to improve 
and protect the fiscal health of the city. Despite actions to address the proliferation of vacant 
homes and lots, property values had not returned to pre-decline levels. City officials needed 
to once again rethink the city’s economic philosophy. 
With minimal public backlash for certain plan modifications, officials began 
applying classifications more liberally. The city rezoned a seven-acre site from high density 
residential to industrial commercial. Over the years, there had been inquiries from 
developers regarding this area but nothing concrete materialized. The inactivity was partly 
because of the zoning. There was no way to know what would happen in terms of allowable 
uses in the future. As soon as the area was rezoned, developers began expressing interest 
in surrounding properties.331 
Administrations in the 1980s and 1990s governed during a period in which the tax 
base transitioned notably. Officials had to decide to uphold, amend, or completely change 
certain policies that had served to protect and improve city conditions in previous decades. 
Most of the city was zoned for 5,000 square foot lots. However, the city fielded its share 
of infill housing requests in areas zoned for larger lots. By the time a major developer came 
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Study Session 1802: February 12, 2001. For information about the city’s path from urban renewal to LCRA 
selling and leasing see. 
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before the council to present a proposal for a multifamily development in 1996, lawmakers 
were staunchly divided on the issue.332 
The developer had been involved in the development of more than 200 luxury 
condominium units in Old Town Clayton. Most of the multifamily buildings were put into 
single-family areas. The proposed development would extend this type of housing into 
University City. Officials had denied the development proposal 10 years prior because of 
strong objections from neighborhood residents.333 
Heralding the Clayton developments as great successes, developers claimed 
adjacent properties dramatically escalated in value due to the developments in neighboring 
Clayton, and assured skeptics that any change in density was imperceptible. Motion to 
approve the new multifamily development carried four to three. Approving a high-density 
development located in the middle of an area zoned for single-family homes signaled a 
significant transition in the council’s aggregate philosophy.334 
Building heights, loss of trees, and other potential impacts on neighborhoods were 
becoming secondary priorities. Economic circumstances predominated matters in officials’ 
decision-making. However, some residents feared this was now happening at the expense 
of the city’s character. University City had fought to preserve its neighborhoods and it 
thrived as a residential community. Neighborhood preservation had been the council's 
primary goal for decades. Now it was more concerned about the economic tax base 
shrinking than preserving the unique character of neighborhoods. 
 
332 Mrs. Vivian Jones offers a heartfelt plea to the council to consider her request for permit to build. See 
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One such unique neighborhood was Parkview. Parkview was well-documented in 
local guidebooks and had numerous books written about it. The subdivision was laid out 
in 1905, one year before the city’s incorporation. One-third (80) of its houses was located 
on the St. Louis side and 2/3 (170) in University City. It was a typical city neighborhood 
with large houses close together, curving streets, beautiful landscaping, many old trees, 
and a vast variety of housing styles. The St. Louis part of Parkview received its local 
designation as a historical preservation district in 1978 and by 1986, all of Parkview was 
on the National Register of Historic Places.335 
When an increase in foreclosures led to more than 30 buildings sitting vacant in the 
Parkview area, the city helped fund the Parkview Gardens Association and its 35 programs 
designed to improve the neighborhood. Officials worked closely with the association who 
established itself as a property management company overseeing 60 units and purchasing 
at least three of the vacant buildings. When the 1990s arrived, the city’s financial 
commitment to the area was well-established.336 
Parkview represents only one of many stories of University City’s unique 
stabilization story. Often omitted from the story, however, has been one of the biggest 
challenges to the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment efforts and serves as the most 
consistent thread throughout every decade of the study period. Before city leaders could 
realize positive effects of policy implementations, an old nemesis would always make its 
return. 
 
335 According to figures outlined in City of University City archive Regular Session 1572: June 1, 1992, page 
3. 
336 Budget and evaluation rubric outlined in record of proposal submitted in archive Session 1588: April 12, 
1993, page 7; Figures taken from association records included in archive Regular Session 1604: October 18, 




When planning, rezoning, and redeveloping in University City, one always had to 
consider proximity to the River Des Peres as an important factor. Storm sewers near 
developments often became clogged and flooded when it rained. Results from a July 1981 
Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) study of flood control in University City concluded 
that, of the more than 850 construction projects with estimated costs of $450,000,000, there 
were 306 areas which lie in parts of University City. Out of the 14 total watersheds located 
within MSD boundaries, three of them were in University City.337 
Although MSD was responsible for all of the River Des Peres, it could not afford 
to do all the work. During the 1980s alone, the city along with the state, county, and MSD 
spent over $2,500,000 on projects associated with River Des Peres flooding. By 1988, city 
officials were hoping for a big breakthrough with an Army Corps of Engineers project that 
was supposed to stabilize the entire river up to 82nd Street at an estimated cost of $13 to 
$14 million. While the Corps committed to paying 80 % of the cost of the project, the city 
continued working on problems upstream using whatever funds were available.338 
For the next twelve years, there were no substantial changes in conditions of the 
river flooding and no notable policy changes related to sewer line maintenance. In July 
1999, an emergency Bill 8437 was introduced. The bill called for an ordinance to authorize 
an annual fee for the repair of lateral sewer lines on residential property. The fee applied 
to properties having 6 or less units. The measure passed unanimously becoming Ordinance 
6212 and established the sewer lateral protection fee.339 
 
337 According to City of University City records Session 1273: April 27, 1981, page 13; According to figures in 
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There was only so much the city could do to address the challenges brought on by 
the flooding and an aged sewer system. When new officials had the opportunity to put their 
stamp on the way the city should address problems, some categories experienced 
considerable change. Nevertheless, despite numerous changes in character, composition, 
and philosophy of city leadership over the course of the entire study period, River Des 
Peres continued to serve as the one issue officials from of all walks of life could agree, no 
policy drafted could fix. 
While each study city faced similar dynamics, sequencing of elements differed. 
City officials were charged with navigating challenges of structural decline and fiscal stress 
while trying to protect neighborhoods’ unique character. As Interviewee U2 explains, “In 
these neighborhoods, you have a house like this that is 50 years old or more and a developer 
will come in, tear this down, and build a house that’s worth $455,000.” Land use decisions 
could potentially move a city closer to decline for the sake of protecting the character of a 














Chapter 7. Fiscal Policy 
Introduction 
Missouri cities entered the post-fair housing 1970s facing financial crises which 
threatened significant reduction in quantity and quality of services provided to citizens. 
Revenue sources were inadequate, and cities needed to develop and implement creative 
strategies for meeting fiscal demands. However, state statutes restricted cities’ authority 
requiring they adhere to certain parameters. Up to that point, cities had not been successful 
in persuading the rural-dominated state legislature to adopt policies addressing issues 
unique to areas with higher populations. 
Missouri courts had interpreted the state constitution to imply that home rule cities 
only had powers explicitly authorized by state statues. Under this interpretation, matters of 
authority were often called into question. For example, when a new industry was created 
which had not been specifically named in state statutes, cities did not technically have the 
right to tax businesses operating in that industry. City officials needed greater flexibility 
and freedom for local governance. They advocated for more local control to determine the 
mechanisms by which services were delivered to residents and the power to choose the 
agency that delivered those services— city, county or other public authority. 
A joint group of lawmakers, referred to as the Home Rule Group, put forth 
legislation to restore the notion that municipal home rule granted cities all powers not 
specifically denied by state or constitutional law. By November 1970, cities were seeking 
a favorable vote on the home rule amendment which would grant municipal officials 
privileges to express their preferences on each individual service and clarify cities’ taxing 




conditions and tools for dealing with conditions, and they were advocating to expand their 
toolbox beyond the traditional taxing measures.341 
Tax levy propositions were often highly contested affairs which required expending 
a great deal of political capital and could culminate in voter rejection. Due to financial and 
taxing concerns of citizens, it was highly unlikely that cities could obtain adequate 
revenues through tax increases. Expanded taxing authority and state and federal funding 
would need to be secured to help with budget shortfalls. St. Louis County’s inner suburbs 
were at the forefront of lobbying for more taxing rights and other revenue generating 
strategies. 
Missouri had taxed retail sales of tangible personal property and certain specified 
services since 1934 and in 1959, the state enacted a use tax to complement the sales tax. 
State legislators believed this model should be duplicated at the local level. The idea was 
that a local sales tax would help solve local financial problems. Coined “creative localism” 
by proponents, the tax was presented as a valuable financial tool that would empower 
municipalities to control their own fiscal destiny. Only cities in which a majority of 
residents voted favorably for the imposition could levy the tax.342 
The local tax on sales and use combined with state sales taxes garnered more 
revenue from purchases made within municipal boundaries. While adopting a local sales 
and use tax empowered cities to levy additional forms of tax, it did not automatically equate 
to increased revenues as levels of income depended on economic activity. City officials 
needed to explore other options for dealing with the difficult economic environment. 
 
341 For a chronology of home rule charters in Missouri, see Westbrook 1968. 
342 Term “creative localism” referenced in City of University City, MO Special Session 962: May 11, 1970, 




Advocates lobbied for a long-range financial aid to cities program to address fiscal 
crises in cities. One study group official served on a national committee lobbying Congress 
to enact a revenue sharing program. Revenue sharing would distribute a portion of revenues 
generated by federal income taxes to state and local governments. These funds could be 
used for any purpose by recipient governments. Supporters viewed revenue sharing as a 
long-term safeguard that would strengthen intergovernmental fiscal structures.343 
On February 12, 1973, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act passed into law. 
Revenue sharing along with county-wide road improvements, funding for urban renewal 
projects, community development, and increases in matching grant programs resulted in 
notable enhancements to cities and increases in overall budgets. By the mid-1970s, 
however, cities’ dependency on aids had increased as supports did little to offset 
inflationary squeezes on resources or the effects of the oil crisis.344 
In October 1973, only eight months after the implementation of revenue sharing, 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil 
embargo. Economic uncertainty made city budget forecasting difficult as revenue streams 
became more unpredictable. Discrepancies in assessed valuation of properties, flattening 
wages, dwindling reserves, and rising costs of health insurance intensified fiscal stress for 
cities.345 
 
343 See Resolution endorsing the revenue sharing program in City of Ferguson, MO March 23, 1971, page 4.  
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The phasing out of urban renewal projects led to more reductions in cities’ income. 
Policy stipulated that once urban renewal projects generated proceeds from the sale of land, 
those monies would be returned to the CDBG program. When federal funding through Title 
II of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976 began, it was a welcomed stopgap to 
reductions in cities’ operating forces. Title II funding involved the U.S. Department of 
Labor issuing grants to jurisdictions to assist with the costs of compensating public 
workers. St. Louis County received funds from the program and study group inner suburbs 
received funds through the county as sub-grantees.346 
City officials were quite familiar with these types of employment programs having 
participated in programs authorized by the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration (CETA) previously. These 
programs allowed municipalities to receive the benefit of payroll supports which provided 
valuable assistance to their operating forces. Cities eagerly integrated new workers and 
trainees into the fold as individual workloads had ballooned following layoffs.347 
Employee compensation assistance programs were much needed costs savings 
measures as inner suburbs struggled to protect their fiscal health amid multiple threats to 
their bottom line. Conversely, if Missouri’s 1976 tax cuts amendment passed, it would 
exempt food and drugs from local sales tax and would mean substantial reduction in 
revenues. Although the measure failed, funding cuts in January 1977 led to the government 
suspending the employee assistance and revenue sharing programs.348 
 
346 St. Louis County grantee- sub grantee relationship taken from records included in archives City of 
University City Regular Session 1153 dated February 28, 1977, page 14. 
347 For more information about figures and the bill see: archives Regular Session 1125: February 23, 1976, 
page 16-17. 
348Payroll figures taken from financial records included in archives from Session 1150: January 3, 1977,  




Local officials mobilized to oppose the programs’ suspensions and in June 1977, 
the CETA employee and revenue sharing programs were reinstated. Suburban lawmakers 
then set out to affect change in the way revenue sharing funds were distributed. They fought 
for the right of cities under 50,000 in population to receive revenue sharing funds directly. 
As it were, cities with less than 50,000 residents had to apply to the county for a share of 
the revenue. Inner suburbs’ officials were honing crisis management skills metro city 
officials had sharpened for decades.349 
As officials worked to address inner suburbs’ problems, planners were developing 
exurbs further away from the core and surrounding suburbs. Increasing sprawl exacerbated 
fiscal strain for inner suburbs. While exurbs attracted homeowners and businesses away, 
inner suburbs’ dependence on public supports and tax increases intensified as many areas 
had very little economic diversification. Lost income intensified pressures to generate more 
revenues from property taxes and remaining local sales tax streams. City leaders scrambled 
to fill voids left by higher income earners, retail chains, and corporate offices. 
Equipment, infrastructure, and service deliver further eroded as local officials 
lobbied for more public assistance, raised taxes, and vied for shoppers. Tax hikes, bond 
indebtedness, and damaged credit ratings led to more residents exiting inner suburbs in 
search of newer exurban developments and lower tax rates. Federal policy evolved to begin 
encouraging cities to develop more economic focused agendas placing a higher priority on 
attracting business investments and generating more commercial capital. 
Tax base decline, funding cuts, resource shortages, and infrastructure challenges 
helped reveal some underlying inadequacies in inner suburbs’ fiscal structure. Heated 
 




debates ensued over the causes of suburbs’ increased dependence on government aids and 
evolution to business-centric approaches to remaining solvent. The era marked profound 
change in inner suburbs’ political atmosphere and deep political divisions developed. 
While some citizens championed changes, other residents’ frustrations and distrust of local 
government intensified. 
Neighborhoods were rapidly changing, and some residents blamed officials’ fiscal 
policies for further spurring exoduses and hindering growth and sustainability. Some 
citizens questioned the motives and philosophies driving officials’ fiscal policy decisions. 
Local governments’ fiscal policies and responses to changing economies occupied the 
center of passionate debate and disagreement; and increased polarization served as the 
primary motivator of referendums and recalls. Qualifications for public office, term limits, 
and conflicts of interest were all called into question. Municipalities composed charter 
review committees to study matters and propose charter revisions. 
While study cities like Hazelwood and Maplewood struggled to professionalize 
their city governments during the era, Ferguson, Jennings, and University City possessed 
variations of governance stability and experience. Nevertheless, these cities’ well-
established institutional structures did not insulate them from financial woes as officials 
responsible for managing their cities’ finances faced volatile environments. Declining 
revenues and intense pressure to increase and stretch budgets required frequent adjustments 
in personnel, priorities, and performance. 
Economic Environment 
Just as individuals’ incomes and expenses change over time, so did inner suburbs’. 




were not keeping pace with operating expenses. Municipal governments began capitalizing 
on tax laws that allowed cities to earn income through other sources of revenue. As cities 
began adopting new taxing laws, economic environments continued to shift. Variables 
influencing those shifts fluctuated. The implications of these interrelated dynamics shaped 
cities’ economic environments for decades to come. 
By the post-fair housing 1970s, Maplewood was no longer garnering massive 
revenues from a vibrant shopping district and the suburbs’ citizens were paying $.80 per 
$100 assessed in property taxes. Maplewood taxpayers had not enjoyed a reduction in 
property tax rate in nearly a decade. The City of Crestwood, on the other hand, had the 
second largest shopping center in St. Louis County. Its city government operated 
comfortably on $.40 per $100 assessed paid by its taxpayers and were looking to further 
reduced the tax down to $.33 per $100 assessed valuation.350 
Crestwood and Maplewood were not unique contrasts. Property tax rates varied 
between St. Louis County inner suburbs. These variations could increase or decrease in 
short periods of time as municipal governments adjusted rates and voters approved 
measures according to internal and external changes in conditions. Crestwood had 
instituted a local tax on sales and the suburb was reaping vast sums from retail activity at 
Crestwood Plaza Shopping Mall. The local sales tax revenues enabled officials to keep 
property tax rates low for citizens of Crestwood. 
Cities could impose either a half cent or a one cent tax on retail sales occurring 
within their borders. About a year into the study period, local sales tax had become the 
norm throughout the county. The cities of Brentwood, Richmond Heights, and St. Ann had 
 
350 City of Maplewood archives 1973 document 168 bill number 3806 certifying the assessment and rate of 




recently adopted the provision while cities like Crestwood, Clayton, St. Louis, and 
Wellston entered the era already charging local sales tax. Communities with large shopping 
districts could set lower property tax rates as they collected more revenue through local 
sales taxes.351 
Local sales tax revenues could also generate substantial income for cities with no 
large shopping center. By 1971, a significant proportion of the budget in Wellston, a city 
with a population of 7,050, were revenues collected from the one cent sales tax. The advent 
of the local sales tax meant even bedroom suburbs like University City were impacted. 
Despite possessing a relatively modest level of commercial activity, and although property 
taxes remained the primary source of revenue, the local tax increased competition for sales 
within taxing boundaries, costs differentials, effects on local merchants, businesses, and 
consumers.352 
Declines in property tax revenues resulted in increasing reliance on sales tax 
revenue for bedroom communities like University City. The transition was not inherently 
negative, however, as local sales tax had its benefits. Unlike property taxes, local sales tax 
granted suburbs the opportunity to glean tax revenues from nonresidents. However, as 
reliance on the tool increased, events like the closing of major retail and grocery store 
chains became more of a threat to cities’ economic health than in previous eras. 
Although Maplewood was struggling, the suburb was still home to some 
commercial businesses. Facing fiscal year projections indicating significant budget 
shortfalls, Maplewood officials could choose to continue raising property taxes and making 
 
351 Bill Number 6675 proposing municipal sales tax was adopted as Ordinance Number 4566.  Session 963: 
May 18, 1970, page 8. 




cuts in city services or ask voters to approve a local sales tax measure. On January 25, 
1971, Maplewood Bill 3765 authorizing a special election passed unanimously and on 
Tuesday March 16, 1971, Maplewood voters accepted the imposition of a local sales tax.353 
Hazelwood followed suit imposing the tax after voter approval in a November 1971 
special election. Maplewood and Hazelwood had now joined Jennings and University City 
as local sales tax levying cities. Voters in those mature inner suburbs had approved 
adopting local sales tax with overwhelming majorities in special elections held the previous 
year.354 
Wide-spread adoption of the local sales tax fueled competition for attracting 
commercial activity and further highlighted differences in suburbs’ economic 
environments. Revenues generated in cities with shopping centers dwarfed cities without 
them, and small municipalities did not stand a chance. Ferguson officials argued against 
the taxing tool, citing revenue distribution as inequitable, unfair, and unrelated to municipal 
services rendered. Ferguson officials favored a county-wide sales tax instead.355 
Using a distribution formula, revenues from county sales tax would be refunded to 
cities based on population. Ferguson officials believed a population-based county sales tax 
would be a more just system of taxing sales in St. Louis County municipalities. Ferguson’s 
position on Missouri’s 1970 House Bill 141 was in direct opposition to the position held 
by cities like Jennings. Jennings had just instituted the local tax and a new county-wide per 
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capita distribution formula could mean less revenue than what the city could collect in sales 
tax dollars independently.356 
While smaller municipalities, municipalities with minimal commercial activity, and 
unincorporated areas stood to benefit from the change, cities like Jennings could be 
adversely impacted. Jennings had already allocated anticipated revenues from their city 
sales tax for municipal improvements and accommodations for commercial establishments. 
Jennings officials opposed a county-wide tax distribution pool and urged county 
government to seek legislative authority to establish their own county sales tax to garner 
revenues from the unincorporated portions of St. Louis County.357 
When cities’ local sales tax provision went into effect, officials were unsure how 
much money they would realize. Some cities’ revenues exceeded expectations, and local 
sales tax became the preferred target of tax relief measures as state legislators went after 
the tax with proposed exemptions for food and drugs. Many local officials favored the tax 
as it allowed them to offer their residents tax relief through property tax reductions. By 
1977, the economic environment for some municipalities had improved a great deal. For 
others, with or without a local sales tax provision in place, conditions remained relatively 
unchanged or had worsened.358 
The Ferguson supported county-wide sales tax measure had failed years earlier, but 
support for the tool was now greater as a provision allowed cities who desired to remain 
independent to do so. In August 1977, Missouri Senate Bill 234 authorized a county-wide 
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sales tax. Soon after installation of the county-wide tax, questions and accusation arose 
regarding the levying of too many taxes and cities’ handling of monies derived from sales 
taxes. A September 1978 Post-Dispatch editorial about over taxation in St. Louis County 
claimed there was a “windfall in quotes from the county-wide sales tax which 
municipalities [were] not sharing with the public.”359 
Local sales tax served as a critical economic environmental influencer throughout 
the study period. Although pre-era differences existed, the spread of local sales tax use and 
the advent of the county-wide sales tax combined with the demographic changes to provide 
additional complicating elements, scenarios, and implications of decisions for officials to 
consider. The economic environment affected economic conditions and available tools for 
dealing with conditions, but cities’ institutional structure determined cities’ level of 
professionalism, and designated roles and duties in navigating the environment. 
Institutional Structure 
Spending, borrowing, and investment decisions served as critical factors in 
determining cities’ economic health. As allowable taxing mechanisms, revenue streams, 
and financing tools evolved, suburbs’ institutional structure became more consequential in 
financial management and decision making. Stabilizing and prospering in this economic 
environment required advanced knowledge of economic principals and instruments. 
In Jennings’ case, until 1993 and in early Hazelwood and Maplewood, neither city 
manager nor finance director positions existed. Jennings’ elected officials handled the 
city’s finances. The city collector received funds due the city, and the treasurer managed 
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city funds serving as the city’s paymaster. However, the council had to authorize spending 
and borrowing actions and could also authorize the mayor to initiate financial actions on 
behalf of the city.360 
Essentially, Jennings’ mayor-council was its own finance director. Jennings’ 
November 8, 1971 enactment of Ordinance 965 created the office of director of purchasing 
and inventory control, but the suburb operated for nearly 50 years without an official 
requirement for a finance professional in its government. The 32-hour a week purchasing 
and inventory control position would serve as the suburb’s only finance related 
appointment until the city instituted an official finance director in 1993. Officials also 
established a law which limited the term of the appointment to four years.361 
A 1992 University of Missouri study recommended installation of the finance 
director as part of a reorganization of Jennings’ administrative structure. Findings found 
that the city needed to improve cost efficiency and general operating efficiency. While the 
city did not adopt most of the recommendations, officials agreed to implement the changes 
in the city’s financial structure by combining the elected offices of collector and treasurer 
into an appointed position. Despite the finance director appointment, archives show the 
city contracting multiple consultants to assist with budgeting and finance matters 
throughout the remainder of the study.362 
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Hazelwood entered the period with its chairman of the board of trustees serving as 
the city’s director of finance. When the village transitioned to a city in late 1970, the first 
question asked of the new city manager was, “When will a finance director be hired?” 
Hazelwood’s installment of a finance director was critical to the city’s success. Finance 
directors occupied an important role in shaping the suburbs’ fiscal position by researching, 
recommending, and calculating varying rate and fee estimates associated with the city’s 
robust business sector.363 
Before adopting the council-manager structure, Maplewood’s lawmakers worked 
as administrative staff. The suburbs’ finances were managed by the superintendent of the 
department of accounts and finance which was simply a designated councilperson. 
Additionally, the city clerk doubled as the city’s collector of revenue. Council-manager 
governments did not guarantee appointment of a finance director nor did the appointment 
of a finance director mean fiscal policy was significantly influenced by the director of 
finance. However, among the four professional study cities it did.364 
Finance directors were well-trained and usually long serving. However, the 
professional cities had strong city managers who enjoyed tremendous influence in 
policymaking. By the mid-1980s, this was especially true in Maplewood and University 
City. Although finance directors occupied an influential role, city managers set the 
administrative agenda and financial recommendations reflected that agenda. 
Institutional structure indicated the presence or absence of degreed public 
administrators and certified public accountants, and designated roles and responsibilities. 
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Differences in institutional structure demonstrated divergent levels of expertise and 
distribution of responsibilities. These differences were most exhibited in cities’ financial 
protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices. 
Financial Protocols and Procedures  
Under good administrative leadership, finance departments develop effective 
strategies for cities to perform as responsible stewards during periods of financial windfall 
and to maintain solvency during lean times. City finance department’s financial protocols 
should be comprised of procedures designed to encourage integrity, ensure regulatory 
conformance, protect cities’ resources, minimize waste, and maximize returns. While 
economic environment set the stage and fiscal structure determined roles in navigating the 
environment, suburbs’ track record of protocols, procedures, and use of best financial 
practices did more to illuminate distinctions in fiscal policy. 
Hazelwood and Maplewood began the period without professional administrations, 
but by the 1990s, both municipalities began being recognized for excellence in government 
accounting and financial reporting. The Municipal Finance Officers Association of 
America (MFOA) presents certificates of achievement to cities whose annual reports 
achieve the highest standards in comprehensive financial reporting. Once Maplewood 
secured its first MFOA certificate in 1994 and Hazelwood in 1998, consecutive annual 
recognitions persisted for both suburbs until study’s end.365 
Although the State of Missouri did not require cities provide annual comprehensive 
financial reports, the practice demonstrated cities’ level of financial accountability and 
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indicated professionalism in city government. Ferguson and University City entered the 
era with respected reputations for financial accounting and reporting. For these suburbs, 
comprehensive annual financial reports were standard operating procedures, and 
consecutive financial excellence awards were common. Ferguson and University City 
enjoyed finance directors and city managers who earned countless MFOA awards, several 
JT Bell Service Awards, and served in leadership roles in local and state associations.366 
According to Jennings’ city treasurer, as early as 1971, “The duties of the position 
was too much.” To address this issue, Jennings created a purchasing and inventory control 
position and assigned the duty of making out checks to the office of the city clerk. Jennings’ 
institutional structure exhibited several areas of weakness regarding internal procedures. 
The city’s controls for financial activities tended to be duplicative, loose, and poorly 
defined. Although officials commissioned multiple studies and implemented several key 
revisions during the study period, adjustments were often made too late and revisions 
caused little substantive improvement.367 
Nevertheless, Jennings’ record of audit authorizations and filings of audited 
financial statements were consistent with other study cities. The suburb hired industry 
reputable independent CPA firms, ensured public accessibility to audited records, and 
made countless efforts to comply with auditor recommendations. Jennings earned a 
reputation for poor governance in the latter part of the study period. However, my 
examination revealed competent officials governing the suburb throughout the study. 
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Institutional structure limited the city’s capacity to deal with economic instability which 
only served to exacerbate issues and further burden the suburb with fiscal stress.368 
Transitions in professional administrators in Ferguson and University City, and in 
Hazelwood and Maplewood by the mid-1980s influenced important changes in fiscal 
behavior. Archives reflect each suburb implementing new fiscal measures shortly after the 
hiring of new city managers and finance directors. One common recommendation involved 
cycling auditor teams regularly. Administrators believed cities benefitted from different 
perspectives. As early as 1975, Ferguson administrators recommended rotating auditors. 
By the time University City implemented three to five-year auditor contracts in 1987, the 
city had been using the same auditor for 25 years.369 
Officials agreed different perspectives could be helpful, but switching auditors 
regularly meant increased fees and skepticism. Extended contracts and longstanding 
relationships with firms granted cities reduced rates for services, familiarity, and 
confidence. By 1980, Hazelwood was still using the firm that had been performing their 
audits since 1957. Although contracts were based on three-year terms, renewals were 
merely procedural. Hazelwood’s notable adjustment came in the form of extending audits 
to all phases of city operations.370 
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Whether cities extended contracts or rotated firms, audits required the full 
cooperation of officials and staff, and reports consistently pointed out areas of needed 
improvement. Findings could indicate cities were relatively debt free with no substantial 
weaknesses, and concerns could be as simple as processes for issuing computer room keys 
or updating manuals to ensure continuity during staff absences. Or concerns could involve 
areas that cost cities a great deal of time and money like internal accounting control 
problems, poor monetary handling practices, and errors and delays in financial information 
recording.371 
A critical difference between professional and nonprofessional suburbs involved 
possessing and lacking capacity to effectively implement changes. Having professional 
staff enabled study cities to quickly adjust to changes in national standards for municipal 
accounting and advise policymakers regarding needs to amend policy to reflect changes in 
state law. Professional cities were better equipped to evaluate and respond to acute changes 
in income and expenditures and recommend appropriate, proportionate, and allowable 
action.372 
Best Financial Practice 
Requests and recommendations included in finance director reports to city 
managers and city manager reports to the council could have major ramifications on fiscal 
policy in inner suburbs. Many fiscal decisions made in the early period established cities’ 
position on issues and embedded dynamics which shaped conditions, places, and policy 
platforms for decades to come. Without professional finance staff, Jennings lacked 
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procedural integrity and the city’s council was disadvantaged by the absence of in-house 
advisement on financial matters. 
Jennings did not practice generally accepted accounting principles. The city’s more 
simplified “cash basis” system allowed for fewer, less trained staff to perform accounting 
duties. However, the city had to pay accounting firms to convert records according to 
accepted accounting principles for reporting. While cash basis accounting provided elected 
officials easy to understand cash-on-hand and cash flow figures for making financials 
decisions, the practice limited the suburb in how it could leverage its fixed assets and 
various sources of revenue.373 
Conversely, Jennings’ style of financial accounting helped the city remain more 
consistent with approved budgets and allowed for more real time comparative analyses 
which helped mitigate vulnerability to overextending resources and overspending based on 
estimates. Jennings’ lack of economic diversification and leveraging of profit earning 
investment tools rendered the city susceptible to acute fiscal stress from decline in tax base 
and economic downturns. However, budget shortfalls were rarely a result of the suburbs’ 
financial practices or speculation.374 
Officials did not have to rely on professionals for decisions such as joining the state 
purchasing program which allowed units of local governments to consolidate financial 
resources for purchasing goods. Such an arrangement made logical sense as it increased 
savings through mass purchases. Administrators did not have to convince officials to 
participate in the formation of a self-insurance pool. Each study city joined the pool and 
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cities realized substantial savings in property, casualty, and workers’ compensation 
insurance. These were not the types of decisions where the lack of professional finance 
administrators impacted best practice.375 
Disparities in fiscal practices between professional and nonprofessional suburbs 
were most demonstrated in investment strategies. Professional cities aimed to be better 
served by financial institutions managing their investment portfolio. Administrators 
advised officials regarding existing arrangements and transferring of investment activities 
according to optimal returns. Although higher yield rates were usually the goal, 
administrators occasionally advised officials to authorize investments which garnered a bit 
less than the going rate to initiate or protect partnerships that included other forms of 
financial benefit for the city.376 
Establishing daily interest savings accounts were significant changes in fiscal 
practice for both Hazelwood and Maplewood. Implementing this strategy allowed the cities 
to begin earning maximum interest on idle funds. When savings account balances reached 
up to more than half a month's normal cash needs, excess funds were converted to a 
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certificate of deposit. Certificates of deposit were arranged so that at least one certificate 
matured each month. By using this system, cities were able to grow contingency funds 
which better equipped cities for unexpected expenditures.377 
With such robust commercial and manufacturing activity, Hazelwood needed 
additional implementations to deal with the management of special use permits, business 
licenses, and revenues generated from fees. The suburb established separate banks accounts 
to enable the finance department to split the duties of payroll check processing and 
reconciliation of other accounts. The city hired a fulltime accountant with audit experience 
to audit business license applications on a regular rotation.378  
University City established minimum reserves to cover cyclical shortfalls. Reserve 
funds were adequate in meeting the city’s short-term needs, but additional measures were 
required during economic downturns and for long-term stability. Following the recession 
of 2008, city administrators were accused of including sales tax money in the budget before 
the tax passed and adding employee pension figures to the budget in an attempt to balance 
it. A review of financial records revealed several discrepancies in the accounting figures.379 
In December 2009, University City’s financials received an “acceptable” rating out 
of a rating system of outstanding, acceptable, or unacceptable. While there did not appear 
to be any malicious intent, this did illuminate areas of concern for the professional cities’ 
financial practices. Financial pressures could be overwhelming in professional 
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administrations just as they were in Jennings. Instead of limited financial tools, however, 
creative accounting and complex financing strategies could lead to problems. Flattening or 
declining revenues impact more than just estimates used for setting tax rates.380 
Consider that administrators advised lawmakers on fiscal policy that also affected 
city personnel. Pay and pensions were embedded in figures and estimates. Whether a plan 
was fully funded depended on fiscal strategies. If a city manager boasted, “There is plenty 
of money in the pension fund and it does not require any additional funding,” officials 
believed no additional funding was needed for the fund. When the study cities amended 
contribution levels, set up new investment accounts, or switched plan managers, it was 
usually in accordance with recommendations made by the city manager and finance 
director.381 
Study cities with professional administrations were more adept at securing 
additional funds through special grants and foundations and raising capital through various 
investment strategies. Ferguson leveraged their professional capacity to garner many 
dollars outside the traditional streams of revenue and public funding assistance throughout 
the study period. These skills would be especially important for Ferguson to meet the fiscal 
demands of recovering from the civil unrests in 2014-2015.382 
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While some initial funding was channeled to the suburb from various sources, 
funding levels were not sufficient for the city to make all the needed repairs and 
improvements. According to one official, “A whole lot of money supposedly came to 
Ferguson. However, it did not come through municipal government to work through these 
issues.” The city led a great streets application process and received a planning grant, but 
the total cost of engineering improvements along the West Florissant Avenue corridor was 
estimated to be about $2,000,000 alone.383   
It is unknown how Ferguson will manage the acute change in its economic 
environment. While securing funding was one of Ferguson municipal government’s 
strongest traits throughout the study period, the suburb never faced this type of crisis. Such 
a change would have placed any one of the study group cities in a very compromising 
position.  
Consider that Hazelwood was so successful in securing 50/50 grants from both the 
Missouri Division of Highway Safety and federal matching programs that the city often 
procured police cars with $0 city spending. Throughout the study period, the City of 
Hazelwood practically planned police car purchases around the funding. However, this 
skill would be minimally helpful if Hazelwood were in Ferguson’s end-of-study 
position.384 
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Professional suburbs enjoyed several important advantages over nonprofessional 
suburbs. Professionals managed cities’ daily financial affairs and provided expert 
consultation and recommendations for financial policy making. While there were 
supportive resources which were common among all the cases, and amounts varied 
depending on circumstance, Jennings’ structure exhibited less fiscal management capacity 
to ascertain certain resources and benefits from various financial practices and tools.385 
My examination confirmed that differences in study cities’ institutional structure 
was an indication of cities’ level of professionalism and revealed that study cities’ level of 
professionalism significantly impacted protocols, procedures, and use of best financial 
practices. These differences impacted cities’ financial management, preparedness, and 
capacity. However, institutional structure, financial management, protocols, procedures, 
and use of best financial practices were themselves fiscal policy decisions. They did little 
to account for the fiscal policymaking process. 
Although fiscal policy decisions impacted preparedness and capacity, cities’ 
preparedness and capacity failed to account for fiscal policy. I found that economic 
philosophy was more significant than fiscal structure in fiscal policy decision making. I 
also found that fiscal policy decisions had significant effects on municipal-level economic 
conditions. 
Therefore, municipal governances’ role in municipal-level economic stabilization 
is best revealed through an examination of local governments’ economic philosophy. 
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Economic philosophy was revealed by examining economic environment, municipal-level 
conditions, available tools, and municipal governances’ choices and uses of tools in 
economic development. 
Point of Sale vs. Pool: A Lesson in Economic Philosophy 
 
By 1977, cities like Hazelwood, Jennings, and Maplewood were no longer opposed 
to the county-wide sales tax. The new plan allowed cities to continue receiving their own 
local sales tax or join the population-based distribution pool Ferguson officials advocated 
for years earlier. Cities could decide to join the pool in the future, but once non-pool cities 
joined the pool, they could not go back to collecting their own local sales tax. The local 
sales tax distribution in St. Louis County divided collections into two groups: 1. Group A- 
point-of-sale cities and 2. Group B- pool cities.386 
The pool served to help the municipalities with less commercial activity. However, 
since Group A cities usually contained the major retail centers and they retained all sales 
taxes generated within their borders, the advent of the pool did nothing to mitigate the 
inequitable revenue distribution. According to 1983 distribution figures, Group A cities 
received approximately $115 per capita and Group B cities received approximately $50 
per capita. However, in some cases, Group A cities could receive as much as 400 % more 
per capita than pool cities. If every city participated in the sales tax pool, each city would 
have received about $70 per capita.387 
Resulting allocations allowed Group A cities to enjoy low or no property tax and 
low utility tax rates. Conversely, Group B cities were forced to greatly increase their gross 
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receipts and property tax levels to compensate for the disparity. Unincorporated areas of 
the county became battle grounds as annexation by a point-of-sale city meant the area 
would be subtracted from the sales tax pool. The structure placed pool cities at a great 
disadvantage. Essentially, Group A cities were able to depend on sales tax monies, much 
of which was paid by residents of Group B cities like Ferguson and University City, to 
support services provided to their residents. 
A coalition of pool city officials formed the Fair Share Coalition to call attention to 
the unfairness of the sales tax structure and to lobby for changes in the system. Point-of-
sale cities rebutted arguing they needed all their local sales tax to cover expenses. 
Organized as Cities for Growth, point-of-sale cities argued they incurred additional costs 
connected with the roads and trucks servicing shopping centers and for providing 
additional city services like policing, fire protection, inspections, licensing, and community 
relations. Group B officials claimed this was a distortion as sales tax revenues and costs of 
servicing commercial areas were out of proportion.388 
By 1993, the Fair Share Coalition consisted of 35 members representing more than 
250,000 people. They lobbied state representatives to pass legislation that would make the 
sales tax distribution system fairer. A compromise was reached in April 1993 which 
restructured the sales tax distribution formula. Reformers pushed to add Group A cities to 
the pool on a “hold-harmless” basis and instituting a grandfather clause. Hold-harmless 
proposed including point-of-sale communities in the pool while preventing any loss of 
existing income. Only increases in sales tax income would go into the pool. By enacting a 
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grandfather clause to existing boundaries, annexed areas would retain their pre-annexation 
status.389 
Critics remained unsatisfied with the system and in later years, pool cities like 
Chesterfield would petition to exit the pool. While cities’ status as point-of-sale and pool 
significantly affected fiscal policy decisions, it did not necessarily equate to a causal 
relationship with municipal-level stability. In fact, too much dependence on local sales tax 
threatened some cities’ fiscal health, and efforts to grow the revenue stream often led to 
disproportionate resources dedicated to the category and decisions which compromised the 
quality of residential neighborhoods. 
By the mid-1980s, revenue from tax on sales was far and away the largest source 
of income for the City of Jennings, and officials remained dedicated to protecting the Group 
A and B distribution formula adopted in 1978. According to a 1985 Jennings resolution: 
“The City of Jennings wholeheartedly endorses the philosophy of allowing those 
communities which choose to endure the conveniences and costs of commercial 
developments to reap any benefits generated by those establishments while 
permitting those communities not desiring businesses to continue as bedroom 
communities, provided they fund their own government without jeopardizing the 
rights and operations of others.”390 
 
Five years later, the mature inner suburb entered the decade of the 1990s 
questioning whether the city would be better off becoming a pool city instead. Although 
FY1991 estimates indicated Jennings would lose money by becoming a pool city, continual 
decline in monthly sales tax collections resulted in significantly lower year-end earnings. 
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Jennings council called for an immediate 10 % pay reduction for all city employees and 
scheduled an August election hoping voters would approve a $.34 per $100 assessed 
property tax increase. The council had originally wanted to propose a $.55 increase, but 
ultimately put forth the $.34 proposition.391 
Jennings’ financial situation only worsened as effects of declining revenues further 
highlighted items like unfavorable refuse contracts, personnel disputes, and growing doubt 
that remaining a Group A point-of-sale city was in the suburb’s best interest. In 1995, 
Jennings officials resumed looking into the implications associated with becoming a pool 
city. Officials were advised not to make a change because ongoing litigation involving the 
county’s sales tax pool cities created uncertainty in the future of the sales taxing 
environment in the county.392 
While the point-of-sale fiscal strategy backfired for cities like Jennings’, others 
flourished establishing vibrant and stable sales tax revenue generating operations. These 
Group A cities thrived as strong commercial centers. As point-of-sale cities’ advantage in 
revenue generating capacity grew, so did pool city officials’ resentment of Group A’s 
economic philosophy. Pool city officials felt some point-of-sale leaders behaved as if their 
city was superior to pool cities. According to one official, “We did not think of our 
neighbors as an economic resource. We have other values.”393 
As a pool city, suburbs like University City often clashed with Group A neighbors 
Clayton and Ladue. Disagreements over sales tax beneficiaries drove border wars over 
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street closures, freight truck traffic, and commercial business placement. Since University 
City had to bear the truck traffic and costs of maintaining roads, officials argued cities like 
Ladue should turn over tax revenue to the sales tax pool. One official lamented about Group 
A neighbors, “They were treating University City as their backyard.” Another lawmaker 
referred to attitudes of point-of-sale cities as, “arrogant beyond belief.”394 
Although the University City Loop was a popular shopping district, it was hard to 
compete with the shopping centers and large department stores in nearby Clayton. They 
provided better parking and more alluring attractions. Interviewee U5 recalls, “Clayton was 
booming, big corporations, a lot of high-powered executives, and a lot of money.” 
University City’s Loop revitalization increased retail activity and helped restore the area’s 
attractiveness. However, success of the project was less evident in the boost to the city’s 
financial chest than in the increase in eclectic shops, establishment of a new farmers 
market, and the pedestrian-friendly designs.395 
University City did not contain the bustling commercial activity observed in point-
of-sale cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood, like Jennings, worked to preserve their point-
of-sale status. In fact, Hazelwood officials served as leaders among the advocates who 
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successfully lobbied for the point-of-sale amendment to Missouri’s 1977 county-wide sales 
tax distribution bill. Hazelwood’s experience was different from Jennings’, however. 
Hazelwood enjoyed enormous success as a point-of-sale city. Officials not only reduced 
rates but also opted to eliminate sales tax on utilities.396 
“We had a moral obligation to reduce taxes,” says one Hazelwood policymaker. 
Adding, “We felt we should cut gross receipts tax and then go even further to reduce taxes.” 
By 1994, while Jennings officials were being advised that decline in sales tax revenues 
resulted from a dip in the overall economy, Hazelwood was experiencing a 21 % increase 
in sales tax revenues over only a five-month span. Hazelwood had become a unique hybrid 
city. After annexing unincorporated areas, the suburb now held both Group A point-of-sale 
and Group B pool city membership statuses.397 
Annexations and annexation attempts carried varying implications for cities 
executing the annexation and for neighboring suburbs. Unincorporated St. Louis County 
areas were often surrounded by multiple incorporated cities. Consider that Hazelwood’s 
1991 annexation involved an area surrounded by five different municipalities. While 
Hazelwood officials asserted neither Ferguson, Berkeley, Florissant or Calverton Park 
expressed any interest in incorporating the area, there were instances of conflict.398 
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Hazelwood’s hybrid status is an indication of the city’s economic philosophy, but 
how officials responded to major manufacturing closures, commercial debacles, and 
dormant retail space revealed much more. Suburbs’ economic philosophy was rooted 
solely in self-preservation. Electing to be a point-of-sale city, pool city, or hybrid city by 
way of annexation depended primarily on a suburb’s economic environment. According to 
Interviewee U1, “University City has always been in the sales tax pool because we haven't 
had much economic development.” Fergusons’ abdication of point-of-sale was less about 
achieving equal distribution for all and more about which status meant more revenue for 
their city’s coffers.399 
While it made sense that each study city would exhibit this feature, stark 
distinctions were revealed through Ferguson’s philosophical hypocrisy and self-
destabilizing decisions. By 2015, Ferguson officials were eliminating contracts, 
authorizing a 23 % reduction in staffing across all departments (approximately 32 
employees), reducing salaries across the board by five percent, reducing the employees’ 
health care subsidy by 30 %, and searching for additional cuts to realize savings. The city 
was reeling from recent events which exposed the city to substantial financial stress, and 
the suburb’s point-of-sale status was no longer sustainable.400 
Twenty years after Ferguson officials lobbied against point-of-sale in favor of a 
more equitable sales tax pool system, 1989’s Ferguson officials unanimously authorized 
the city’s exit from the pool to become a point-of-sale city. Twenty-five years later, 
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Ferguson wanted back in the pool. It was never been about more equitable distribution as 
1970’s Ferguson officials claimed. “The reasoning behind becoming a pool city and no 
longer being a point-of-sale city,” a Ferguson administrator explained in 2015, “the 
revenue is greater, and the likelihood of this reversing is very low.”401 
Just as Ferguson’s 1970 economic environment was different from 1989’s, the 
mature inner suburb’s 2015 economic environment was strikingly different from them 
both. By inequitably rezoning, investing, and servicing neighborhoods, the city had 
discarded residential areas in favor of big box retailers and cordoned off sections of the 
city through isolation and neglect. Ferguson was not committed to the principles expressed 
through the city’s 1970 stance against the point-of-sale tax structure and the city’s 
economic philosophy backfired.402 
Ferguson’s 2015 return to the sales tax pool not only signified a full circle back to 
1970 but helped shed more light on the fact that the very change Ferguson hoped to avoid 
in the 1970s, the city’s fiscal philosophy actually helped bring about, and in the worse way. 
The following excerpts from Interview F2 help illuminate Ferguson’s modern-day 
environment: 
“A lot of people were moving out of Ferguson. So, all the taxes and stuff were gone. 
People were just abandoning the city. So, now we had to decide are we going to go 
to a pool city or are we going to stay a point-of-sale city?” 
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“If you look at it from a regional standpoint, Chesterfield basically pulls all of the 
malls and all of the jobs out of north county. So, here I am as a resident; I don’t 
have these resources in my area. I have to go out to these other municipalities to 
shop, to work, do all this other stuff.” 
 
“Then you have the school district that’s suffering as well. So, you don’t have the 
people moving in because the school district is suffering. So, all this is going on, 
but you don’t have that being discussed. How these fit into a larger set if issues. At 
the same time, the government is doing their stuff, and their coming in saying you 
can and cannot do this. The county, the state is coming in, doing their stuff. But we 
have to basically get it right.”403 
 
Maplewood officials warned against adopting a local sales tax in 1970. They 
believed local sales tax hurt businesses and drove more local merchants to relocate. 
Nevertheless, the city put the question to voters and since 1971, Maplewood has been 
generating substantial local sales tax revenues. By 1974, Maplewood’s budget looked 
dramatically different than it did just three years earlier. The addition of public dollars from 
programs like revenue sharing and savings realized from assistance programs combined 
with sales tax revenues to change Maplewood’s economic trajectory, create a revenue 
surplus, and ignited citizen demands for more fiscal accountability and professionalism.404 
Purging of Maplewood City Hall and the transition to professional local 
government further reinforced the mature inner suburb’s preferred position as a point-of-
sale city. As a prominent member of the Cities for Growth group, Maplewood not only 
worked to protect their sales tax revenue interests, they demonstrated how to leverage and 
maximize the tool amid strife and uncertainty. While Fair Share Coalition challenges, court 
battles, and economic downturns threatened Maplewood’s resurgence, the city’s economic 
philosophy never wavered. 
 
403 Excerpts of quotes in Interview F2: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-Public Official. 




Maplewood officials authorized special elections immediately following changes 
in taxing laws and utilized the advent of new taxing authority to establish new sales tax 
revenue streams. Increased revenues allowed for capital improvements, redevelopment of 
the city’s business district, and new developments. The city creatively integrated incentives 
into marketing plans designed to attract businesses which helped to offset the disincentive 
to companies relocating to areas with more local sales taxes.405 
University City voters were promised a $.30 reduction in property tax if they 
approved the half-cent capital improvement tax in a 1996 election. Voters obliged, and the 
city reduced the general fund tax $0.10 and debt service received a $0.20 reduction. 
Economic conditions had been improving in the mature inner suburb since the mid-1980s. 
Property tax rates had dropped below $1.00 in 1989, and University City taxpayers were 
enjoying a tax rate which was over 50 % less than the rate at the start of the 1980s. As the 
new millennium dawned, a five percent increase in revenue and a healthy reserve prompted 
further property tax cuts, wage increases, and loan payoffs.406 
University City was enjoying the benefits of a booming economy. Property tax 
revenues were up from new construction in the late 1990s, there were new revenue sources 
from point-of-sale cities that were now going into the pool, and despite the city’s limited 
commercial activity, robust increases in sales at local retail outlets were occurring. 
 
405 Resolution 93-5: City of Maplewood Missouri archives dated January 26, 1993: Document 479; City of 
Maplewood Missouri archives October 12, 1993: Document 75; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 
February 22, 1994: Document 112, Resolution 94-9A; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 8, 1994: 
Bills 4791 and 4792 in Document 114; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 1995.    
406 Fiscal conditions had improved dramatically in a short period. See archive City of University City, MO 
record of the city’s general fund budget in archive Session 1409: May 12, 1986, page 2; Regular Session 
1440: May 20, 1987, page 4; City of University City, MO Tax figures taken from financial records submitted 
in archive Regular Session 1665: May 13, 1996, page 1; According to financial records in City of University 
City archives Regular Session 1721: May 4, 1998, page 5. See also, Supreme Court ruling, and figures can be 
found in records City of University City, MO Regular Session 1569: May 11, 1992, page 1; Session 1570: May 




Additions of the hybrid cities to the pool meant shopping more in one’s own community 
or other pool cities was no longer the only way Group B cities earned sales tax. As 
Interviewee U2 points out, “We were still going to get the same percentage from the pool, 
but overall it helped lift the pool up.”407 
Despite some periods of spikes in sales tax pool revenues, University City was 
never under the illusion they were built to depend on the sales tax revenue generating 
sphere. Uncertainty in the pool structure, its members, and its continued existence furthered 
highlighted the city’s need to plan for a time when they may have to make the change to 
becoming a point-of-sale city. When asked about this Interviewee U1 responded, “We're 
not looking to have that happen. In fact, were fighting that. But we don't know what will 
happen, and there may come the day when it's gone.”408 
Interviewee U2 believes, “If something like that happened, we get to the point 
where we are putting in more money than we're getting out of the pool or the pool starts to 
implode, we will have that discussion.” However, the suburb demonstrated throughout the 
study that it could not remain debt free for long and experienced notably acute fiscal 
wounds which threatened fiscal health. To maintain their infrastructure, meet operational 
expenses, replace equipment, and keep a sufficient contingency fund, the city may have to 
become more business friendly and more intentional in seeking more economic 
development and redevelopment.409 
 
407 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official. 
408 Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official. 
409 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official; According to 
city’s general fund budget records outlined in City of University City, MO Regular Session 1595: June 7, 1993, 
page 5; Bond issue and reserves figures taken from financial records in archive Regular Session 1618: May 




This issue has ignited heated debate during transitions in local government seats 
and administrative appointments. Two diverging economic philosophies converged at the 
intersection where University City’s status as a bedroom suburb and the city’s fiscal 
dilemma meet. While each study city faced difficult economic environments with growing 
fiscal demands, University City provided the opportunity to examine a suburb which 
remained in the pool since its inception. University City was the only case in which officials 
were truly navigating what a January 2009 Newsweek article termed “the suburban 
challenge.”410 
A significant proportion of University City’s fiscal health remained directly tied to 
the fiscal health of many municipalities in a county that became home to 50 % more 
working poor than St. Louis city. Inner suburbs like University City struggled with many 
of the same challenges as the metro city. “Adoption of Financial Policies,” a piece in the 
Missouri Municipal Review, talked specifically about the need to rethink funding strategies 
that focus mainly on cities. University City leaders may need to increase new developments 
and business activity to protect its fiscal solvency.411 
Nevertheless, the mature inner suburb will always retain its attractiveness as it 
continues to possess important advantages for luring new residents as well as developers. 
Interviewee U4 believes, “With University City, you are addressing a more diverse 
audience. If you're a developer, black money is just as good as white money.” If city 
administrators and officials continue to remain committed to continuing the city’s tradition 
of inclusion and proactively addressing concerns, the city should remain viable.412 
 
410 Reference to Newsweek and Missouri Municipal Review articles in transcript of City of University City 
archive Regular Session: January 26, 2009, pages 6 and 9. 
411 Ibid 




University City weathered severe economic duress without compromising the 
city’s identity. Officials demonstrated trust in the city’s professional administration, and 
the city’s administration delivered quality best practice recommendations which remained 
aligned with the city’s economic philosophy— at least until the city’s economic philosophy 
began to change. Just as economic environments, conditions, and tools evolved, so did 
some economic philosophies. Reversal or reinforcement of each cities’ economic 
philosophy guided economic development decisions throughout the study period. 
Economic Development  
Environments evolved, institutional structures changed, and as officials and 
administrators transitioned, protocols, practices, and philosophies were either altered or 
policymakers and administrators conformed to preexisting norms. Early era decisions 
established study suburbs’ position. Suburbs’ position helped shape their economic 
conditions and stock their economic development toolbox. Just as economic conditions 
differed between suburbs, tools and use of tools varied in degrees of strength and weakness 
as officials tasked with identifying, developing, and diversifying sources of revenue 
selected, levied, and determined frequency of use. 
Economic development should garner new revenues; levies need to be 
administrable, auditable, and acceptable; and sources need to be impactful, cost efficient, 
equitably applicable, reliable, and sustainable. Some suburbs’ overdependence on one 
source of revenue made them susceptible to acute fiscal stress by increasing their 
vulnerability to external economic effects from economic shifts, market fluctuations, and 




underfunded pension plans, and depended on loans and bonds to stay afloat. By the end of 
the study period, conditions ranged from solvent to debt-ridden.413 
Near the end of the study period, in 2014, the City of Hazelwood was the only 
municipality in St. Louis County not levying a residential utility tax. Until 1978, 
Hazelwood levied a utility tax on both residential and non-residential properties. Amid a 
growth boom, officials repealed the tax. Although lawmakers instituted a six percent utility 
tax on non-residential property in 1988, nearly 30 years had passed when officials placed 
a residential utility tax before voters on an August 2014 ballot.414 
Hazelwood boasted low taxes for decades, and its population growth and changes 
in resident demographics separated the city’s economic environment from the other study 
group cities. Even though the city’s average household size decreased from 3.29 to 2.59 
during the early post-fair housing period between 1970 and 1980, total population remained 
relatively stable. And between 1980 and 1990, the city’s population and housing units went 
from 13,098 / 5,119 to 15,324/ 6,848. While Hazelwood’s population had actually declined 
 
413 For bond election results which approved the bond issues see City archives Session 1008: January 17, 
1972, page 11; Hazelwood Addendum 2 minutes of regular council meeting of January 19 1972 Page 1 of 2; 
City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 26 1974 Document 37Abstract of votes cast in special election 
at city of Maplewood St Louis County Missouri held on Tuesday August 20th 1974 proposition 2. University 
City was proposing a bond issue of $1,000,000 for more information regarding the city’s efforts see archives 
Session 1212: March 26, 1979, page 5; City of Maplewood Missouri archives approved May 22, 1979: 
Document 208 resolution number 49; For election results which approved the bond issue see University 
City, MO archives Session 1008: January 17, 1972, page 11; Figures reported in City of University City 
archives Session 1205: December 18, 1978, page 11: ; City of Maplewood, Missouri February 11, 2014: 
Resolution 14-11 Bill 3307 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 3224 -00 on December 20; City of 
Maplewood, Missouri archives August 12 2014; Resolution 14-46A. 
414 A report on comparable communities found six cities with a residential utility tax above six percent, one 
at six percent, and four below six percent. Hazelwood Regular Council Meeting —April 16, 2014 Unfinished 
Business; Hazelwood December 21, 1988 Regular Meeting: BILL 2187 Mayor Robinson explained Bill 2187 
would provide for a utility tax to be levied utility tax to be levied on all non - residential users. Bill 2187 was 
unanimously adopted as Ordinance 2128 -88; and Hazelwood August 15, 1990 Regular Meeting; Hazelwood 
May 30, 1972 Special Council Meeting; Hazelwood June 20, 1979 Regular Meeting. The loss from these 
former sources of revenue amounted to approximately $ 300, 000; Hazelwood January 2, 1985 Regular 




four percent since 1983 (16,178), the suburb was still the only study group city with net 
increase in population.415 
The other study cities operated in economic environments of steadily declining tax 
bases and sharp increases in renter-occupancy. Hazelwood’s path to 1,376 (38 %) 
nonowner-occupied residences by the end of the study period involved more gradual and 
modest increases. Further, Hazelwood did not only stand out from the study group, the 
suburb had few economic peers in St. Louis County. Consider, in 1976, while cities like 
Jennings struggled with an unemployment rate above the national average of 7.8 % and St. 
Louis County’s unemployment rate hovered above six percent, the unemployment rate in 
Hazelwood was 5.75 %.416 
By 2000, the city’s assessed valuation ranked seventh in the county and property 
tax revenues only accounted for seven percent of city income. Hazelwood was home to 
some of the largest manufacturers in the entire region, and the suburb was economically 
diversified. In addition to property taxes, the city derived 33 % of its revenue from sales 
 
415 According to US Census data, NHGIS figures, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session Hazelwood July 23, 
1980; Hazelwood December 17, 1980; Hazelwood November 7, 1984; Hazelwood January 2, 1985; City of 
Hazelwood, Mo archives interoffice memorandum, Review of business license structure August 15,1988 
page 1-2, 4-5, 13 Page 21; and Hazelwood September 5, 1990. 
416 National unemployment rate according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics. County’s rate was used to 
determine eligibility for funding programs. It was figured by subtracting unemployment percentages for 
cities over 50,000 in the state from the unemployment rate in St. Louis County during the base period 
January 1 through March 1, 1976. References (P.L.92-54), archived in City of University City Session 1024: 
August 7, 1972, page 20. Formula and figures taken from records included in archives City of University City, 
MO Regular Session 1153: February 28, 1977, page 14; City of Hazelwood, MO September 15, 1976. See 
also, Hazelwood September 15, 1971; Hazelwood January 19, 1972; Hazelwood February 2, 1972; 
Hazelwood November 1, 1972; Hazelwood Special Session February 25, 1975 Page; Hazelwood April 7, 
1976; Hazelwood May 13, 1976 Special Session; Hazelwood May 27, 1975 Special Session; Hazelwood 




taxes, 28 % from licenses, 11 % from utility tax, and 21 % percent from fees, fines, and 
miscellaneous sources.417 
By study’s end, Hazelwood administrators were preparing a budget which officials 
assumed would not include estimated revenues from Proposition P’s quarter-cent sales tax 
increase. However, voters passed the proposition sending officials a clear message to undue 
the cuts made in city programs, services, and personnel. After the restorations along with 
salary and benefit increases, Hazelwood’s revised budget for FY2016 still projected a 
general revenue surplus and a 26 % reserve. Hazelwood appeared to have stabilized its 
economic conditions.418 
Despite the suburb’s wealth and solidity, Hazelwood did not escape the fiscal strain 
and uncertainty of the 2008 recession. In addition to the foreclosure crisis, county-wide 
sales tax had its lowest return in a decade, and cities were forced to adjust their budget 
downwards for loss in sales tax revenues. Hazelwood was hit from both sides. Already the 
largest portion of the city’s income, sales tax had grown to represent 39 % of Hazelwood’s 
revenue sources by 2008, and property tax accounted for 15 % of city earnings.419 
Although a two percent increase in property tax revenue was most likely reflective 
of recent trends in new construction, it was clear Hazelwood’s position was shifting. The 
suburb had fell from seventh to 12th in total assessed valuation in St. Louis County, and 
derived a disproportionately large percentage of its sales tax revenue from one outlet mall. 
 
417 According to figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 7, 2000. 
Financial records indicated an assessed valuation of $432.9 million; City of Hazelwood, MO May 15, 2000 
Special Meeting. 
418 Figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Council Budget Work Session: April 22, 2015. 
419 According to figures taken from archives Public Hearing City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting 




While figures estimated 85 % of the sales tax generated at the mall came from non-resident 
shoppers, the suburb’s revenue sources had become less diverse.420 
The 2008 economic downturn exposed weaknesses in Hazelwood’s economic 
strength. Revenues had peaked and would only flatten and decline for the foreseeable 
future. By FY2012, Hazelwood was deficit spending. The suburb’s deficit spending 
increased in 2013, and despite a modest decrease in 2014’s deficit spending, the city was 
forced to cut city programs and services. Hazelwood was in a different position, navigating 
unfamiliar economic conditions, and no longer enjoying a large surplus of capital 
improvement funds for improvements and repairs in the commercial and industrial areas.421 
While the 2008 recession attributed to increased fiscal stress for Hazelwood, a 
closer examination revealed decisions made well-before 2008 had increased the city’s 
exposure to economic instability. The events of 2008 only expediated the process. As early 
as 1983, Hazelwood had already become heavily dependent on business license fees 
generated from manufacturers. The suburb’s business tax strategies included complex fee 
structures which were difficult to administer and often ignited legal disputes over double 
taxation related to property, tools and machinery. 
Business license fees accounted for the second largest source of the city’s general 
fund revenue. Combined with point-of-sale local sales tax income, these two streams 
accounted for over 70 % of Hazelwood’s total general revenue. Additionally, by not 
 
420 According to figures taken from archives Public Hearing City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting 
June 4, 2008; City of Hazelwood, MO Hazelwood Budget FY2009 -2010 beginning July 1, 2009 and ending 
June 30, 2010;  
421 See archives City of Hazelwood, MO June 1, 1988: Bill 3307; According to figures taken from City 
Manager’s Report City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 21, 2014; City of Hazelwood, 
MO Regular Council Meeting dated October 1, 2014; According to figures in archives Special Order of 




levying either form of the utility tax, the suburb further concentrated its dependence on 
license fees. Hazelwood officials used the utility tax tool like a zero-property tax. While 
this was an attractive measure, it was far less alluring than zero property taxes and the 
income hit outweighed the benefit. This was best demonstrated in the city’s reinstitution of 
the non-residential form several years later and the resident form in 2014. 
Hazelwood officials were committed to keeping taxes low for residents. However, 
in doing so, officials hedged 70 % of the city’s fiscal health in fees and sales. The strategy 
worked well in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The suburb’s revenues increased with fees 
and sales exhibiting the steadiest growth. Nevertheless, these were not only the largest and 
most important revenue sources for the suburb, they were also the most vulnerable to 
external threats. 
Hazelwood began the study period borrowing money to meet expenses and making 
installment payments to purchase land for parks. As the village transitioned into a 
professionally run city, officials adopted new taxing laws and structured fee agreements 
with businesses. The city grew in population, land, and wealth. As Hazelwood’s success 
increased, so did the number of businesses, business success, and business fees. Companies 
began to challenge the fee structure as they found increases in their contribution to city 
coffers and the pay schedule unacceptable.422 
 
422 Hazelwood January 7, 1970; Hazelwood May 24, 1971 Special Council Session Budget; Hazelwood May 
24, 1971 Special Session Budget; Hazelwood February 4, 1970; Hazelwood November 3, 1971; Hazelwood 
May 30, 1972 Special Council Session Budget; Hazelwood February 16, 1972; Hazelwood December 13, 
1973 Special Council Session Budget; Hazelwood May 8, 1979; Special Meeting Budget; Hazelwood May 20, 
1985; Special Council Session Budget Message; Hazelwood June 18, 1980 Regular Session Budget; 
Hazelwood June 20, 1984 Regular Session 1984 -85 Budget; Hazelwood May 9, 1990 Special Council Session 
Budget; Hazelwood June 6, 1990 Regular Council Session Budget1990 -1991 City Budget; City of Hazelwood 
Mo archives financial records June 30, 1990; Hazelwood October 18, 1995 Regular Session Line of Credit; 




The production expansions and facilities’ upgrades generated enormous sums of 
revenue, attracted scores of residents employed or seeking employment at factories, and 
provided thousands of local jobs. However, these benefits began to be replaced with major 
downsizing, relocations, and closures. The turn of events rendered the suburb’s financial 
projections of annexed areas useless. Although through annexations the city acquired land 
for a community center, parks, and easy access to main arteries, the large empty industrial 
areas, strained relations with neighboring suburbs, and boundary commission battles 
flipped the acquisitions from benefits to detriments and liabilities.423 
By 1995, Hazelwood had become the fifth most populous city in St. Louis County 
with 26,829 residents. The suburb had maximized tools like industrial development bonds 
and TIF. Nevertheless, the city was borrowing money and requesting payment extensions 
on lines of credit in lieu of the city’s receipt of business licence revenues. Just five years 
earlier, Hazelwood was still enjoying steadily rising revenues and low bonded 
indebtedness. New economic considerations tempered the suburb’s optimism borne of 
consecutive decades of growth and stability. Early decisions established an 
 
423 Hazelwood May 24, 1971; Hazelwood March 9, 1972; Hazelwood March 6, 1974: Bill 1059 was 
unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1027 - 74 on March 6, 1974; Hazelwood June 5, 1974: Proposition No. 
1 City votes Yes 422 No – 63; Hazelwood November 15, 1978 Regular Session Annexation Petition 7456; 
Hazelwood February 27, 1979 Special Session Annexation Proposal; Hazelwood May 21, 1979 Regular 
Session; Hazelwood Regular Session Annexation; City of Hazelwood, MO June 6, 1979: Election returns for 
the June 5th annexation election, 364 votes in favor of annexation and 86 against. In the area outside the 
City, 66 votes for to116 against. Proposition required a simple majority in both the unincorporated and 
incorporated areas; Hazelwood June 20, 1979 Regular Meeting; Hazelwood January 15, 1981Special 
Session; Hazelwood April 6, 1983 Regular Session Election Results held on Tuesday, April 5: passed by a vote 
of 1, 489 for and 345 against, 16 acre tract annexation; Hazelwood February 20, 1985 Regular Session 
Boundary Commission: Resolution 8502; Hazelwood May 2, 1990: Bill 2307 was unanimously adopted as 
Ordinance 2246 -90City of Hazelwood, MO November 20, 1991; Hazelwood May 6, 1992; Hazelwood 
November 18, 1992 League Meeting; Hazelwood May 4 1993 Public Hearings, Annexation Invalidation: 
Missouri Supreme Court ruling which invalidated Hazelwood' s annexation was signed May 4; Hazelwood 
February 7, 1990; Hazelwood April 4, 1990 Regular Session Annexation; Hazelwood June 7, 1995 Population 




overdependence on sales and fees and resulted in mid-1990s fiscal stress. However, it may 
have been for the best.424 
By the time the 2008 recession hit, Hazelwood had endured their first economically 
challenging decade of the study period. Spared the fiscal destruction of early post-fair 
housing era economic conditions, the suburb had little experience with acute declines in 
revenues. The exit of major manufactures during the latter half of the era, however, forced 
the city to rethink their economic model and adjust. While the city could not be expected 
to totally revamp, there were concerted efforts to better diversify streams. Economic 
development plans now focused more on business parks, commerce centers, hospitality 
and services, and recreation and entertainment.425 
University City officials worked throughout the study period to retain existing 
commercial businesses, generate more commercial activity, and attract new commercial 
investment. Officials aimed to increase the utilization of local businesses and increase the 
city’s economic competitiveness. Strategies included marketing and promoting the city’s 
resurgence, conducting code enforcement information analyses, and evaluating areas for 
redevelopment. The city contracted consultants to provide in-depth reviews of existing 
retail and other commercial facilities to better assess existing businesses and their 
accessibility to neighborhoods throughout the city.426 
 
424 See City of Hazelwood, MO March 3, 1980 Regular Session threat of General Motors Plant Move; City of 
Hazelwood, Mo archives interoffice memorandum, Review of business license structure August 15,1988 
page 1-2, 4-5, and 13; Hazelwood August 25, 1988 Special Meeting; Hazelwood April 15, 1992 REGULAR 
MEETING Resolution 9202 was unanimously adopted on April 15, 1992; City of Hazelwood, MO January 15, 
1994 Special Meeting; 
425 See archives City of Hazelwood, MO June 1, 1988: Bill 3307; According to figures in archives Special Order 
of Business City Hazelwood Council Budget Work Session May 6, 2013; According to figures taken from City 
Manager’s Report City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 21, 2014; City of Hazelwood, 
MO Regular Council Meeting dated October 1, 2014; 
426 See financial figures listed in City of University City, MO archives Regular Session 1135: June 7, 1976, 




University City’s approach to economic development projects involved three 
different type of processes: 1. Formal, 2. Informal, and 3. Quasi Formal. The city’s formal 
process included strategic planning sessions with policymakers, contracted consultants, 
and administrators such as city manager and directors of planning and finance. Boards, 
focus groups, and public hearings were convened to elicit citizen input. Requests for 
proposals were rarely issued in advance as officials usually identified potential developers 
through the informal process. 
Inviting developers to meet informally and submit proposals was customary 
behavior. No written rule governed the activities, and businesspersons often approached 
the city unsolicited or circumvented boards and commissions review processes. The 
informal process often resulted in an imbalance in information and background. 
Policymakers and administrators, through which the project made entry onto the agenda, 
were usually well-informed and very much in support of the project while others were 
skeptical. This challenged continuity in making development decisions. 
Quasi formal processes included staff involvement and boards and commissions 
reviews. However, policymakers were seldom aware of critical details related to how these 
groups arrived at their decisions to recommend approval or denial. While administrative 
supervisors could elaborate on staff roles and involvement, information from boards and 
commissions was not as readily available. Boards and commissions were comprised of 
non-city employed citizens, and although councilmember and citizen liaisons served as the 
 
7115 passed as Ordinance Number 4964. Refer to archives Special Session 1123: January 23rd, 1976, page 
1. For more information regarding the firefighter’s petition see City of University City archives Session 1032: 




go between, there was no rule or official process for taking meeting minutes or forwarding 
information to the council or administrators. 
When revenue figures and finance department’s estimated projections began 
exhibiting substantial discrepancies in the late 1970s, officials assumed the lower than 
anticipated revenues were attributable to lower property assessments. However, a 
proliferation of tax-exempt properties within the municipality’s borders had resulted in a 
significant number of properties being removed from the tax rolls. The suburb had always 
been home to many churches and other nonprofits delivering services to residents, but most 
organizations usually leased space and buildings. Only nonprofit-owned properties were 
removed from the tax rolls. 
University City had become “saturated with nonprofits,” and some officials 
believed the suburb was a “target for tax-exempt operations.” City officials assessed the 
situation and determined conditions warranted a new economic development strategy. In 
1977, the city created a municipal officer position to monitor commercial and industrial 
development and assist those looking for properties to redevelop. Officials authorized the 
formation of an industrial development corporation in May of 1979. In October 1980, 
University City established the special business district commission and began designating 
special business districts.427 
Special business districts permitted the city to levy a tax for exclusive use in 
improving taxed areas. Officials also applied an additional 50 % fee to merchants’ business 
licenses for the same purpose. By 1984, the tool had generated enough revenue that the 
 
427 The formation of the IDA marked a pivotal change in the city’s development practices. For more 
information regarding the IDA see archive Regular Session 1215: May 7, 1979, page 8, 10. See also, 
development specs taken from Regular Session 1108: July 14th, 1975, page 7-8; City of University City, MO 




city was able to begin making small loans to district merchants. Officials then began 
phasing out the city’s department of human resources and established a public affairs 
department.428 
By the mid-1980s, attitudes regarding economic development had shifted, and the 
practice of contracting outside firms “equated to buying advertising.” To initiate and 
sustain substantive economic development activity, the city needed in-house personnel 
dedicated to the category. Utilizing economic development staff instead of consultants 
granted administrators and officials better access to ongoing activities. The implementation 
of the public affairs department expanded the city’s capacity for economic development by 
cultivating relationships, project plans, and proposals. Nevertheless, developer interest 
remained lower than desired. 
University City had long been credited as being a self-starter, but “It’s difficult to 
develop when the city is landlocked.” University City projects were often delayed awaiting 
interest from developers. Early period University City officials had remained reluctant to 
turn to tax incentives to attract developers and to finance projects. Local lawmakers 
believed, “The city should be very careful in matters concerning TIFs and tax abatement.” 
Officials remained confident, “The city could secure a developer of land without offering 
any tax incentives.”429 
 
428 Loan conditions taken from application information outlined in archive City of University City, MO 
Regular Session 1365: July 9, 1984, page 10; Discussion and passage of Ordinance 6050 can be found in City 
of University City archive Regular Session 1658: January 22, 1996, page 3: The city also established the 
Parkview Gardens Special Taxing District. 
429 Excerpts of quotes taken from City of University City, MO archives: For more information regarding the 
Cunningham Park development see the following archives: Session 1184: April 10, 1978, page 1-2, 5; Session 
988 April 5th, 1971, page 14; and Session 1060: November 19, 1973, page 12.For more information 
regarding the Berger project see City of University City archives Regular Session 1101: May 19, 1975; and 




The mature inner suburb had no shortage of blighted areas that easily qualified for 
TIF, and University City officials’ unwillingness to authorize tax incentives drew harsh 
criticism both internally and externally. It was common for TIF requests to involve areas 
where several municipalities shared boundaries. Such occasions mandated developers 
secure approval from each jurisdiction. Refusals sparked contentious battles and pitted the 
suburb against county, state, and federal elected representatives, private developers, and 
neighboring municipalities.430 
During the city’s 1986 comprehensive planning process, however, city officials 
began to exhibit more favorable attitudes and views regarding the use of TIF. Although 
most citizen input was not as supportive, property owners and most business owners were 
onboard. Officials determined the increased interest from the business community 
warranted instituting TIF districts. Additionally, results from a 1989 market study 
confirmed that level of developer interest in University City was contingent upon the use 
of TIF.431 
University City established a TIF commission to field requests, manage accounts, 
and make recommendations. Interviewee U2 explains:  
“We needed to bring some economic stability to University City. If you don't have 
a good healthy economy, you can't do anything. We needed to have money to be 
able to do these things and we needed to have a good economy to help stabilize 
neighborhoods. So, we started looking at TIF when a developer came to us and said 
I would like to put in a development in this area.”432 
 
 
430 The city’s actions related to the county’s plan can be furthered explored in archive Session 1070: April 8, 
1974, page 9-10. Figure of families served taken from archive Session 1178: January 9, 1978, page 7. 
431 See results in Harland Bartholomew market study archive Regular Session 1460: February 8, 1988, page 
14.  




Officials set a use policy that TIF would only be considered to assist in new 
development and rehabilitation of blighted properties with extraordinary costs. Projects 
were required to conform to objectives outlined in the city’s comprehensive plan and 
demonstrate substantial tax revenue for the city and schools during the subsidy period and 
result in major increases at the conclusion of the subsidy. Projects also had to provide jobs 
for University City citizens. Eminent domain could only be employed when it was 
necessary to complete projects in or immediately adjacent to designated redevelopment 
areas listed in the comprehensive plan. 
Traditionally, University City officials discouraged the use of TIF. However, by 
the second half of the study period, evolving attitudes were affecting change in University 
City’s position, toolbox, and decision-making. The early post-fair housing era shift in 
University City’s fiscal health highlighted vulnerabilities in the bedroom community 
model and created an environment of less resistance to divergent economic philosophies 
and provided more opportunities for more business-centric ideologies to be politically 
represented, acquire more policy impact, and affect change in the suburbs’ economic 
development strategy. 
Economic ideological disagreement reintroduced University City’s government 
and its citizenry to a level of divisiveness not experienced since the 1960s. Some city 
officials and citizens accused officials of using TIF to bribe large merchants to relocate 
into the city, and opponents claimed major commercial retailers put smaller stores out of 
business. “The TIF is corporate welfare,” exclaimed one former official. “They basically 




power.” Lack of continuity in processes and approach further exacerbated disunity in the 
city’s economic development strategy.433 
University City’s TIF commission was often inactive and unaware of the city’s 
economic development goals and objectives, and city officials were unclear of the 
commission’s role in economic development strategy and execution. Some officials 
believed the TIF commission presented a “roadblock” to progress, and it was common for 
the economic development board and TIF commission to engage in activities which were 
not aligned with the council’s philosophy— some of which increased expenses for the city 
and delayed activities.434 
While business growth did occur along the city’s popular southern strip, projects 
were realized despite no special planning and minimal public financing. Further, there was 
little economic development occurring in other areas of the city as projects were 
concentrated in the popular district. According to Interviewee U2:  
“Young people have nowhere to go to spend their daily dollars. When they need to 
go to the grocery store or go buy stuff, they go to Maplewood, to Walmart, or to 
Target, Richmond Heights, and spend their money. That money is not in the pool. 
I want people to stay in University City and spend their daily dollars.”435 
 
University City decision makers continued to push for more use of tax abatements 
and TIF and began advocating for the use of the Maplewood method of economic 
development to spur activity in the other areas. The Maplewood model included aggressive 
and multilayered measures of attracting businesses and investment. Like University City’s 
public affairs department, Maplewood established a community development department, 
 
433 Excerpt from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official. 
434 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of council discussion regarding TIF commission in archive Session 





hired staff, and assigned personnel to contact developers and specific businesses. Personnel 
initiated contact, cultivated relationships, and promoted the city’s attractiveness. 
Maplewood’s model, however, included incentives for businesses to relocate, 
initiate, or expand operations in the city. Maplewood’s pitch included business loans, 
grants, and access to specialists and brokers who assisted in identifying location, securing 
agreements, and completing requirements. University City officials felt the revival in 
Maplewood could be copied in their city. With a pro-business mission and the right sales 
broker, they believed they could develop a larger commercial retail base and stand as a 
point-of-sale city should the time come. 
Although the Maplewood model has been lauded for its walkability, small eclectic 
shops, and annual events promoting the main street business district, many disagree with 
other elements of Maplewood’s economic development strategy. Interviewee U2 points 
out:  
“When we do redevelopment, we don't just say ok bring us big box development 
projects. We say we want to do something that's really going to help people and get 
better jobs for the people that live over there.”  
 
Conversely, “I don't view this as gentrification,” exclaims Interviewee U1. “I view 
this as an opportunity to get some better prices to shop in places.”436 
 
University City’s economic ideological debate continued through to the end of the 
study period. Some officials still aligned with the city’s early period view of tax abatements 
and TIF and preferred financial assistance sources such as special business districts (extra 
property tax and license fee), neighborhood improvement districts (special assessment / 
property tax), and transportation improvement districts (added sales tax). Additionally, 
 
436 Excerpts from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official; and Interview 




where permitted by law, officials advocated obtaining tax credits and lower interests 
financing at no cost to the city. Other officials stood firm in the position that the only way 
to generate any substantial activity was TIF. 
Meanwhile, the “forgotten corridor” and international district of the city became 
home to payday/title loan establishments, rent to own, and DWI traffic clinics. Officials 
were responsible for issuing business licenses and despite their expressed belief in the need 
to limit such operations, they continued to flourish. Although a joint redevelopment 
agreement between University City and the City of Olivette instituted plans limiting certain 
types of businesses moving forward, prohibition of car washes, resale thrift shops, tattoo 
parlors, drive-through food chains, and short-term lenders did not extend restrictions into 
much of the city’s own part of Olive.437 
As the study period neared the end, University City had multiple special business 
taxing districts, TIF districts, and scores of TIF-assisted properties. One TIF district alone 
contained nine undeveloped properties and four LCRA-owned properties. One TIF district 
had no money, a TIF district owed the city approximately $1,000,000, and assets of TIF 
districts were in the process of being transferred to the city.438 
 
437 Resolution 2010-15 was just one measure put forth by the council to address the Olive/I-170 corridor 
issue. See also: Regular Council Session: August 30, 2010, page 5; Regular Session: March 4, 2011, page 6; 
Regular Council Session: January 23, 2012, page 2; Regular Council Session: January 23, 2012, page 10-11; 
and Regular Session: December 13, 2010, page 3. University City and the City of Olivette had established 
the joint redevelopment task force (JRTF) in May 2009 to explore redevelopment opportunities and joint 
initiatives in the Olive Blvd. corridor on the east and west side of the intersection with I-170. On August 30, 
2010, the council passed resolution 2010-15 authorizing the preparation of a joint development zoning 
overlay district (JDO) for the Olive / I-170 area. See figures in City of University City transcript of agreement 
recorded in archive Regular Council Session: March 12, 2012, page 3. See also: Council Study Session: 
September 10, 2012. 





Other than some private investment and public-private partnership success in the 
city’s Loop district, University City officials struggled to spur economic activity in other 
areas of the suburb. The city’s Olive area was still not conducive to pedestrian shoppers 
and was plagued with vacant store fronts, poor street lighting, and the state-owned road 
lacked adequate maintenance, landscaping, and designs. Officials leveraged various tools 
to attract developers but ultimately only managed to improve some facades, signage, and 
landscaping.439 
Several successful redevelopments resulted in a warehouse and business park, and 
entry of several large commercial retailers into the city. However, use of highly 
controversial financing tools such as tax abatements and TIF further divided the city and 
complicated its economic development process. Since attaining consensus became much 
harder, the city’s projects received less support, tended to be less beneficial for the city, 
and were often delayed or abandoned. This has resulted in perpetual periods of economic 
bliss routinely interrupted by increased fiscal stress. 
In 2000, University City was deriving 30 % of its revenues from sales taxes, 20 % 
from utilities tax, 10 % from property taxes, 40 % from refuse collection and miscellaneous 
sources, and the suburb had six million dollars in reserves. A decade later, according to 
one University City official quoted in a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article, “City finances were 
 
439 See record of resolution, and transcripts included in City of University City archives Regular Session 1656: 
December 11, 1995, page 5; In 20 years, the Loop Special Business District had grown from a request to 
self-tax to a well-organized and productive operation;  and Loop Trolley’s inception in 1997, the council 
supported the vintage trolley line. By January 2012, the Federal Transit Administration had approved urban 
circulator funds and the $24.99 million project was in its final stage of design University City, MO Session 
1760: June 21, 1999, page 8. Development specs and tax abatement details outlined in City of University 
City archive Regular Session 1416: July 7, 1986, page 5. University city was one of five cities around the 
nation awarded a grant. Figure taken from transcript of Loop Trolley presentation in archive Regular Council 
Session: September 10, 2012, page 22. Figure taken from Loop Trolley discussion in archive Regular Council 




in abysmal shape.” Findings in citizens’ petition-initiated Missouri State Auditor, city's 
annual audit, and independent financial consultant examinations confirmed the assertion 
by attributing a number of issues to poor financial management.440 
The consultant's report alone included 47 recommendations for improving the city’s 
finance department. University City had 22 different bank accounts that were accruing 
thousands of dollars in bank fees, clerks were adjusting customer bills without receiving 
prior approval, and financial records were disorganized which caused the city to incur 
additional charges for extra accounting during audits conducted by private firms. Amid 
financial strife, the wedge that had previously been serving as an economic ideological 
partition matured into a bitterly divisive tool used to identify, call out, and attack 
opponents.441 
Vitriolic infighting within local government was intensified by watchdog groups 
and citizens accusing officials of conflicts of interest and sunshine law violations and 
demanding more transparency. A Post-Dispatch editorial referred to what was happening 
as “[U City] shenanigans.” A longtime city employee described city hall as, “A hostile 
work environment.” Another lamented, “There was a lack of respect, common courtesy, 
and professionalism; [the environment] was one of distrust, suspicion, and oppression.”442 
 
440 Bott, Celeste. “University City Mayor Shelley Welsch Will Not Seek a Third Term.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
January 15, 2018. (https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/university-city-mayor-shelley-
welsch-will-not-seek-a-third/article_881b34ed-2ba0-5c91-8b29-8921c344bd2a.html. accessed 
07/25/2018, 12:30pm). 
441 Figure taken from transcript of City of University City archive Regular Council Session: September 10, 
2012, page 20. See also: Regular Session: August 9, 2010, page 3. See also, Figures taken from budget line 
item recorded in archive Regular Council Session: February 27, 2012.   
442 Resolution 2011-5 was a reprimand of one of the councilmembers for inappropriate behavior during a 
council meeting. This event garnered regional media attention. Refer to archive Regular Council Session: 
February 28, 2011, page 11.For more information regarding the allegations and others, refer to the 
following archives: Regular Meeting: November 8, 2010, page 8; Regular Council Session: February 13, 2012, 
page 3; and Regular Session: December 9, 2011, page 9; Excerpts of a quotes from an article referenced in 




Interestingly enough, the apex of University City’s economic ideological divide 
and the city’s dissent into civility deficiency coincided with the hiring of the mature inner 
suburb’s first black city manager. Notwithstanding, most observers attributed tensions to, 
“The warp speed with which changes were occurring within city government.” A 
reorganization of the city’s finance department and cuts in personnel and spending 
produced a balanced budget by FY2012. Interviewee U3 said, “One of my proudest 
achievements was with members of the council and our former city manager. We were able 
to put [U City] on a stable path.”443 
University City’s 2012 comprehensive financial report showed that the city’s assets 
exceeded its liabilities by approximately $74 million— a two-million dollar increase from 
the previous year. By the end of the study period, however, the city needed to levy two new 
special tax funds as 69 % of voters said no to two bond issues, and the city’s FY2016 
budget estimated only a $60,000 difference in revenue over expenditures. Interviewee U3 
commented on the city’s economic future adding, “I am concerned our outlook financially 
is not good.”444 
 
political atmosphere during this time, refer to the following archives: Regular Council Session: July 14, 2014, 
pages 18 and 22; and Regular Council Session: November 26, 2012, page 20. See also, Missouri Sunshine 
Laws outlines legalities in operations and public communications for government units in the state. See 
Regular Council Session: August 30, 2010, page 10; and Regular Session: April 22, 2010 page 2-3. 
443 Excerpt from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official; Reference 
to quote in transcript of archive Regular Council Session: August 30, 2010, page 6; According to City of 
University City budget reports submitted into record n archive Council Study Session: April 9, 2012, page 1. 
See also: Regular Session: October 18, 2010, page 15; Figure taken from budget line item recorded in archive 
Regular Session: April 12, 2010, page 3. See also: Regular Council Session: June 13, 2011, page 9-10.  
444 According to financial records submitted in City of University City archive City Council Study Session: 
December 16, 2012, page 1. Figures taken from record of general fund budget in archive Regular Council 
Meeting: June 23, 2015; According to the plan outlined in archive Regular Council Meeting: May 11, 2015, 
page 3. See also, according to financial records submitted in City of University City archive City Council Study 
Session: December 16, 2012, page 1. See also: Regular Council Meeting: April 11, 2011, page 2; Election 
results taken from City of University City archive Regular Council Meeting: June 23, 2015, page 15; Excerpt 




University City was established as a residential community and the suburb’s 
strength remains its residential offerings. However, this strength also serves as a liability 
for the city as revenue is vulnerable to acute changes in the housing market and officials 
are limited by law in terms of how high they can increase the property tax. Officials are 
dependent on property owners approving property tax rate hikes that exceed the maximize 
allowed rate. This increases the city’s vulnerability, decreases municipal government’s 
fiscal tool options, and further highlights the need for the city to improve its economic 
development strategy. 
While the divide among divergent economic development philosophies in 
University City centered on the use of TIF to attract developers, mature inner suburbs like 
Maplewood were leveraging the tool to become one the largest retail shopping areas in the 
region. Maplewood first began using TIF as a central tool in its economic development 
strategy in 1990, and a decade later, officials feared changes to TIF standards could 
eliminate TIF from communities who could take advantage of the established standards of 
blight.445 
In early 2000, proposed limits to the statewide availability of TIF were designed to 
end abuse of the “but for” rule which required reasonable justification for officials claiming 
developments would not take place without TIF. By redefining the term “blighted” to 
include some measurable, unambiguous standards, framers aimed to prevent the funneling 
of taxpayer money into private development in places that did not exhibited characteristics 
like derelict properties, loss of population, pervasive poverty, and unemployment. 
 
445 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 12, 2007; Taken from record of Tax Increment Financing 
documents included in archive Session 1800: January 8, 2001, page 2-3. According to City of University City 




Economic benefits from TIF were to be area-wide and limited to expenses that would not 
be covered by private investment without this kind of assistance.446 
Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective and controversial as 
the city received many responses from business and developers ready to take the city up 
on offers. Critics challenged the city’s TIFs, and courts interpreted the legalities. While the 
suburb’s business grants and loans program was popular among smaller merchants, large 
corporations wanted TIF. Controversy ensued regarding Maplewood’s 2002 agreement 
with Walmart when developers expressed the development would not require the $34 
million TIF originally requested.447 
Walmart had not undertaken a project in the St. Louis area without the use of TIF, 
and the question arose, “If Walmart could construct a store in Maplewood without the use 
of TIF funds, should all the other Walmart projects in the area have been granted TIF?” 
Competing developers threatened Maplewood officials with possible legal action against 
the city and warned if the Walmart developers did the project without TIF, the development 
would not be feasible and could be closed in a few years. However, threats were ineffective 
as Maplewood had spent the first 30 years of the period stocking its economic development 
toolbox for moments like this.448 
Just a little over a decade earlier, Maplewood had lost a large sales tax revenue 
generator in Kmart, and abandonment and deterioration of several defunct factories had 
left a 62-acre cavity in the suburb’s landscape. Maplewood, not yet in the attractive position 
it would assume in the last decade of the period, was desperately trying to get the area 
 
446 Record of Tax Increment Financing documents included in archive Session 1800: January 8, 2001, page 
2-3. According to City of University City archive Session 1773: January 24, 2000, page 10. 
447 City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 8, 2002.   




redeveloped and secure a new tenant. Officials authorized the hiring of a consultant to 
assist the city in finding a tenant to occupy the old Kmart building.449 
Maplewood designated both sites TIF redevelopment project areas, established 
boundaries, and began inviting developers to take advantage of TIF to redevelop land and 
properties in the designated areas. Execution of redevelopment contracts, management 
agreements, and construction soon followed. Maplewood’s position had not changed since 
the early post-fair housing era. In fact, in replacing Kmart after the retailer’s exit from the 
city in 1990, officials only needed to revisit Kmart’s entry into the city 16 years earlier.450 
In 1974, although the municipality was not yet a professionally governed city, 
Maplewood’s economic philosophy and economic development strategy was already 
embedded. After meeting with developers and property owners regarding the Kmart 
development, officials still had one unanswered question: “How can it be financed?” 
Usually, the process involved large commercial retailers and a construction company, 
which serve as the developer, purchasing, developing, and leasing the property to the 
retailer.451 
Before the retail business would commit to a lease, specific requirements for 
buildings, total land space, and large parking area had to be met. Parking is critical to large 
 
449 City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 12 1990 document number 222; City of Maplewood Missouri 
archives May 27 1997: bill number 4942; bill number 4599 approved as ordinance number 4454  authorizing 
and directory the issuance and delivery of tax increment finance note; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 
November 13 1990 document number 247; City of Maplewood archives hello May 28  1991 document 
number 279 -280: Bill number 4639 an ordinance amending ordinance number 4476 authorizing indirect 
during the issuance and delivery of the tax increment financing notes; dated March 14 1997 approved as 
ordinance number 4774 . City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 8, 1997: bill number 4932 
450 Ibid 
451 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Maplewood Missouri archives Special Session 
September 27, 1974: Documents 65-66. See also, City of Maplewood archives Document 23 1971; City of 
Maplewood archives September 28, 1979: Document number 273-274; City of Maplewood Missouri 
archives April 10, 1981 approved April 28, 1981: Document 448, Resolution 60; City of Maplewood Missouri 




retailers’ business success. Ironically, parking was also one of Maplewood’s top priorities. 
Early era officials identified lack of parking in the city’s business district as a major 
inhibitor to competing with fellow retail sales tax revenue-oriented suburbs like 
Crestwood. As part of the development, officials required the Kmart project developer to 
include a large parking facility for its downtown business. 
This created a dilemma for the developer, however. To secure financing from a 
lender, the developer had to demonstrate the project was feasible and profitable. This model 
required the developer to meet the Kmart parking requirements, which were substantial, as 
well as provide additional parking according to the city’s specifications. Statutes prohibited 
a leasing arrangement between the developer and the city. Therefore, the only incentive for 
the developer to provide the additional parking was the original one— leasing to Kmart.  
Maplewood got the extra public parking for its downtown business district in the 
form of a two-level parking deck under the Kmart building. Consider that the ground 
underneath the property was owned by the city, and Maplewood leveraged that ground and 
the developer’s desire to execute the development to expand the city’s parking options and 
strengthened its downtown. Maplewood accomplished something that was unheard of at 
the time and would serve as a model upon which other cities around the country based their 
development negotiations.452 
Maplewood’s victory did not come without notable costs, however. Developers 
wanted certain areas containing residential properties rezoned commercial and wanted the 
city to secure and retain ownership of the land. Nevertheless, officials were pleased with 
the deal. They had successfully secured a large sales tax revenue generator and even if 
 
452 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives Special Session September 27, 1974: Documents 65 -66; and 




Kmart closed, they still would have a public parking garage for the business district. 
Conversely, the city’s rezoning of residential areas proved problematic.453 
In addition to rezoning single-family residential to commercial, officials rezoned 
old historic properties from residential to heavy industrial districts. As expected, citizens 
opposed these decisions and petitioned the council to reconsider rezoning these areas. 
However, a closer examination of the issue revealed other pertinent elements to consider. 
The city’s decision to rezone these areas for business purposes was not only problematic 
because it sacrificed the character of neighborhoods, but it did nothing to address the 
problems facing the struggling district.454 
Unless Maplewood addressed issues of abandonment, obsolescence, and 
deterioration in the city’s business district, benefits of the new garage would be minimal. 
Many stores had closed, and if the trend of decline in the district continued, businesses 
would continue to exit, and buildings could remain vacant for some time. Up to that point, 
the city’s focus was to provide ample free parking to attract more shoppers to the area. The 
city’s planning and zoning commission had identified parking as the top priority in efforts 
to save the central business district from further deterioration.455 
With the goal of expanded parking achieved, the city needed to focus its attention 
on revitalizing the existing business district and making substantial improvements to the 
city’s infrastructure to help drive traffic to the area. Bridges needed replaced, streets needed 
new paving and signage, and intersections needed synchronized light signals. The city’s 
 
453 Ibid 
454 City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 1974: Bill 3820 and 3821 approved and became Ordinance 
number 3736; and City of Maplewood, Missouri archives approved May 30, 1974: Document 493. 
455 City of Maplewood Missouri archive approved August 13, 1973; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 




budget could not support these projects through recurring income and there was no 
significant nonrecurring capital anticipated. Maplewood began applying for public 
assistance, and with funds from the Missouri’s Office of Community Affairs, paid for a 
housing inventory and streets needs study.456 
To increase accessibility to the business district for shoppers using public transit, 
Maplewood officials petitioned the Bi-State Development Agency to relinquish right-of-
way on properties at the bus loop, allocated funds for construction costs, and installed two 
passenger shelters. By the time Maplewood adopted its charter and professionalized its 
local government, in 1978, the mature inner suburb had laid the groundwork for a 
resurgence. All that was needed was a replenishing of resources, acquiring of new tools, 
and effective use of tools.457 
Maplewood’s first economic development decisions as a charter city established a 
land clearance and redevelopment authority, declared a substantial portion of the city’s 
land mass to be blighted, and designated the area a redevelopment zone. Bounded by the 
city’s eastern city limits shared with the City of St. Louis and the centrally located major 
north-south artery, the redevelopment zone was subject to the convenience and necessity 
of the Maplewood Development Corporation (MDC).458 
Through a contract agreement with the City of Maplewood, the MDC possessed 
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, establish land use restrictions for certain 
 
456 City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 13, 1973: Documents 258 and 259; City of Maplewood 
Missouri Archive November 26, 1973: Document 374; City of Maplewood Missouri archives Approved 
December 10, 1973: Document 377. Resolution number 140, 1973. 
457 City of Maplewood Missouri archives July 14, 1975; See also, Maplewood 2003: The city established the 
boundaries for the Manchester road transportation development district TDD included joint representation 
on a TDD board to determine how monies are allocated for the district and approve the development plan 
of the Maplewood South Redevelopment Corporation. 




property, and carry out other relevant activities outlined in the redevelopment plan. The 
city made the next major addition to its economic development toolbox, in 1980, when 
officials authorized an agreement with St. Louis County’s industrial development authority 
to finance the cost of an industrial development project. The partnership with the county 
allowed the city to leverage a financing tool which had not yet been added to its economic 
development toolbox.459 
By 1981, Maplewood officials agreed that solely hiring economic development 
consultants was no longer meeting the city’s needs. To address this deficiency, officials 
instructed the city manager to appoint an economic development director. The original 
appointment involved a reassignment of internal personnel and was voted down by the 
council. A year later, officials approved the appointment of the same internal personnel as 
an officer in the department. The rejection a year earlier and the filling of the director’s 
role with a new hire demonstrated officials’ desire to add new viewpoints, ideas, and 
capacity to the city’s economic development strategy.460 
The era of a bustling, self-sustaining central business district requiring only the 
basic services of local government had passed for Maplewood. For the mature inner suburb 
to have any real chance of rebounding and achieving vibrancy and longevity, Maplewood 
officials had to adjust the city’s historical approach to economic development. Planning, 
setting goals, and working with the remaining businesses would not be enough to save the 
district. The city needed to build on the success of landing the major retailer and parking 
garage in the previous decade. 
 
459 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1978: Document 82, Resolution No. 67; and Year 1980, Resolution 
No. 32. 
460 Resolution 136- 1981 in City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1981: Document 2; and City of Maplewood 




The Kmart deal came about as a result of the developer approaching the city. 
However, Maplewood did not have the luxury of waiting for developers to express interest 
in developing in the redevelopment zone. Officials needed to take an active role in 
promoting the area, recruiting developers and businesses, and leveraging economic 
development tools to incentivize projects and increase interest. Maplewood officials 
decided to amend the city’s approach to economic development by first establishing the 
central business district’s new image. 
Involving local business, the local chamber of commerce, and other community 
stakeholders, the city established the Maplewood Community Betterment Foundation and 
developed a revitalization plan for the central business district which included detailed 
goals and specifications for the desired image of the area. The group, along with city 
personnel, began promoting Maplewood to the types of businesses identified as aligning 
with the preferred image detailed in the plan. In anticipation of new types of businesses 
and to ensure compatibility, officials began adjusting zoning codes and exploring 
relocation options with existing stores.461 
By 1984, with a new administration in place, Maplewood was primed to take its 
economic development to the next level. The city strengthened its economic development 
toolbox by establishing its own IDA. In utilizing the county’s IDA, the city was at the 
mercy of the county’s decisions regarding projects. By establishing their own IDA, 
Maplewood gained the freedom to independently approve or deny industrial development 
projects. The city’s first independent IDA authorization involved the granting of bonds for 
 
461 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1982 Document 33; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1983 




the redevelopment and rehabbing of the 62-acre tract of land and properties mentioned 
earlier.462 
In continuance of the city’s efforts to revitalize the central business district, 
Maplewood formed special business districts which allowed the city to increase the 
property tax and license fee assessed on businesses in the district. The additional revenue 
was then used to promote businesses and create renovation grants issued directly to 
business owners for physical improvements to establishments. As stores’ appearance 
improved through accentuations like fresh paint and new facades, the city strategically 
expanded special business district boundaries to increase eligibility for the storefront 
renovation grants program.463 
While improvements were notable and consumer activity began trending upward, 
some vacancies remained. One official recalled, “It was like throwing a party and no one 
comes.” To fill remaining vacancies, the city designed a rebate program for business 
district building owners. Property owners received 25 % of the sales tax generated by new 
retail establishments that located to the district and remained for at least three years. The 
strategy further demonstrated Maplewood’s superior prowess in the economic 
development space. The program did not only address vacancies by incentivizing owners 
 
462 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1984: Resolution 84-4, Document number 261; City of Maplewood, 
Missouri archives January 22, 1985: Document number 341. See also, City of Maplewood Missouri archives 
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to get the property occupied and fully leased as soon as possible, but it also incentivized 
property owners to only extend occupancy leases to sales tax revenue generators.464 
By the time Kmart exited in 1990, Maplewood was still years away from achieving 
its renaissance. Notwithstanding, the mature inner suburb was much better positioned, 
equipped, and professionalized than it was when the retailer arrived. The unveiling of the 
new business park and the groundbreaking ceremony for the next phase of the 62-acre 
redevelopment demonstrated this best. In less than 20 years, the City of Maplewood had 
designed and executed an economic development plan which revitalized the city by 
converting an old model that left only liabilities from a bygone era to a modern major 
revenue producing model.465 
Maplewood progressed through the remainder of the study period strengthening its 
economic development strategy and accentuating the efforts through increased focus on 
improving the housing stock and attracting younger homeowners and families.  
“I never saw a 20 something parent with a stroller the first six or eight years I was 
in Maplewood,” says Interviewee M4. “But in the early 90s, people started looking 
for affordable housing, maybe it was late 90s, a lot of the good stuff started kind of 
happening and it sort of fed off each other.”466 
   
Official agreements with the local chamber of commerce formalized and clarified 
revitalization goals, functions, and services. This strategy significantly improved and 
 
464 See Document number 311 city of Maplewood Missouri archives June 14, 1984; and City of Maplewood 
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expanded Maplewood’s capacity to promote the city as a prosperous, economically viable, 
and desirable locale for businesses and residents alike. Efforts resulted in further 
accentuation of the city’s image by attracting unique businesses like microbreweries that 
produced significant amounts of sales tax dollars for the city and sponsored events like art 
fairs.467 
Maplewood cultivated and leveraged relationships to develop partnerships which 
greatly increased the suburb’s ability to execute maneuvers far beyond the scope of the 
city’s capacity to perform independently. By explicitly promoting citizen involvement in 
economic development efforts, Maplewood benefitted from the wide range of expert and 
creative input represented on its civilian boards and commissions. Maplewood was not 
only effective at attracting new businesses, but the city developed innovative programs for 
retaining and helping grow existing businesses. 
Maplewood created a pro-business atmosphere in which existing businesses helped 
promote the city and recruit new businesses to the area. Officials affirmatively sought out 
joint ventures with neighboring municipalities and worked collaboratively to develop 
projects and institute methods to help ensure that the adjacent and surrounding 
neighborhoods were not compromised by decline or traffic from redevelopments. 
Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective, efficient, and sustainable. 
 
467 City of Maplewood , Missouri archives February 8, 1983: Document 133; City of Maplewood Missouri 
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Document 403; City of Maplewood Missouri archives approved July 25, 2000; City of Maplewood archives 
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Bill number 4720; City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 26, 1994 document 134; City of Maplewood 
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However, as the city’s first big economic development win of the period demonstrated, 
Maplewood’s model contained embedded costs.468 
According to Interviewee M3, “Maplewood is the place where people want to live, 
but it's a double-edge sword.” The suburb’s commercial activity ultimately exceeded levels 
experienced in the city’s pre-mall era success, and old nemeses reemerged. Parking 
shortages became more pronounced than before. Challenges with maintaining and 
upgrading the parking garage became a politically divisive topic. Tensions in the business 
sector ensued from parking lot expansions and encroachment disputes, and served as 
constant inhibitors to achieving economic development, preservation and expansion 
goals.469 
By 2000, the Kmart property was sitting idle and Maplewood’s strategic planning 
meetings were producing few ideas for addressing the matter. Maplewood would have to 
institute a tax increase to raise the money to buy the old Kmart property and demolish the 
parking garage. Despite vast improvements in the business sector, the city still faced the 
dilemma of budget concerns, increased pressure to continue expanding the sales tax 
revenue stream, and citizen backlash from leveraging TIFs and compromising more 
residential area for the sake of economic development.470 
National tragedies, busted stock market bubbles, and broken commitments served 
to expediate the dissolution of agreements and exacerbated anxieties regarding 
 
468 City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 10, 1994 Document 142: Enough money was in the debt 
service fund to pay off the bonds the following year without having to collect additional monies to put into 
the debt service fund. The city could not continue to levy a debt service tax without a vote of the people; 
City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1996; See City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 10, 2003. 
469 Excerpt of quote from Interview M3: 07/25/2019, White / Female / Resident / Business Leader. 
470 City of Maplewood June 13, 1995: Bill number 4843; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 24, 




Maplewood’s financial future. The suburb’s model was built and reinforced over decades 
to survive, thrive, or decline on sale tax revenues. The small eclectic shops were great, but 
the new model required major retail chains. Officials remained committed to the model 
and over the final third of the study period, the city attracted a new tenant for the old Kmart 
building and attracted some of the biggest retailers in the industry to the area.471 
Kmart’s 1990 departure from Maplewood was not a unique occurrence for inner 
suburbs by the early 1990s. Evolving consumer demands and economic transitions were 
challenging the sustainability of large-scale retailers and mall developments. The River 
Roads Mall had served as a dependable sales tax revenue engine for Jennings since the 
early 1960s. However, 30 years later, Jennings officials began the process of blighting the 
mall, plaza center, and surrounding properties. From 1985 to 1991, assessed valuation of 
the property had declined 48 %, and a steady outflow of retail tenants resulted in the city’s 
sales tax revenues plummeting.472 
The mall’s last occupant vacated in 1994, and the facility closed for good the 
following year. Five years later, officials blighted “St. Louis County’s first ultra-modern 
retail village, Northland Shopping Center in Jennings, Missouri.” By 2006, both sites were 
the malls once stood as symbols of suburban prosperity, modernity, and stability served as 
 
471 City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 8 1993 document number 25; City of Maplewood Missouri 
archives January 8th 2002; City of Maplewood archives August 27 2002; City of Maplewood Missouri 
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8, 2011. 
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visual and fiscal reminders of colossal failures, a bygone era, and the suburban realism that 
had replaced suburban utopianism.473 
In April 2000, the city clerk of Jennings invited business and property owners from 
the city’s downtown business district to meet with the city council. Prompted by a letter 
advising the council of “the serious situation that is rapidly developing in Jennings’ 
business district on West Florissant,” officials instructed the clerk to schedule a meeting. 
The district had long been a shell of its former self. For decades, as Jennings vested most 
of its economic development focus in the malls, the remnant of the district’s retail and 
service businesses struggled to stay afloat amid a divested environment inundated with 
structural deterioration and substantial vacancy rates.474 
Jennings’ fiscal strain began long before the decline of the malls and the business 
district. To fully understand how Jennings reached a financial position which prompted 
officials to levy the maximum property tax rate allowed by law in 1993, we must return to 
the start of the period. Based on the total operational costs for fiscal year April 1, 1969 to 
March 31, 1970, the City of Jennings established a property tax rate of $.5579 per $100 
valuation. One year later, Jennings increased the property tax five cents. Combined with 
$.20 garbage and $.10 police and firemen's retirement fund, by 1971, Jennings’s taxpayers 
were paying $.90 per $100 assessed in property taxes.475 
With projected increases in property tax revenues from higher property assessments 
between 1984 and 1985, officials adjusted the tax rate down from $.90 to $.84 for tax year 
 
473 See archive City of Jennings, MO Regular Session 1436th meeting dated Monday July 26, 1999; and 
tobyweiss.com/northland-shopping-center/. 
474 Excerpt of letter filed in City of Jennings, MO archive dated April 24, 2000, page 1-3; City of Jennings, MO 
Regular Council Meeting 1219th Session dated March 25, 1991, page 1. 
475 According to financial records in City of Jennings, MO Session June 8, 1970 page 3; and Jennings Regular 




1985. By FY1987, Jennings tax rate was up to $.94, and to maintain the same amount of 
revenue by FY1991, required the tax be set at $.99 and raising the trash fee from $30 per 
year to $50 per year. This trend continued for Jennings as the tax rate reached $1 per $100 
assessed valuation in 1993. To raise the rate any further, lawmakers needed two-thirds 
voter approval.476 
The City of Jennings’ economic development model has never allowed the mature 
inner suburb to enjoy low property taxes or to achieved decades of sustained fiscal 
solvency. The advent of the revolutionary malls attracted scores of shoppers to Jennings 
and provided the city sales tax revenues but did not set the municipality on a course for 
wealth and sustainability. Any excitement about the modest surplus found in the city’s 
1971 general revenue fund was soon tempered with the reality that the capital equipment 
fund was nearly depleted. Although Jennings had been populated as far back as before the 
emancipation of slaves, the Jennings, MO that entered the post-fair housing age was still a 
fairly new city.477 
Up until 1947, a local volunteer fire and improvement association provided fire 
protection for Jennings, and a county deputy sheriff served as the area’s police protection. 
In late 1946, the scattered settlements of Jennings, Woodland, Jenwood, West Walnut 
Manor, and farms north of the railroad tracks designated the area for incorporation. 
Neighboring Country Club Hills and Flordell Hills had recently incorporated and began 
 
476 Jennings special counsel session public hearing budget Aug twenty one 1985 Page 1, Jennings Regular 
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laying claim to the promising commercial potential on West Florissant Avenue. Property 
owners on and around the old James Jennings plantation quickly followed suit, formalized, 
and began laying their claim to the revenue engine.478 
By 1972, a one cent sales tax had replaced the city’s one-half cent tax implemented 
just two years earlier. Records reveal why Jennings doubled the rate to the maximum 
allowed at the time. Exactly half of the sales tax revenue received during the fiscal year 
beginning April 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973 was allocated to defray costs 
associated with the building of a police department building and municipal court room. 
The following September, officials formed a bond issue committee, commissioned a 
feasibility study, and began promoting a bond issue to raise funds to construct a community 
center.479 
When Jennings officials met with the new director of the Jennings Chamber of 
Commerce in March 1975, the first order of business was to form an investigative 
committee to determine the needs of the community. By November, federal and state 
officials were receiving letters expressing Jennings’ desire to have a federal or state 
government agency located in their city. By July 1976, the group included officials from 
the City of Flordell Hills. The group’s new focus involved a joint effort to revitalize the 
West Florissant Business District.480 
 
478 Schmerber 2011, p.128-129. 
479 According to figures in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session April 10, 1972, page 6; and Jennings Regular 
council session September 24, 1973, page 4. See also, Jennings Regular council session May 13, 1974, page 
5; Jennings Regular council session April 7, 1975, page 1: Document 02922. 
480 See City of Jennings, MO archives Regular council session 866th Meeting of the City Council dated March 
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During the 13 years between 1947 (Jennings incorporation December 1946) to 
1960, the suburb experienced steady economic growth. However, beginning in 1960, 
Jennings began to experience gradual economic decline. While Northland’s 1955 arrival 
and River Road’s entrance less than a decade later provided a boost in the city’s income, 
they also punctured the city’s cord which funneled a steady revenue stream from the 
commercial strip along West Florissant Avenue. By the mid-1970s, the malls had all but 
driven the final death nail in the business district. Jennings officials along with their 
suburban neighbor Flordell Hills hoped together they could revitalize the struggling area.481 
Almost 30 years to the date before Jennings blighted Northland Shopping Center 
in 1999, as officials prepared the city’s FY1979-80 budget, Jennings’ mayor described the 
mature inner suburb’s economic situation as, “Robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Jennings 
officials concluded the city needed to formalize its work with the Jennings Chamber of 
Commerce by hiring the organization to help the city develop an economic development 
plan, promote the business sector of the city, and attract new businesses.482 
In addition to executing promotions efforts, chamber personnel coordinated the 
city’s business loan program, which made loans available to businesses located in HUD 
homestead project areas. Meanwhile, a Jennings liaison stayed in communication with the 
organization and reported back to the council. By September 1980, West Florissant 
business owners were petitioning the city to establish a special downtown business taxing 
 
481 See City of Jennings, MO archives Regular council session 866th Meeting of the City Council dated March 
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7; and City of Jennings Special Session dated July 6, 1976, page 1: Document 3009. 




district. Officials obliged and formed a downtown special business district steering 
committee.483 
Jennings extended a loan to the district to develop administrative staff services, 
imposed the increased tax on assessed valuation of property in the district, and instituted 
the 50 % increase on merchant licenses. Once the additional taxes and fees reconciled the 
loan, the district planned to use the designated funds for the creation of a business directory 
and farmer’s market, renovations, installation of lighting, special patrols by the Jennings 
Police Department, and the sponsoring of special events like crime prevention seminars for 
merchants.484 
Besides authorizing loans and imposing tax and fee increases, Jennings officials 
had little time to dedicate to the downtown business and property owners’ efforts to 
revitalize the area. Jennings’ housing situation had been deteriorating for some time, and 
as early as midyear 1980, housing concerns demanded the lion’s share of officials’ 
attention. Jennings’ stock of automobile-age friendly homes were being replaced with new 
apartment buildings and citizens wanted to know, “If Jennings’ residents got preference in 
rentals and sold their homes to get into the housing, what guarantee do they have that young 
people will be moving into Jennings?”485 
A decade into the post-fair housing era, the City of Jennings consisted of a 
population comprised of 38 % senior citizens, and Jennings officials faced a serious 
dilemma. In an effort to increase retention of the city’s longtime residents, officials 
 
483 See City of Jennings Regular Session dated May 14, 1979, page 6. 
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authorized new apartment developments and apartment building rehabilitations to 
accommodate the senior population cycling out of their homes into smaller units. 
Conversely, many of the seniors’ children, who were raised and attended school in Jennings 
and who had purchased their own homes in the suburb, desired to continue living in 
Jennings but opposed the city’s proliferation of rentals.486 
As Jennings officials spent the decade of the 1980s focused on housing projects 
leveraging newly added tools like industrial development authority and local development 
corporation, the city’s downtown business district faded into obsolescence, major retail 
occupants began abandoning the malls, and rental properties lost 47 % of their assessed 
value. Jennings entered the 1990s under severe fiscal stress, blighting large redevelopment 
districts for TIF, and found the city beholden to developers for economic development.487 
Failure of the malls, housing stock decline, and tax base transitions delivered 
notable shocks to Jennings’ fiscal health. By the mid-1990s, the city’s financial status and 
economic development prospects made fiscal recovery unlikely. Interview J1 shares the 
following: 
“When these companies started shutting down and moving due to crime or 
whatever, the people followed. At that point, it was probably 30/70, 30 being black 
African American. Groceries stores left, there were no hospitals in the area.” 
 
“You know we make all these wonderful plans, and everything looks good. We 
wanted to be a bikeable and a walkable area but how can you connect your city? 
You know you can't go in a community or a neighborhood and tell these people 
with different types of communication what they should or need to be doing in their 
community. But if you're going to make this work not only do you have to be 
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inclusive, you have to make it equitable. We don't want our neighborhoods to look 
like Chesterfield. We want our neighborhoods to look like our neighborhoods.”488 
 
The advent of the City of Jennings in 1947 reflects traits of many rapidly expanded 
post-WWII outposts of metro cities. By the time River Roads mall opened in 1962, 
Jennings’ economic growth had peaked. The housing construction that saw nearly 80 % of 
Jennings’ homes built after WWII had slowed by 1970, and Jennings entered the post-
fairing housing era already on the decline. The model was flawed from the outset and 
officials found themselves navigating perpetual cycles of fiscal stress and temporary 
periods of solvency and surplus.489 
Jennings’ housing stock and tax base did not evolve to become an inadequate source 
of revenue to support the city; the city was established with inherent flaws in institutional 
structure, structural design, and fiscal model. This placed the mature inner suburb in a 
position where economic development decisions were efforts to correct for these flaws as 
opposed to realize growth and sustainability. While the 1970s white flight, housing 
discrimination, and housing stock deterioration receives the bulk of attention, consider as 
late as 1990, Jennings still enjoyed 16,000 residents, 50 % white / 48 % black residency, 
75 % owner-occupied homes, and $111 million in taxable sales.490 
Early era economic development decisions increased the city’s vulnerability to 
economic decline. Decisions compromised economic diversity by concentrating the city’s 
financial dependency in the unproven revenue stream of retail malls and diverting 
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resources from other budget categories to accentuate the stream. The lack of direct city 
involvement in protecting and growing the downtown business district served as a fatal 
missed opportunity to strengthen and expand the stream. 
Jennings’ downtown business district was not a small collection of eclectic shops. 
Covering 39 acres of Jennings’ landscape and offering 1.68 million square feet of real 
estate, the district comprised several large anchor businesses including retail and 
commercial service-oriented businesses, various food and industrial manufacturers, 
supermarket grocers, and a large Catholic church. With direct city involvement leveraging 
all relevant tools at the city’s disposal, attempting to stabilize and revitalize the area would 
not have been considered a futile endeavor in 1980. However, by the 1990s, many of the 
business and property owners who were attempting to save the area a decade earlier had 
all but cycled out.491 
Jennings had not positioned itself as a highly desirable locale for businesses or 
residents, and the suburb had not developed an effective economic development plan or 
apparatus. Consequentially, business closures often resulted in long-term vacancies, 
obsolescence, and structural deterioration. Areas descended into low trafficked, high crime 
areas. Any chance of resurgence required substantial investment of dollars and resources. 
Economic development investments in cities like Jennings carry disproportionately 
high risks and no reasonable or serious investors were willing to take those risks without 
substantial investment on the part of the city. The mature inner suburb was at the mercy of 
investors, developers, and lenders. If any one of the study cities met the “but for” test for 
TIF redevelopment, Jennings certainly did. In 1991, Jennings and the St. Louis County 
 




LCRA began developing a plan for attracting developers to the suburb, designating large 
portions of the city’s landscape as redevelopment areas, and leveraging the TIF tool as the 
incentive.492 
Blighted for redevelopment and carrying a seven-million-dollar improvement price 
tag, River Roads garnered numerous proposals from interested parties. Suiters requested 
100 % TIF to redevelop the 57-acre tract of land. Authorized to negotiate from a starting 
point of 40 %, Jennings had minimal leverage and the city’s fiscal condition was rapidly 
worsening. Debt spending was not a traditional practice. However, Jennings would become 
very familiar with the technique during the middle third of the period; taking out loans to 
cover city operations, authorizing budget transfers to pay monies owed to pension plans, 
and drawing upon lines of credit until depletion.493 
Jennings’ fiscal health steadily deteriorated as taxable sales plummeted from $111 
million in 1990 to just over $65 million by 2000. Results from the 2000 census resulted in 
further reductions in the city's revenue. Jennings’ economic development during the final 
fourth of the study period was led by a contracted economic development consultant, 
financed by the taxpayers of Jennings through TIF, and resulted in the redevelopment of 
both malls. Developments included a mixture of retail strips, government offices, single 
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and multifamily dwellings, senior apartments, convenience store gas stations, and fast food 
restaurants.494 
Before Jennings officials entered the 1990s using the TIF tool from a position of 
dependence, Ferguson officials ended the 1980s wielding the tool in preparation of their 
exit from the sales tax pool. Scores of Ferguson citizens filed into the city’s August 10, 
1987 special council meeting to oppose the city’s rezoning and use of TIF for a large 
Walmart development surrounding their residential subdivision. Of course, residents did 
not want the commercial development near their residential neighborhood, but more 
notable, residents disagreed with the council’s assessment of the area as blighted and 
insisted the target area did not meet the “but for” test.495 
Residents accused Ferguson’s local government of using TIF “because they are 
pro-commercial.” Another resident felt, “They’re too buddy-buddy with the business 
community.” According to one Ferguson Third Ward resident: 
“I objected to most things proposed for West Florissant, but it was like the residents 
was wasting their time speaking to the council. We were being treated like second 
class citizens. [Councilmember] had Walmart on the same agenda.”496  
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Unlike Jennings, Ferguson did not have failing malls, impending insolvency, or 
nonprofessional government. Ferguson entered the post-fair housing era already a well-
established, professionally governed city. By the time Jennings and the chamber began 
lobbying for a government office to locate to Jennings, a Missouri State license office had 
already been located in Ferguson’s central business district nearly 20 years. The office 
attracted many people from the north end of St. Louis County and served as an anchor 
helping to keep Ferguson’s business district viable. Ferguson was not only more 
established as a city, the mature inner suburb was wealthier than its neighbor.497 
Ferguson entered the era a debt free city offering a competitive salaries and benefits 
package. The suburb retained quality personnel and residents enjoyed the second lowest 
property tax rate among study cities throughout the study period (Hazelwood was lowest). 
Commercial expansion and transition to a point-of-sale city flushed the city with increases 
in capital allowing officials to further reduce rates periodically. When the city elected to 
increase the merchants’ and manufacturers’ license tax and replace the fixed fee with a 
variable rate system in 1981, it was the first modification to the tax and fee since 1951.498 
Consider when Ferguson began using the TIF tool in the late 1980s, the city enjoyed 
impressive economic diversification. Receipts from utilities taxes accounted for 28 % of 
the suburb’s revenue while income from the sales tax pool represented 24 % of earnings. 
 
497 See Ferguson Resolution approving the special debt statement made by the director of finance and filed 
in the office of the city clerk on the 22nd day of January 1980 for Year January 1, 1979.City of Ferguson, MO 
dated March 10, 1981; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session August 25, 1981, Page 3. 
498 Ferguson’s total property tax rate was among the lowest total property tax rate in the area in 1970. the 
City of Ferguson May 26, 1970 page 2; Ferguson Regular Council Meeting May 14, 1974, Page 3; Ferguson 
Election results November 24, 1981 from votes cast in the special election held on Tuesday November 3, 
1981 in the City of Ferguson from the board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, State 
of Missouri: Bill 5231 passed and adopted by the council of the City of Ferguson as Ordinance 81-1872 to 
become effective May 1, 1982; Ferguson Regular Council Session July 26, 1994, page 2; and Ferguson 




Intergovernmental services pulled in 15 %, property taxes added 11 %, and licenses, permit 
fees, and assessments rounded the city’s intake accounting for 22 % of total revenues. 
Ferguson was a highly self-sufficient, well populated, resource rich city. Like other suburbs 
of comparable size and history, Ferguson had its challenges and suffered economic hits. 
What separated Ferguson, however, the suburb was better equipped than other mature 
suburbs and the city’s most devastating blows were entirely self-inflicted.499 
While other study cities spent the early period of the post-fair housing era 
developing, growing, or redefining their city’s identity, Ferguson officials adhered to the 
will of a slim citizen majority demanding preservation of their city’s identity through 
insulation and exclusion. When it became clear by the mid-1980s that efforts to preserve 
municipal-level racial homogeneity had failed, the modus operandi the city would become 
infamous for received reinforcements. As Ferguson’s black residency nearly doubled from 
13 % in 1980 to 25 % by 1990, the suburb’s policies, economic development decisions, 
and fiscal behavior adjusted accordingly.500 
Planning and zoning strategies exhibited features consistent with efforts to 
reinforce, establish, or support isolation and control of particular areas of the city. A failed 
1983 attempt to garner voter approval of a municipal court costs hike demonstrated some 
early citizen pushback against the direction of city policy. However, by 1985, police and 
protective services expenditures accounted for 62 % of Ferguson’s spending, while 
transportation and streets received 15% of city dollars; general government and police 
 
499 According to archives City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session June 14, 1983, Page 1; Ferguson Regular 
Session June 12, 1984, Page 1. 
500 According to US Census data; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic 




facility debt services got 12 %; and sanitation, parks and recreation represented 11 % of 
city spending.501 
Ferguson’s failed municipal court costs increase was not surprising. Ferguson 
voters rarely approved any type of tax or fee increase. Consider that by the start of the study 
period, it was already estimated that around 700,000 cars were traveling the roads in the 
St. Louis area. Ferguson officials agreed with the traffic commission’s recommendation to 
construct a bridge near a high traffic area where many school children had to cross and 
walk along the shoulders of the road as no sidewalks had been installed. However, voters 
defeated the bridge measure along with the alternative proposal to enact sidewalk districts 
to fund sidewalk installations.502 
Ferguson’s civic engagement was extremely high in the 1970s but by the mid-
1980s, the political environment in Ferguson had changed dramatically. The 1984 election 
saw the mayor and three council members all run unopposed. Ferguson voters’ April 1985 
disapproval of a half cent utility tax showed Ferguson voters still opposed raising capital 
improvement funds through tax increases. However, the narrow margin of 1,188 in favor 
to 1,207 opposed indicated Ferguson’s level of voter turnout and preferences had shifted 
substantially.503 
Narrow elections were common in other study cities throughout the study period. 
As few as a single digit number of votes could determine approval or denial of a measure. 
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This was especially true on nonmonetary related ballot initiatives or in low civically 
engaged cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood’s April 1996 half cent sales tax for capital 
improvements passed by only nine votes and the vote for amending the number of wards 
passed by only 15 votes. Narrow tax elections in Ferguson, however, were unheard of until 
the mid-1980s.504 
Low voter turnout and narrow elections in Ferguson beginning in the mid-1980s 
suggest no clear consensus or mandate from citizens. At this point, the slim majority had 
lost a great deal of power as it related to influencing policy through voter preferences. The 
only way exclusionists could remain the driving force behind municipal government’s 
planning, decision-making, and response to the changing environment would be to gain the 
majority on the council. 
With a lower voter influence in policy, Ferguson officials were more empowered 
to enact corrective, stabilization-oriented policies or they could elect to continue expanding 
and reinforcing poor, destabilization-oriented policies of the past. Their choices would 
have significant impact on the cities’ direction moving forward.505 
To refer to Ferguson’s position in the mid-1980s as a mature inner suburb poised 
for a resurgence would be inaccurate. Ferguson had not experienced nearly the level of 
structural deterioration and economic decline observed in Jennings, Maplewood, and 
University City. Further, Ferguson did not have to adapt to the post-fair housing era 
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phenomenon of a major influx of blacks accommodated by a mass exodus of whites. In 
fact, the city’s identity preservation strategies were so effective, by the start of the 1980s 
even as a north county municipality, Ferguson’s black residents represented only four 
percentage points more of total population than black Maplewood citizens’ proportion of 
that suburb’s population.506 
By the mid-1980s, Ferguson was poised to redefine itself, redirect its policy 
patterns, and make history. Ferguson would achieve the latter while becoming known 
around the world for refusing to pursue the two formers. Ultimately, the mature inner 
suburb would be forced to address the two formers by study’s end. Ferguson’s failure to 
capitalize on its opportunities dwarfs Jennings’ downtown central business district blunder. 
In 1984, Ferguson was ripe with economic diversity, fiscal solvency, and 
professional financial wherewithal. The recession was over, and the economy had 
rebounded and entered a period of sustained growth. Ferguson business owners 
independently reactivated the Ferguson Downtown Business Association and were hoping 
to transform the district into a University City Loop-like area. With the right local 
leadership and support, they may have pulled it off. The license office relentlessly attracted 
visitors from other cities throughout north county to the westside of Ferguson. The suburb 
had a rapidly growing, younger, and untapped black consumer base on its eastside. And 
the city had a new young lead administrator with ties to Hazelwood.507 
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As fate, or more apropos municipal governance’s role in municipal-level 
stabilization would have it, Ferguson not only blew the opportunity, but officials proceeded 
to make administrative, policy, and economic development decisions which were direct 
contradictions to creating a University City Loop-like business district or a University City-
like anything for that matter. 
By 1988, the young city manager was out, a new finance director was in, all requests 
and proposals for developing an east-west connecting corridor had been definitively 
quashed on arrival, and Ferguson officials were putting the finishing touches on the 
delineation of two distinctly different Fergusons. Any attempt to calm the over 200 Third 
Ward residents attending the May 3, 1988 special public hearing were largely unsuccessful. 
Many residents in and around a subdivision designated for an Emerson Electric buyout 
were there to voice opposition to the city’s authorization of the project.508 
Residents expressed distrust of Emerson and local government accusing the 
manufacturer of being a bad neighbor and officials of deceptive tactics lacking 
transparency, communication, and consideration of Third Ward residents. The project 
included the city leveraging the eminent domain tool to acquire homes identified in the 
plan, providing assistance in finding a new home, and paying moving expenses. Officials 
assured remaining residents that their property values would go up as a result of the 
project.509 
However, the following exchange raises serious doubts to that claim as well as 
questions regarding the city’s ultimate goal for the project: 
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Ferguson Resident: “What about vacant lots? Will the adjacent owners be required 
to purchase them?  
 
Ferguson Official: “No one will be required to purchase a vacant lot. It may just sit 
empty.”510 
 
While official plans were not included in the archives, transcripts reveal many 
residents expressing concerns. For instance, one resident believed, “Emerson wants the 
area rezoned into an industrial park.” Another citizen was convinced, “Emerson just wants 
more streets through the subdivision for the employees to get out.”511 
Consider the Emerson project and the aforementioned Walmart TIF issue ran 
practically concurrently (late 1987-1988). These economic development decisions also 
paralleled Ferguson’s early era policies. Ferguson has two main parallel north-south 
running streets: New/South Florissant on the westside and West Florissant on the eastside. 
New/South Florissant is anchored on the north by January-Wabash Park and on the south 
by a S.T.E.A.M. academy high school, a space education and simulation center, and a pre-
K learning center. West Florissant is anchored on the north by a Walmart supercenter and 
Emerson anchors the south end. 
The Ferguson the world was introduced to in 2014 was fashioned four and a-half 
decades prior but was solidified beginning in the mid-1980s. Late 1980s and 1990s 
Ferguson officials spoke of improving the eastside neighborhoods through an innovative 
funding method. Officials expressed “great concern because the residents [were] not 
working together.” The following statements by Ferguson officials offer more insight into 
perspectives and relationship dynamics of Ferguson lawmakers and eastside residents: 
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“The project offers much more than would otherwise be received.” 
  
“The neighborhood does not have to be forgotten and stay the same, but it will not 
improve unless the people pull together.” 
  
“This council has learned a lot while working on this project, and I would like to 
find a way to turn around the feeling against the city and convince the residents that 
we do want to work with them.”512 
 
As detailed in chapter six, although some forms and tactics changed, Ferguson’s 
discriminatory treatment of eastside residents did not begin with the entry of black people. 
Before there was the 1990s “wrong side of the tracks” and “ghetto slum” monikers, “the 
blue-collar part of town” and “poor white trash” were used as distinguishers. Nineties’ 
Ferguson officials claimed, “There would be no street improvements if it were not for the 
TIF.” However, archives reflect disproportionately low infrastructure investment on the 
eastside even in the early period.513 
Ferguson officials complained the area’s residents were not civically engaged and 
did not work together or with the city. While archives do indicate a significant decline in 
overall voter turnout, they also show a significant decline in ballot issues for determining 
policies during the same period. Additionally, archives reflect public hearing attendance, 
number of citizen comments, and petitions remained relatively stable throughout the study 
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period. Furthermore, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era local government was not the best 
example of cooperation. 
The City of Ferguson upheld its strong opposition against any regional collective 
efforts, rejected invitations to joint ventures from adjacent neighbors, and other than the 
occasional lending of the city’s dogcatcher’s truck to Kinloch and a Municipal League 
membership, participated very little in resource sharing. Ferguson’s issues did not begin 
when the mature inner suburb deserted its county sales tax pool comrades, or five years 
later when the city was forced to adopt a month to month budget.514 
The genesis of Ferguson’s challenges will not be found at a point of deteriorated 
housing stock. In fact, pre-WWII houses’ proportion of the suburb’s total housing offerings 
increased over two percent between 1990 and 2015. A decline in the city’s tax base will 
not satisfy an inquiry regarding the suburb’s transformation from a self-sufficient, 
economically diversified juggernaut to a city beholden to commercial retail giants as sale 
tax revenue dependency more than doubled to account for 57 % of the suburb’s income by 
2005.515 
Do not be fooled by the transition, however. Despite Ferguson’s questionable 
economic development decisions throughout the first half of the study period, and the fiscal 
strain experienced in the 1990s, the municipality was economically strong leading up to 
study’s end. The city had 134 employees averaging 43 years of age with 12 years of service 
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to city. The city's pension plan was over 100 % funded with 95 former city personnel 
receiving pensions.516 
The last fourth of the study period saw Ferguson secure an intergovernmental 
cooperation and development assistance agreement with NorthPark in 2004; accumulate 
an unrestricted funds balance as high as 72 % of general revenue in 2011; increase net 
assets nearly two percent from 2012 to 2013; generate a seven percent increase in revenue 
through the first quarter of 2013 alone; attract a $19 million, three-building corporate 
development due to be completed by the beginning of 2016; and had plans to create 100 
new jobs— 80 % of which were to be filled by north St. Louis County residents.517 
Ferguson’s contemporary officials (2000-2015) exhibited a notable divergence in 
many policy patterns demonstrated by their post-fair housing era predecessors (1970-
1999). This cannot be ignored. Their work resulted in some notable improvements 
throughout the mature inner suburb. However, contemporaries upheld the one carryover 
from the previous era the city could least afford to keep, and the one which would prove to 
be the city’s biggest self-inflicted blow to date. 
Recall the seven percent boost in the city’s 2013 first quarter income? Consider that 
the increase occurred during a period in which the city’s sales tax receipts were down five 
percent. Now, consider that the Ferguson Police Department and municipal court registered 
a 13 % increase in fines and forfeitures through the first quarter of 2013.518 
 
516 According to archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated February 24, 2015. 
517 Budget figures for first quarter FY2013-2014 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, 
page 1; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 2; and City of Ferguson, MO 
Regular Council Session May 26, 2015, page 1-2. 
518 According to budget figures in archive City of Ferguson, Regular Council Session January 24, 2012, page 
2; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 1; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular 




Ferguson’s taxation by citation practices did not begin in 2013. Complaints about 
problems on Canfield, discriminate treatment of blacks by the Ferguson police, and 
Ferguson’s use of various tactics to quarantine black areas did not begin in 2014. More 
notable, they did not even begin with Ferguson’s black residents. Every one of these 
elements were present at the start of the study period when Ferguson’s black residents 
barely accounted for one percent of the suburb’s population. 
During those days, the Canfield complaints ignored by local government came from 
whites residing in the area. Residents of the blue-collar side of town served as the Ferguson 
isolates of the day, while black residents of Kinloch and later Berkeley served as the target 
of the city’s harsher quarantine methods. Interviewee F4 shares: 
“Ferguson was a sundown town in those days. You could go over there you know, 
for certain stuff like work or whatever, but you better not still be in town once that 
sun went down. Not if you were black.”519 
 
Ferguson did not have an economic development problem. Ferguson suffered from 
its own refusal to end the racial and social caste system which had guided its policy long 
before the advent of fair housing. Ferguson’s isolationism and inequitable treatment of 
lower income white areas demonstrated the city’s fundamental economic philosophy. 
Insert a change in racial composition, and the city’s overall philosophy is fully revealed. 
Ferguson allowed antiquated notions of class and race to guide its economic development 
decisions and in doing so, the mature inner suburb committed entirely avoidable errors and 
forfeited its advantaged position. 
Advancement and retrogression in suburbs’ fiscal health were significantly 
impacted by local officials’ economic planning, evaluation, toolbox adjustments, and use 
 




of tools. Some decisions involved levying, raising, and lowering taxes. Others included 
increasing and reducing spending, personnel and services, and use of alternative financing 
instruments. Whether a city faced a revenue shortfall and mounting debt or a thriving 
economic sector and a growing budget surplus, municipal-level stabilization depended a 
great deal on municipal governances’ capacity to protect, increase, and diversify a city’s 





















Chapter 8. Conclusions  
My examination of five mature inner suburbs in St. Louis County found three 
stabilized cases, one transitioning case, and one declined case. Consistent with existing 
theories of community stabilization, I found mature inner suburbs could achieve 
stabilization and remain stable, and I found various internal and external factors impacted 
municipal-level stabilization. I also found several key elements which challenge existing 
stabilization theories and expand on existing concepts of neighborhood stabilization. I 
conclude, the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization is to enact best 
practice policy, practices, and programming. 
My conclusions do not argue a direct causal relationship between municipal 
decisions and municipalities enjoying stability or suffering decline. I do, however, argue 
that municipal governances’ policy decisions significantly impacted cities’ stability. While 
many other factors affected cities’ racial composition and economic conditions, stabilizing 
inner suburbs required good municipal governance as quality policy decisions were a 
prerequisite to stability. Further, I found quality policy decisions required additional 
support to be effective stabilization tools while poor policy decisions did not require 
additional support to negatively impact cities’ stability. 
Stabilization literature outlines human capital in the form of talented, inclusive, and 
committed leadership as requirements for stabilization. Stabilized cases like University 
City and Hazelwood, and Maplewood beginning in the middle period, enjoyed this 
resource in local government. However, Jennings demonstrated that the presence of human 
capital absent the presence of professional management renders talent, inclusive policies, 




human capital, talent, committed leadership, and the presence of professional management, 
failure to implement inclusive policies in a timely manner can be just as consequential as 
the absence of the aforementioned elements.520 
By the mid-1970s, Ferguson’s open housing advocates were still advocating for 
adoption of anti-discrimination policies, and Maplewood’s low black in-migration was not 
enough to divert citizens’ attention from their mission of purging a corrupt city hall. The 
timing of policies was important as policy determined cities’ level of preparedness for 
dealing with destabilizing events. Nevertheless, while early antidiscrimination housing 
policy was necessary, it was only effective when it interacted with other factors such as 
professional management and strong resident programs. 
Studies posit regional collaboration and community involvement as prerequisites 
to sustained stabilization. However, I found these factors are not always necessary for cities 
to realize stabilization or to enjoy sustained periods of stability. I found very little in the 
way of regional collaboration in the St. Louis region. In fact, Ferguson’s municipal 
governance explicitly opposed the notion of regional cooperation, and there remained 
minimal civilian participation in boards and community efforts in Hazelwood throughout 
the entire study period.521 
Hazelwood and University City present an opportunity to contrast the Jennings case 
and better understanding the impact of professional administration on stabilization efforts. 
All three cities aimed to combat resegregation by enacting open housing policies early, 
leveraging city forces to investigate, report, and pursue legal recourse in discrimination 
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matters, formed and promoted committee participation, and allocated city resources to 
support integration groups. However, University City was the only city to enjoy a robust, 
civilian-led integration maintenance program in the University City Residential Services. 
University City’s citizen engagement was extremely high and municipal 
governance effectively leveraged its active citizenry. Officials funded and supported 
citizens’ efforts, solicited citizens’ input, valued civilian commissions and boards, and 
encouraged participation in city functions and events. Although for different reasons, both 
Jennings and Hazelwood struggled to seat full human rights boards and neither city enjoyed 
strong and active residential integration programs. 
While Hazelwood did not experience the level of black resident influx seen in 
Jennings during the early and middle-era, Hazelwood’s latter-era transition rivaled 
Jennings’ highest level of transition as the suburb experienced acute transition in a shorter 
period of time. Hazelwood’s professional administration better equipped the suburb to 
provide ongoing support and supervision of stabilization efforts during the period of rapid 
transition. Despite minimal citizen engagement and support for stabilization programs, 
Hazelwood’s professional government helped mitigate destabilizing effects of acute 
change in the suburb. 
Existing theories require proactive municipal governance action to compliment 
citizen stabilization efforts. This understanding fails to account for proactive citizen 
coalition building and mobilization which transforms municipal government. Maplewood 
contradicts the interventionist approach to stabilization. In the Maplewood case, 




conflict. Only after citizens were successful in changing the form and composition of local 
government were adequate resources dedicated to stabilization projects.522 
Scholars have already established that institutional change is not required to 
improve municipal governance’s responsiveness to citizens. However, Maplewood, 
Ferguson, and Jennings presented variations in municipal governances’ structure and 
responsiveness to voter preferences which are important to expanding the understanding 
of the role of local government in stabilization. My examination revealed institutional 
change significantly improved Maplewood’s capacity to stabilize, and Jennings’ 
institutional structure limited its municipal government’s stabilization effectiveness.523 
For University City, citizen preferences tended to favor best practice policies such 
as open housing, antidiscrimination, and integration maintenance policies and officials 
enacted these policies. For Jennings, citizen preferences tended to oppose best practice 
policies. Despite Jennings’ nonprofessional governance, officials usually elected best 
practice policies anyway. 
Ferguson’s slim majority tended to oppose best practice policy in favor of avoiding 
integration. Ferguson’s council majority favored best practice policy but repeatedly elected 
to vote consistent with the preferences of the slim majority. Despite the council’s expressed 
belief that certain policies and failure to enact certain policies were not in the best interest 
of the city, Ferguson officials elected to honor the preferences of the slim majority. 
Maplewood’s renaissance can be traced as far back as the citizen’s mid-1970s 
purging of city hall. Maplewood citizens mobilized and demanded a new form, more 
accountable, and responsive government. Citizen leaders collaborated to ensure their local 
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institutions remained functional and impactful. While city officials and administrators are 
lauded for Maplewood’s resurgence and rightfully so, it was the well-organized efforts of 
the suburb’s citizens which thwarted destabilization threats, refashioned Maplewood’s 
identity, and set the city on the path to becoming the mature inner suburb we see today. 
While Maplewood citizens’ efforts resulted in increased responsiveness to citizens 
and improved the quality of the city’s policy decisions, Ferguson’s responsiveness to 
citizens negatively impacted its municipal government’s quality of policy decisions. 
Jennings’ low responsiveness to citizens’ preferences resulted in best practice policies. 
However, Jennings did not possess the capacity needed to ensure actions complemented 
policies. Unlike Ferguson, Jennings did not institute policies counter to best practice. Best 
practice policy selection did little to affect stabilization, however. Unlike Maplewood, 
Jennings did not address the city’s capacity deficit created by its institutional structure. 
Research indicates architectural and locational features significantly impact 
stabilization. University City benefitted a great deal from its mixed housing stock and its 
proximity to the central city and Washington University. Consequentially, the suburb 
attracted highly educated, civically engaged, and socially conscious professionals. Citizens 
organized groups, participated in various associations and projects, mobilized, and 
executed campaigns for a range of issues.524 
While University City’s architectural and locational features provided the suburb 
advantages, the benefits of these advantages were often offset by costs. For example, 
University City’s proximity to St. Louis city and Washington University increased its 
attractiveness and resource richness. However, challenges to stabilization were also 
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significantly increased as certain areas bordered declined neighborhoods and the 
university’s buying of buildings removed properties from the city’s tax rolls and increased 
the city’s fiscal strain. 
North county suburbs were surrounded by ever-present reminders of the 
resegregation and economic decline that can happen in previously burgeoning 
municipalities. Early implementation of policies and establishment of programs helped 
cities prepare, but stabilization depended on cities’ capacity to effectively mitigate 
disparities, deterioration, population decline, fiscal challenges, and polarization. Many 
north county suburbs lacked the capacity of a University City to stabilize. 
It is also important to note that cities’ location impacted the timing of racial 
transition. As a consequence of their locations, University City and Jennings’ experienced 
in-migration of blacks before the other study cities, and Maplewood was last to experience 
a notable influx of blacks because of that suburb’s location. Further, location affected the 
amount of black in-migration into cities. North county suburbs experienced more in-
migration of blacks because of their proximity to north St. Louis city. This made Jennings 
especially prone to tipping and Maplewood much less prone to tipping.  
Timing of transition impacted city’s economic conditions as new black 
suburbanites’ socioeconomic strata changed over time. Early period transitions involved 
in-migration of middle and upper-class blacks buying homes while middle-era new black 
suburbanites tended to be lower-income and subsidized renters. This is best demonstrated 




transition. These suburbs’ middle-era black population increases exhibited influxes of 
more low-income black renters than homeowners.525 
Traditional understanding of invasion and succession points to new inhabitants 
taking over an area, but Jennings offers an opportunity to expand on the theory of invasion 
and succession. As Jennings’ residents aged and cycled out of single-family residences, 
local government authorized more apartment developments to accommodate and retain its 
senior population and homeownership was often transferred within families. This 
discovery helps us better understand Jennings’ municipal government’s role in the 
proliferation of rental units and the city’s overall housing stock composition.526 
Municipal governance played a significant role in housing stock preservation and 
composition but increases in renter occupied dwellings and aged housing stock did not 
automatically equate to decline. University City exhibited economic and racial balance 
despite proliferations in rentals. Although the city’s mixed housing stock provided the 
suburb an advantage, policy decisions still demonstrated intentional efforts to mitigate the 
destabilizing effects of concentrating low-income and subsidized rentals. 
When dilapidated HUD properties threatened to accelerate blight in University 
City, officials leveraged the city’s professional capacity to halt and reverse the trend. After 
Jennings’ collegial attempts to collaborate with HUD were largely ignored, city leaders 
from both suburbs collaborated to openly promote plans to file suit against the federal 
agency. However, when HUD amended its practices, the presence of an LCRA better 
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equipped University City to address the problems of derelict HUD properties while 
Jennings lacked the tool. 
University City was largely successful in staving off neighborhood decline because 
the LCRA helped empower the city to better preserve the municipality’s housing stock. 
However, University City’s rehabilitating of derelict buildings, new construction, and 
redevelopment of blighted areas were only part of the city’s effective housing stock 
preservation system. With aggressive enforcement of stringent building codes and 
occupancy regulations, innovative strategies such as the home rehabilitation loan, adjacent 
lots abatement, and rental housing registration programs, the city effectively fought off 
deterioration in its neighborhoods. 
University City was not the only study city to leverage these tools. What was unique 
about University City’s use of tools, however, was University City explicitly leveraged 
tools to encourage affordable housing throughout the city and prevent concentrations of 
government-assisted residents. Officials creatively utilized low-income programs like 
Section 8 and CDBG funds, advocated for low-income renters, and limited luxury 
apartment developments and conversions. 
Research has established that housing segregation is not required for cities’ to 
experience school segregation as black-white school segregation is often present in 
integrated municipalities— particularly at the high school level. Further, studies have 
pointed to segregated schools as a precursor to economic decline and assert city-school 
collaboration as necessary for the effective promotion of stably integrated locales and 




differences confound application of these concepts and high-performing segregated 
schools and noncollaborative revitalization efforts run counter to these claims.527 
University City schools have been mostly segregated since the 1980s, yet the 
suburb remains stable and the school district continuously outperforms other districts of 
comparable size and racial demographics. While the city has enjoyed periods of high-level 
collaboration with the local school district, the city has also experienced sustained periods 
of adversarial relations dynamics between city and school district officials. This is also true 
in Maplewood. Maplewood’s renaissance involved two separate, noncollaborative efforts 
on the part of city and school officials. Although each entity’s work helped the other’s 
efforts, collaboration ensued only after both the city and school district had revitalized its 
respective institutions. 
Through various collaborative efforts with school districts, regional forums, 
marketing campaigns, and programs, north county suburbs worked to counter image 
defamation, struggling schools, and discriminatory treatment from various agencies and 
industries. These factors undoubtedly affected overall conditions as the north county 
experience included all the destabilizing elements which made neighborhoods undesirable. 
Economic development strategies served as an important determinant in suburbs’ 
fiscal condition over the study period. Some suburbs concentrated their income 
dependence, some creatively achieved an economically diversified mix of revenue streams, 
and others wavered between identities. Regardless of position, however, each suburb 
navigated multiple threats that impacted their city’s fiscal conditions throughout the study 
period. Suburbs’ response to events like fluctuations in the economy, discrepancies in 
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projections versus actuals, flooding, equipment failure, and an uprising highlighted cities’ 
level of preparedness and economic philosophy. 
Through the use of economic tools like TIF, tax abatement, tax credits, low-interest 
financing, special business district taxing, neighborhood improvement, and transportation 
improvement taxes, municipal government occupied a significant role in shaping the 
landscape, function, and feel of inner suburbs. Some of these decisions were advised by in-
house professional CPAs and city finance departments as a continuance of a developed 
strategy for maintaining financial solvency. Others lacked in-house financial advisement, 
investment strategies, and best practice regulatory conformance. 
Financial crises in the study cities caused spending on community enrichment 
programs to wane as policymakers and program supporters found it difficult to justify these 
types of expenditures regardless of programs’ target populations. Some provisions 
considered imperative in strong economic times became expendable when cities 
experienced fiscal stress. Consequently, cities struggled to develop effective strategies and 
programs that endured. However, professional cities tended to continue providing certain 
services despite periods of fiscal strain. 
Despite advantages and challenges, Hazelwood and University City’s policies and 
spending remained aimed at preventing areas of concentrated poor people. Hazelwood, 
Maplewood, and University City invested substantial resources in parks, recreation, public 
spaces, cultural attractions, infrastructure improvements, and pedestrian-friendly 
enhancements like bike lanes and bus shelters. Jennings made early investments in 




Ferguson offers the most compelling case in my study of the role of municipal 
governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs. As inevitable changes in racial 
demographics were occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, Ferguson possessed the professional 
capacity required to prepare for destabilizing effects of transition and to support and 
manage integration programs. Nevertheless, officials elected not to proactively enact best 
practice policy or support integration programs.  
Instead of implementing zoning and land use strategies which dispersed low-
income rentals throughout the municipality, Ferguson’s policies concentrated low income 
apartment complexes on the city’s eastside. Investment in neighborhoods and quality of 
service delivery favored the city’s wealthier westside at the expense of the city’s eastside 
citizens, housing stock, and infrastructure. Ferguson’s policy decisions eliminated and 
decreased desirability of certain residential areas by concentrating commercial and 
industrial businesses nearby, and the suburb did not start investing significant funds in the 
development of mixed-use, walkable environments until the 2000s.  
While municipal-level stabilization is fairly easy to observe, the stabilizing process 
is an extremely complex phenomenon. Capturing every dynamic involved in the process is 
impossible. Nevertheless, examinations have provided a roadmap for better understanding 
elements which are essential to stabilization. We know municipal governance occupies a 
central role in stabilization. However, even in the best-case scenario, municipal governance 
alone cannot achieve stabilization and factors outside municipal governance authority limit 
what the body can do in pursuit of stabilization. 
Except for early policy intervention, Ferguson possessed all the prerequisites for 




such as professional governance. Hazelwood and University City possessed both 
prerequisites, and Maplewood adopted the prerequisite most relevant to its challenges. 
While there are many other factors to consider, I submit that these decisions had substantial 
impact on the respective positions of the suburbs by the end of the study period.  
Despite its fiscal soundness, sustained desirability, and professional leadership, 
Ferguson was a transitioning case as early as 2010. Ferguson expands our understanding 
of the role of municipal governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs as it provides an 
example of the effectiveness of rejecting best practice policies independent of additional 
support. I conclude stabilization in open housing suburbs requires good municipal 
governance and outside support, but municipal governance needs no additional support in 
compromising municipal-level stabilization through poor policy decisions and 
nondecisions. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Contextualizing 1960s Population and Crime Surge in Studies of Suburban 
Integration 
Black suburbanization alone did not induce the palpable fear observed in suburbia 
in the 1970s, nor was black suburbanization the principal phenomenon challenging 
suburban idealism. The 1960s illuminated cities’ lack of capacity to handle dynamic 
societal changes and like metro cities, inner suburbs entered the 1970s with looming 
doubts. The country had changed dramatically in one generation since the post-WWII 




at rates never before seen in the history of the country and by the late 1960s, the first few 
cohorts of baby boomers were 20 somethings with something to say.528 
While the exponential increases in population could account for most increases in 
measurable categories including crime, by 1960, the rate of increase in violent crimes 
began to grow at a disproportionately faster rate than the rate of population growth. 
Between 1960 and 1970, violent crime increased by 126 % in the United States, and violent 
crimes attributed to the social, political, and cultural revolutions could only explain a small 
percentage of the increase.529 
The era saw the formation and expansion of countless civic groups working to 
change a wide range of conditions, laws, and minds. Efforts resulted in important historical 
achievements of which civil rights and fair housing rank among the most notable. Some 
groups remained active in the post-civil rights era fighting to realize the terms outlined in 
the legal victories of the 1960s. Citizen collectives known as integration maintenance 
groups occupied a crucial role in municipal-level stabilization by working to prevent 
resegregation in suburbs. 
Much has been written about the work of suburban integration and integration 
groups. Studies frame successful stabilization in the context of the black suburbanization 
period. I posit, to better understand neighborhood and municipal-level stabilization in inner 
suburbs, and to better design revitalization programs for destabilized communities require 
 
528 See US Census Current Population Reports Population Estimates and Projections: P25-1141; Colby, S. L., 
and J. M. Ortman. (2014). “The Baby Boom Cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060.” Issued May 2014; 
and FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports. Note: The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program is produced from 
data received from law enforcement agencies voluntarily participating in the program. 
529 According to Eisen, L. B. “America's Faulty Perception of Crime Rates: America's crime rates are at their 





research which contextualizes post-fair housing era municipal-level stabilization with the 
unprecedented pre-fair housing era surge in population and violent crime. 
Best Practice vs. Citizen Preference 
Conventional wisdom posits cities benefit from having civically engaged citizenry. 
Studies indicate citizens play a critical role in determining what is best for the city. 
According to some scholarship, cities’ sustainability is connected to local governments’ 
level of responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and warns local government must “never 
forget that you always govern for people.” However, I found, for the sake of exhibiting 
local government responsiveness to citizen majorities, local government may elect poor 
policy over best practice to the detriment of the city.530 
Study cities with highly engaged citizenry were especially prone to citizen 
preference-based policymaking. This is traditionally encouraged and can be helpful for 
cities’ growth and fiscal health as engaged electorates can provide capacity building 
assistance and expertise by way of boards and other civic service activities. 
Notwithstanding, politically savvy, well-organized citizen groups may possess preferences 
which are contradictory to best practice. When personal perceptions are galvanized into 
group efforts, opposition to best practice policy can be effective. 
When discontent provokes mobilization, disparagement, and sabotage instead of 
problem solving, polarization and gridlock occur. Consequentially, either poor policy 
selection or stagnation is the result. I found the relationship between citizen preferences 
and municipal governances’ level of responsiveness to citizen preferences significantly 
impact the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization. I conclude, in 
 
530 See Sanchez-Teba, E. M., and G. J. Bermúdez-González. (2019). “Are Smart-City Projects Citizen-




cases in which municipal governance elected not to apply best practice stabilization policy, 
decisions were a result of dedicated adherence to the preferences of a citizen majority at 
the expense of best practice. 
University City was not the only inner suburb to anticipate that discriminatory 
housing practices like blockbusting, steering, and inequitable lending would accompany 
black suburbanization and; the suburb’s path to open housing was not without robust 
citizen opposition. However, the city was one the few suburbs to proactively prepare. 
Ferguson was also home to a substantial population of civically engaged citizens from 
which lawmakers could select for committee assignments, but whose conflicting views 
made policy making tantamount to an allegorical civil war over the issue of integration. 
By the mid-1980s, University City still enjoyed robust civic engagement while 
Ferguson began to experience a significant decline in civic engagement. Although 
University City’s citizen engagement had declined, the decline was much less notable than 
Ferguson’s. I posit, the significant decline in Ferguson’s civic engagement was due to the 
lack of economic mix in black in-migration as poorer black residents were less likely to 
vote, run for office, and incorporate politically. 
Future research should investigate civic engagement levels of early era, middle era, 
and contemporary black suburbanites and compare engagement levels and policy 
preferences with municipal governments’ policy choices. One goal of such research would 
be to see if eras reflect notable differences and if so, determine if and how these differences 
impacted local governments’ policymaking processes, decisions, and use of best practice 
policy. I hypothesize, black civic engagement and black voter preferences’ policy impact 
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Figure 4. Bellefontaine Neighbors Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.  
 







Figure 6. Hazelwood Percent Black Trajectory1970-2015.  
 
































Figure 10. Black population shifts            1970-2015     Figure 11. Black population shifts 























































Figure 15. University City’s black population trajectory 1970-1980. 




























Figure 21.              Ferguson 
 




Figure 23.     Jennings 
 












Figure 26.     Jennings 
 
 









Figure 28.     Jennings 
 









Figure 30.          University City 
 


































Figure 36.     Florissant 
 



















































Figure 43.     Hazelwood 
 
 
















































Appendix A. Consent Form 
Participant Consent: Interview for Research  
 
Dear, Community Stakeholder;  
 
My name is xxxx xxxx. I am a xxx at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. I am conducting 
research on the role of municipal governance in achieving and maintaining municipal-level 
stabilization in mature inner-ring suburbs. I am writing you to request your participation as 
an interviewee in my study. You will remain completely anonymous, but your insight may 
prove invaluable to the findings.   
 
This study is of great importance as inner-ring suburban communities are grappling with 
challenges historically believed to be reserved for disinvested portions of the inner-city. 
Suburban revitalization and stabilization require unique approaches to examining issues, 
identifying solutions, and implementing initiatives. Studies show that municipal 
governance can impact conditions in municipalities in a variety of ways. My goal is to 
better understand the relationship between the dynamic factors that impact municipal 
governance and the effects of municipal governance on municipal-level revitalization and 
stabilization of older inner-ring suburbs.  Moreover, I aim to strengthen community 
stakeholder capacity to achieve community stability by contributing information that 
expands our knowledge of policy-making effects on suburban transitions.    
 
Participation in this research is free and voluntary. You may withdraw from the interview 
at any time or refuse to answer any question. There is no risk of harm to participants. This 
study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board protocol number: 1096007-4. 
You may request a summary of the findings. You may also request to have any part of your 
submission eliminated from the study. All raw data will be destroyed at the end of the 
study.   
 
If you consent to participate, I will schedule a confidential interview to be conducted via 
the most convenient method for you (e.g. phone, video chat, in-person). With your consent, 
the interview may be audio taped. You will be assigned a number to maintain 
confidentiality. The information obtained in the interview will be coded for analysis and 
will be kept in a secure location. Only I and my faculty supervisor, xxxx xxxx will have 
access to the data. Every possible measure will be taken to ensure your anonymity. I invite 
you to be as blunt and candid as you wish to be. Your participation is greatly appreciated. 












I _______________________, agree to participate as an interviewee in the research of 
municipal governance in mature inner-ring suburbs conducted by xxxx xxxx, xxx at the 
University of Missouri-St, Louis. I understand the purpose of the study is to collect and 
analyze data related to experiences and conditions in St. Louis County municipalities to be 
formulated into policy and community stakeholder recommendations.  
 
I understand my participation is completely voluntary. I may withdraw from the interview 
at any time and I may refuse to answer any question without penalty. I understand that the 
interview may last one and one-half hour. I understand that the interview will be audio 
taped unless I request it not be. I understand that the recorded audio will be transcribed and 
stored in a secure location until the completion of the study, at which time the transcription 




xxxx – Political Science 





I have read the information above. I agree to participate as an interviewee in this research.  
Please, place an X in the spaces below that correspond with your preferences.      
 
I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to have my responses recorded to audio. 
 
I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to being quoted in the report.   
 
 
______________________________  __________________________ 
Participant signature     Date 
 
 
*This project has been reviewed and approved for human subjects research by the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis Institutional Review Board protocol number: 096007-4 
in accordance with the National Research Act (PL 93-348) implemented by Federal 
Regulations (45 CFR 46). Should you have any questions concerning your rights as a 
participant you can forward them to:  
 
Office of Research Administration 
341 Woods Hall 
One University Blvd. 
St. Louis, MO 63121 
(314) 516-5899 





Appendix B. Interview Questions 
 
Note: You are not expected to have insight into every topic. Open-ended questions will be 
asked based on relevancy and your connection to the municipality (e.g. resident, official, 




1. Tell me about yourself, your connection to the municipality.  
 
2. What were the municipality’s characteristics when you arrived (e.g. economics, racial, 
housing)? 
  
3. What characteristics changed, when did these occur, what do you think caused them, 
and how did the community respond? 
 
4. What is your impression of local government and civic engagement? 
 













Appendix C. Guiding Questions for Data Collection  
Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilizing Mature Inner Suburbs: 







Municipal Governance  
 
1.)  Policy Decisions: 
a. Did the municipality employ integration maintenance practices (i.e. 
point of sale inspections, forbidding For Sale signs, door-to-door 
solicitations, affirmative marketing to whites? 
b. Did the municipality pass a fair housing ordinance? 
c. Did the municipality rezone land to exclude rental housing?   
d. Did the municipality participate in federal affordable housing 
programs (i.e. CDBG, Section 8, LIHTC, etc.)?   
2.)  Policing and Code Enforcement: 
a. Did the municipality have its own police department, or did it contract 
out? 
b. Did the municipality have programs to specifically recruit black police 
officers?   
c. Did the municipality have any civilian review boards?  





e. Did the municipality out-source its code enforcement, share officers 
with other municipalities, or contract with the county? 
3.) Engagement, Support, and Timing:  
a.  Did the municipality engage residents, solicit resident input on issues, 
and include residents in decisions? 
b. Did the municipality appoint and hire black administrators and 
employees?  
c. Did the municipality establish, support, provide resources, and/or fund 
civic associations working to improve race relations? 
d. Did the municipality implement municipal-level stabilization strategies 
prior to exceeding 20 % black population?  
4.) Environmental and Infrastructure Investment: 
a. Did the municipality invest significant funds in mixed-use pedestrian 
friendly developments (i.e. parks, public spaces, recreation centers)? 
b. Did the municipality initiate, support, and/or fund land reutilization, 
beautification, and revitalization programs? 
5.) Financial Practices: 
a.  Did the municipality employ taxation-by-citation practices relying 
heavily on traffic fines and court fees to generate revenue? 
b. Did the municipality employ a professional CPA or contract with an 
accounting firm? 
c. Did the municipality participate in the county sales tax pool or did it 




d. Did the municipality apply for and secure grants (for training, 
equipment, etc.)?  




 1.)  Did a community-led stabilization effort occur? 
 
2.)  When and in what way did stabilization efforts begin? 
 
 3.)  What groups were involved in the stabilization movement? 
 
  a.  How was the group formed, structured, staffed, and funded?  
    
  b. What was the composition of the group (e.g. race, age, profession,  
residency)? 
 
  c. What was the group’s goal and what activities did the group engage in? 
 
  d. How did the group promote its efforts (e.g. brochure, media,  
newsletter)?  
 
  d. Did the group form coalitions and if so, with whom?  
 
  e.  What was the group’s impact on stabilization in the community?   
 
  f. Does the group still exist and if not, when and why did it dissolve? 
 
 
 
 
 
